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ABSTRACT

The politics of fear have deeply divided the United States of America. Decades of
propaganda portray Muslims as a terrorist threat to the dominant US culture and society. The
War on Terror and its consequences, including the rise of ISIL and the 2015 Syrian refugee
crisis, resulted in the destabilization of democracy in both the US and Europe. I argue that the
US public’s fear of terrorism is not just a fear of violence but instead reflects racial tensions and
anxieties in a rapidly changing world. These tensions and anxieties are fueled by media coverage
leveraging a general fear and distrust of non-white foreigners. The result of this is a pervasive
fear of violent victimization at the hands of minorities, shaped by mass media content, which
politicians capitalize on for their own gain. In this dissertation, I study the media effects of
agenda setting, framing, and reinforcing spirals on public fear of terrorism with data from the
Granite State Poll (GSP), Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP), and a content analysis of
broadcast news transcripts from NexisUni. I expand on current research by examining the fear of
terrorism from the perspectives of criminological theory, critical media studies, and racial
formation theory.

Keywords: Terrorism, Fear, Mass Media, Politics, Immigration, Race, Islam

Word count: 64,629 (inclusive)
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

Today the United States of America stands deeply divided. Arguably the social and
political divisions seen in 2020 are the deepest that they have been since the US Civil War.
While many factors have contributed to the current social-political climate the War on Terror,
started in 2001 in response to the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon,
was the catalyst for a long series of events which has resulted in the destabilization of democracy
in both the US and Europe. The War on Terror not only prompted multiple wars and
fundamentally changed American life, but also stoked racial tensions and revived age-old
xenophobic tendencies in American culture.

In this dissertation, I argue that fear of terrorism is not simply a response to the threat of
violence, but a reflection of racial, cultural, and other identity-based tensions and anxieties felt
by traditionally powerful groups in the US (i.e. whites, men, Christians, etc.) who are facing a
globalized world and a rapidly diversifying society which threatens their perceived status, power,
and social domination. These anxieties are in large part the result of global structural changes
occurring as a result of the forces of Globalization and the Digital Revolution and are frequently
misattributed as a foreign or non-white threat to a traditional culture and way of life. Rather than
emphasizing the real, measurable economic changes which have occurred in the US and other
wealthy nations, some populist politicians have seized on these cultural anxieties and
campaigned on issues of identity and belonging. The result is a populist narrative that blames
perceived social problems on foreigners, whether it be Latin American immigrants, Muslims, or
China, ignoring powerful domestic actors who hold more responsibility.
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The ubiquity of mass media in the digital age stokes these anxieties to the benefit of elites
who seek to expand their power and wealth. Mass media decides what is newsworthy and shapes
how individuals view issues that society faces (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Entman 1993;
McCombs and Shaw 1993; Glassner 2009; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Woods 2007, 2011).
Members of the US public selectively consume propaganda which not only reinforces their
beliefs but can also push them towards extremes (Slater 2007, 2015). In the case of this
dissertation, I pay attention to two decades of propaganda disseminated through US news outlets
portraying Muslims as a terrorist threat to US culture and society. The result of this is a fear of
violent victimization at the hands of non-White foreigners, specifically “Muslims” and other
minority groups, shaped by mass media content, which politicians capitalize on for their own
gain. Popular narratives about Muslims and the terrorist threat directly contributed to the election
of Donald Trump to the Presidency in 2016 and the UK’s decision to leave the European Union.
Both campaigns saw unprecedented distribution of misinformation in digital media (McCombie
et al 2020), heated rhetoric about immigrants and refugees (Debarael et al 2019; Washington
Report on International Affairs 2015), and revived the politics of fear (Altheide 2006, 2017) by
invoking the threat of terrorism by the Islamic State group (Albertson and Gadarian 2016;
Brogan et al 2020). Discussions of issues of immigration, refugees, and terrorism frequently
involve racialized language.

Race and ethnicity have long been used as a means of dividing people in the US (Feagin
2007, 2013, 2015; Omi and Winant 2015). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks,
political leaders seized on the public’s fear to build support for the wars in the Middle East,
expansion of surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the creation
of a robust drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US public’s
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historical xenophobic tendencies, now focused on people of Middle Eastern, North African, and
Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of anti-Muslim sentiment in
the US which developed out of this period, encouraged by political leaders and media outlets,
culminated in the 2016 Presidential race in which Donald Trump famously called for a ban on
Muslims entering the US. The present dissertation argues that public fear of terrorism is a proxy
measure for racial and other identity-based anxieties and one of many perceived threats to the
dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This is fueled by nearly two
decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a foreign, Arab, Muslim
threat to the US homeland and way of life.

Specifically, I argue that members of the public develop and reinforce their perceptions
of terrorism by consuming mass media and interacting with political parties, that fear of
terrorism in the US is shaped by media coverage and attention from political elites as much as it
is influenced by actual terrorist attacks, and that the content of news coverage of mass violence is
racially biased, focusing on violence perpetrated by Muslims. I employ a mixed-methods design
to address my research objectives, drawing on New Hampshire survey data, publicly available
national polls, and broadcast news media stories about suspected terrorists and the propaganda
efforts employed to capitalize on this fear.

My dissertation research points to politics and mass media as the primary social
institutions which shapes the public’s perception about issues such as terrorism. Mass media
does this by setting agendas and deciding what is newsworthy, by framing events and providing
the language and imagery used to understand what is happening in society, and increasingly by
reinforcing previously existing beliefs through selective media exposure. Media effects, and
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specifically the promotion of the fear of Muslims as a terrorist threat to Americans, have far
reaching consequences in how the behavior of institutions and individuals have been shaped over
the past 20 years. This includes the US wars in the Middle East, erosion of civil liberties
domestically, and the decline of Western democracy. I also refute the notion that economic
insecurity is the primary cause of support for anti-immigrant and anti-minority policies, instead
asserting that support for these policies is primarily motivated by a perceived status threat. This
position is supported by other recent scholarship (see Mutz 2018).

The current research also examines power: the power of media and elites to shape
conversations, to construct enemies, and to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. I
conceptualize a model of power articulated by C. Wright Mills in The Power Elite (1956). Mills
viewed power as being held by a class of people in the separate spheres of government, the
military, and big business. While the goals of these spheres do not always align, they frequently
do. More than this, membership in these spheres is not mutually exclusive, with a great degree of
overlap. Similarly, the relationship between societal elites and mass media is not one of
domination, but of separate but of shared goals. Neither societal elites nor mass media are having
necessarily more power to influence the public than the others. The driving force of public
opinion depends on a particular social context, i.e. in some situations politicians may be pushing
their narratives, while in others media owners (who are also societal elites) may have more
control. Beyond this, media legitimates power and the dominant social structures which support
those in power.
In chapter 2, I use data from Gallup’s Most Important Problem poll, and compare it with
data from the Global Terrorism Database on terrorist attacks in the US, news media coverage
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data from Lexis Nexis, and presidential addresses from the American Presidency Project. I
examine the trends in these data sources using a qualitative time series approach to give context
to the long-term national trends in the US public’s worry about terrorism as the most important
problem facing the nation. This allows me to look at the long-term effect of media and political
attention to terrorism on the public’s perceptions, while also accounting for terrorist violence that
is occurring. In this chapter, I find that a larger share of the US public identify terrorism as the
most important problem facing the US when mass media and political elites are devoting more
attention to terrorism as a topic, regardless of the number of terrorist events which recently
occurred in the US or the number of individuals killed or wounded in terrorist attacks in the US.
I also find that economic insecurity factors, i.e. unemployment rates, are negatively associated
with perceptions of terrorism as a social problem. Additionally, my analysis points to two key
time periods which shaped discussions and perceptions of terrorism: the September 11, 2001
attacks, and the ISIL-related attacks in Europe and North America in 2015 and 2016. While
previous work such as David Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017)
investigated the fear of terrorism in the years following 9/11, I seek to add to a new body of
research into the social and political dynamics of the politics of fear leading up to and following
the 2016 election.

Then, in Chapter 3, I examine the content of news stories about suspected terrorists, by
collecting data on the characteristics of terrorist attacks in the US and their suspected
perpetrators, as available from the Global Terrorism Database. I then collect broadcast news
transcripts through NexisUni by searching the suspects’ names and performing a quantitative
content analysis approach. I hypothesize that suspected perpetrators of terrorist attacks, as
defined by the GTD, who are Middle-Eastern/North African in origin, associated with radical
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Islam, and foreign born are more likely to be called a terrorist by news media, even controlling
for other characteristics of the attack. Tests using multi-level logistic regression techniques
reveal that individuals associated with “radical Islam” are most likely to be framed as terrorists
for the same behavior as non-Muslims. This demonstrates that the race/ethnicity/religion of the
suspected terrorist is a key factor in how the public understands terrorism, rather than the
violence itself.
Following this, in Chapter 4 I address the public’s fear of a terrorist attack compared with
the public’s fear of a mass shooting in the Granite State Poll. These intersecting types of mass
violence have occupied much news airtime and political debate in recent years. I find that
selective exposure to partisan mass media sources is associated with what respondents are more
worried about. Listeners to New Hampshire Public Radio (NHPR) reported being more fearful of
a mass shooting and listeners to Conservative Talk Radio (CTR) reported being more fearful of a
terrorist attack, even when controlling for background characteristics and prior political beliefs.
Additionally, respondents who watch WMUR non-partisan local TV news more frequently
report being wore fearful of a mass shooting, but not a terrorist attack. If the public is simply
worried about the violence of these events, then there should not be a statistically significant
difference between reported fear/worry about a terrorist attack and reported fear/worry about a
mass shooting. The differences which exist along political lines and are amplified by selective
exposure to partisan mass media demonstrate that violence is not the only criterion by which
individuals are estimating their risk of victimization, rather that fear is shaped also by
interactions with social institutions, and suggests that the framing of violence as a “Terrorist
Attack” or a “Mass Shooting” evokes distinct meanings, images, and threats to respondents.
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Taken together, the above data sets and analyses aim to link the fear of terrorism among
individuals in the public more directly to the propaganda and institutional biases which have
used and exacerbated these xenophobic tendencies in American society. Racial tensions have
been a fact of American life since the founding of the nation, and newer immigrant groups often
bear the brunt of hostility from the dominant majority. In the case of US Muslims, I do not find
support for the popular hypothesis that economic insecurity is motivating racist sentiments and
policies. Instead I, along with Mutz (2018), assert that anti-Muslim and anti-Immigrant sentiment
and policies that propelled Trump’s 2016 campaign represent a perceived status threat to
dominant American culture posed by non-white foreigners. This threat has been leveraged and
exacerbated by powerful social actors seeking to enrich and benefit themselves rather than
address the underlying inequalities in US society.

Background

Knowledge is constantly developed through a process of social interactions between
individuals and institutions, commonly known as “the social construction of reality” (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966). In the study of social behaviors such as crime and terrorism, this perspective
aids our evaluations by emphasizing that: (1) any given issue has connected to it socially
developed meaning (e.g. Islamic radical terrorists are a national security threat); (2) said
meanings are constructed and reinforced in social interactions (e.g. news media portrayals of
terrorism), and (3) these understandings assist in socially defining said issue as a “problem” in
need of resolution (i.e. Islamic radical terrorism is a problem that threatens our way of life and
must be addressed).
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Mainstream criminology recognizes terrorism as a socially constructed concept and not a
categorically objective act (see Turk 2004). With that in mind, I do not intend to explicitly or
definitively characterize what terrorism is or isn’t in the content of this dissertation, a debate
which is not likely to be settled easily. Instead, my focus is on how the general public reacts
when terrorism is portrayed as a problem facing society, how suspected perpetrators of mass
violence are portrayed as terrorists (or not) in US news media, and how selective news media
exposure enhances individual beliefs about the risk of mass violence victimization. In short, this
project is about the demonstrating that the effects of the “terrorism” label – including the
messages surrounding the nature of the terrorist threat who is portrayed as a “terrorist” – is
largely responsible for the public’s views about terrorism, and by extension Muslims, rather than
the actual violence.

The rest of this chapter provides an overview of key concepts and findings which are
utilized throughout this dissertation research project. These include sociological approaches to
the study of terrorism, literature on the fear of crime and fear of terrorism, literature on media
effects, terrorism and the politics of fear, and the social construction of race. All of these are used
to integrate the theoretical and empirical approaches of traditional sociological criminology,
critical media analysis, and the racial formation perspective in examining the causes and
consequences of the fear of terrorism in modern American society.

Defining and Studying Terrorism

From bombs in downtown Belfast, to the arson burning of ski resorts, to coordinated
attacks in Paris and Brussels, terrorist violence has become a reality of life in the modern world.
Despite the relatively low prevalence of terrorist type violence in the United States (see FBI
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2005; LaFree et al 2009), following the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism emerged as the
chief national security concern in the US and the world. How do we make sense of these
seemingly random acts of violence? Terrorism has been referred to as the “conflict of our time”,
and a form of violence which is increasing in prominence in the 21st century, while also rooted in
history and social context (Black 2004; Smelser 2007; Turk 2004).

Currently, the study of terrorism is constrained by a lack of definitional consistency about
what constitutes a terrorist act and a terrorist group with some scholars arguing for some
consistency in criteria, others using ideal-types of terrorism, and others still arguing that these
debates are ultimately unfruitful (see Black 2004; Phillips 2015; Schinkel 2009; Smelser 2007;
Turk 2004). The labelling of terrorism and terrorists is a highly politicized process in which
institutions and individuals subjectively interpret events involving power dynamics, political
agendas, and stereotyping of violence (ibid.). This has posed difficulties for researchers seeking
to unravel the causes and consequences of terrorist violence and the mechanisms through which
terrorism occurs. Practical issues aside, the inconsistencies and politicization of terrorist labelling
speaks to the socially constructed nature of the problem.

As such, classifying an act as terrorism is highly dependent on contextual factors (Turk
2004). Though there is no one universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, most definitions
agree on a basic concept. Terrorism is commonly classified as “violence or the threat of violence
against persons or property to intimidate a government or civilian population in pursuit of a
political, social, economic, or religious goal” (see FBI 2005). Additionally, terrorist violence
frequently targets civilians outside the context of legitimate warfare and is intended to convey a
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message and inspire fear in a group larger than the immediate victims (Black 2004; Rosenfeld
2004; Schinkel 2009; Turk 2004).

Because of the fluid nature of this definition, incidents of terrorism often overlap with
hate crimes, organized crime, insurgencies, and other related behaviors. Moreover, perpetrators
of terrorist-type violence often do not self-identify as terrorists. Instead, the label of “terrorist” is
typically applied to individuals and groups after the fact (Turk 2004). Acknowledging that
defining terrorism is difficult and that violence is socially constructed, sociological research has
made progress in understanding the problem.

In this dissertation, I rely on data from The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and
consequently, adopt their definitions and standards of terrorism. The GTD is a popular opensource database used by academics and policy researchers alike (Sandler 2011). The GTD
defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or
intimidation” (START 2019). Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the act
must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons or
property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors1. In addition, the GTD includes three
criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the strictness of their
definitions:

1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal.

1

For more information, see the Global Terrorism Database Codebook at
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf
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2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to
a larger audience than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

Like traditional crimes and other conflict behaviors, terrorism is a fundamentally
sociological phenomenon. Terrorism is inherently a social interaction, involving multiple actors
(perpetrators, victims, and audience) and a threat or act of violence carried out in pursuit of a
goal beyond the immediate targets. Terrorist violence can be understood sociologically above
and beyond the individual motivations and dispositions of the actors involved, embedded in
social structure, and social/historical context. This is not to say that individuals do not matter in
the sociological research on terrorism, rather that the role of the individual is conditioned by
social reality.

The causes and consequences of terrorism are inherently situated in the social and
historical context in which terrorist events occur (Smelser 2007). In 2001, President George W.
Bush declared a “war on terror” after the September 11th attacks. After the “war on crime” and
“war on drugs”, the “war on terror” constitutes the third time that US politicians have ‘declared
war’ on criminal behaviors since the mid-20th Century. This time the “war” is on a global scale,
and was subsequently used to justify numerous policy, law, and social agendas including the
USA Patriot Act and military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by US and coalition forces
(LaFree 2009). Certainly, the creation of the war on terror was not arbitrary or whimsical, but a
calculated response to the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the perceived risk of future attacks
against the United States (ibid.). This illustrates that both the causes and consequences of
terrorism are rooted in social conditions.
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Emile Durkheim (1898) asserts that sociology is the empirical study of social facts – that
is to say manners of acting, thinking, and feeling that are shaped by social forces external to the
individual, which exert influence over members of a society and constrain behaviors within
society. This approach has been the dominant way of doing sociology and criminology in North
America, with over 60 percent of research conducted using quantitative, positivist approaches
which compare trends between discrete groups, relying on a priori assumptions (LaFree and
Freilich 2012). This approach has largely been adopted in the study of terrorism as well, as
researchers apply statistical techniques used in the study of traditional crime (ibid).

Conversely, Weber (1945) defines sociology as a science concerned with the interpretive
understanding of social action, or behaviors of individuals which influence or are influenced by
other actors and social situations. This line of thought assumes a complexity of explanations to
any given social phenomenon, from which it has been argued that terrorism can be understood
not merely as a single behavior with a single cause, but a type of action which arises as the result
of the convergence of certain historical and social conditions (Smelser 2007). Some social
theorists have also asserted that terrorism in its ideal type, another concept originated by Weber,
is a form of collective violence which arises out of a specific set of social and structural
conditions, where social and cultural distances are great, but technological advancements have
closed the physical distances which made terrorist violence historically less likely (Black 2004).
For example, the September 11th attacks against the World Trade Center and Pentagon are
perhaps as close to this concept of terrorism as any, where civilians from one society attack
civilians from a distinct society on the other side of the world using advanced modern
technology (ibid).
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Concepts from sociology have been used in theorizing terrorism by researchers in several
disciplines (Turk 2004), typically relying on theories of collective action (Smelser 2007). Other
researchers have suggested that theories of crime and deviance can be usefully leveraged to
illuminate the causes of terrorism (LaFree and Dugan 2004; Rosenfeld 2004). LaFree and Dugan
(2004) argue that although there is a set of conceptual similarities between terrorism and crime,
the presence of key differences is an obstacle to the direct application of criminological theory to
terrorism. For instance, terrorism is not a specific crime that exists within the criminal statutes of
many countries and therefore terrorists are typically prosecuted for the multiple crimes such as
murder, arson, kidnapping or extortion that constitute their terrorist act (ibid.). Additionally,
unlike common crimes, definitions of terrorism typically conceptualize terrorism as a means to
broader political and social ends (ibid.).

Like other crimes, incidents of terrorism, perpetrators, and methods of terror are not
equally distributed across societies. Rather, terrorism varies greatly from place to place, across
time, and is embedded in the particular social/historical context (Black 2004; LaFree et al 2009;
Phillips 2015; Rosenfeld 2004; Schinkel 2009; Turk 2004). The patterning of terrorism across
time and space speaks not only to the social construction of terrorist violence but to the social,
not individual, nature of terrorism which occurs as a result of social-structural conditions. For
example, incidents of terrorism appear to cluster in places where political oppression and
exclusion fall along social group divides, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as in
conflicts in which means and power are asymmetrically distributed (ibid).

Terrorism also tends to occur in waves, in response to conflict cycles, and largely occurs
around political and social conflicts which may involve other forms of collective action and
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violence including protest, state repression, war, and insurgency (Schinkel 2009). Further,
terrorist groups are constrained by social and situational conditions, typically attacking targets
close to their operational base. This holds true even for high-profile groups such as Al Qaeda, for
whom the overwhelming majority attacks occur against local, more immediate targets, and
appear to be motivated more by local and regional grievances rather than by anti-Western
ideologies as is popularly believed (LaFree et al 2009). Additionally, terrorists and terrorist
groups may move in and out of terrorist behavior as situational factors change, switching to or
from insurgent tactics to terrorist tactics, and escalating or desisting terrorism campaigns
(Moghadam 2009).

The lens of sociological theory and methods can be easily and effectively applied to the
study of terrorism. Terrorism is socially constructed. It is not an absolute but defined by
institutional forces and interpreted by individuals and groups (Turk 2004). Terrorism is also
patterned behavior, not random or the result of individual psychological factors. Understanding
terrorism as a sociological phenomenon requires linking contemporary events to core
sociological thought, such as Durkheim’s concern with manners of acting, thinking, and feeling
external to the individual, and Weber’s interpretive understanding of social action (Smelser
2007). From this, terrorism is the result of structural conditions, social and historical contexts,
and cannot be explained simply by individual dispositions or motivations. Sociologists consider
the broader social patterns underlying terrorist violence rather than individual motivations or
dispositions (Black 2004; Rosenfeld 2004).
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Fear of Crime and Fear of Terrorism in Criminology
Individuals’ perceived vulnerabilities due to gender, age, or race, have typically been
shown to influence fear of crime victimization (see Henson and Reyns 2015 for a review), and
likely influence fear of terrorism as well. However, terrorism is unique because victims are often
chosen randomly and rarely know the perpetrator, it involves broader political, social, religious
goals (other than personal gain), its rare occurrence, and the intent to cause fear beyond
immediate victims (Turk 2004). The media is a key element to understanding not only how the
“problem” of terrorism is being portrayed, but also where our biases lie as a society.
Additionally, I argue, as other scholars have before, that media and political institutions are key
to shaping perceptions of threat and that creative use of language and metaphors by political
elites shapes the way other social institutions view terrorism (Altheide 2006, 2009; Shoon,
Meltzer, and Reese 2008; LaFree 2009).

Like the fear of crime, fear of terrorism can be understood on multiple levels of analysis
such as perceived risk of victimization to the individual, perceived risk to the community, and
even perceived risk to society as a whole. For some time, criminologists sought to explain the
heightened fear of crime in the US, which has endured into recent years despite significant
decreases in actual crime rates. Some scholars (Glassner 2009) have attributed this to increased
media exposure of crime and continued attention to crime as a social problem by US political
elites. Others have examined the fear of crime and perception of victimization risk among
individuals. This literature has generally found that certain social characteristics such as age,
race/ethnicity, and gender significantly influence these perceptions (see Henson and Reyns
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2015), with older individuals and women most consistently reporting greater fear of crime
victimization.

Theories regarding fear of crime have attributed these findings to respondents’ perceived
vulnerability and decreased ability to resist crime victimization, and fear of specific types of
victimization, particularly fear of sexual assault among women which is reflected in a general
fear of crime (ibid.). The theoretical mechanisms by which individuals perceive their
vulnerability likely influences fear of terrorism, though the specific individual factors which
influence these perceptions are likely different from the general fear of crime. For instance, it is
illogical to presume that an individual’s fear of sexual assault would translate to a heightened
fear of terrorism. Other factors, such as exposure to terrorism in news media and proximity to
potential targets has been shown to influence perceptions of terrorism risk (Nellis and Savage
2012; Woods et al 2008).

Fear of terrorism can also be conceptualized as an issue of risk management similar to
other national and global security issues (e.g. nuclear proliferation, climate change). Ulrich
Beck’s Risk Society thesis (1992) posits that modern societies have produced a great number of
risks, many of which exist as the result of the material reality of modernity such as the negative
effects of industrialization. As a result, society has become preoccupied with these risks and the
strategic management of these risks, many of which are attributed to human activity. Sociologists
have used these ideas to help explain why, in a world with seemingly infinite risks, some are
given more attention than others. This approach has been embraced by environmental
sociologists, where the bulk of risk society scholarship lies, and has influenced terrorism
researchers as well, though to an admittedly lesser extent. Any analysis of fear of terrorism
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should take Risk Society into account, particularly when exploring how this fear is portrayed by
media and politicians and interpreted by the public. Previous research has suggested that societal
levels of risk perception are heavily influenced by societal elites, particularly those in the media
(Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007;
Woods and Arthur 2014).

Studying Media Effects

The study of media effects on society and individuals has covered a wide range of topics
including warfare, vaccines and other medical interventions, politics, climate change,
immigration, crime, and terrorism to name a few. In this dissertation, I draw primarily on the
traditions of critical media studies, a field of study dating back to the Frankfurt school in the
early 20th Century (see Horkheimer and Adorno 1944). This field of scholarship examines our
relationships to and interaction with indirect sources of information, or media, and how media
serves to benefit powerful groups in society and reproduce systems of social inequality. Hermann
and Chomsky (1988) more recently articulated a propaganda model of news media. David
Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017) then takes us to the current day,
examining how public fears are created and leveraged by social elites in mass media and politics
to pursue political office, policy agendas, and make profits. Media effects have been shown to
operate in three primary ways: 1. Agenda setting; 2. Framing events; and 3. Reinforcing spirals.

1. Agenda Setting

Mass media decides what is newsworthy and promotes certain topics as deserving of the
public’s attention over others. This is known as Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993), a

18

theory which asserts that mass media drives large-scale trends in public opinions, attitudes, and
beliefs. As an example, FOX News is a very influential media source for many Americans. If
FOX News devotes a great deal of attention to illegal immigration, then according to Agenda
Setting Theories, FOX News viewers are more likely to be concerned about illegal immigration
than other potential issues.

2. Framing Events

Broadly speaking, Framing refers to the use of words, phrases, and imagery to describe
and portray events to the public in a certain way. Consider the use of terms such as “illegal
immigration” compared to “undocumented immigration”. The former is often accompanied with
imagery of the southern US border and typically discussed in terms of illegal border crossings. It
evokes a law enforcement narrative of how to deal with the issue as well, painting all illegal
immigrants as criminals. The latter is a more sympathetic phrase used to describe migrants,
discussed in terms of problems in the US immigration system. In fact, most undocumented
immigrants entered the US legally and simply overstayed their visas (Warren 2019). Each of
these phrases refers to the same sets of behavior, however the language, imagery, and ideas
surrounding these phrases suggests different ways to view the phenomenon. By framing a topic
in a certain way, using particular words, phrases, and images, mass media contributes to how the
public perceives issues.

Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars, and consequently one of the
most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman (1993) described framing as a
“fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into detail to define what ‘frames’ and
‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood concepts (Entman 1993), others
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interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are explicitly defined. Some researchers
see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse (Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize
frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999), and further still, framing can refer to
the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the exact definition of framing varies
across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently used by political elites and media
sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Herman
and Chomsky 1988). In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to
persuade and gain support for social and political objectives (Altheide 2006, 1009, 2017;
Herman and Chomsky 1988). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life,
particularly regarding terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage.

3. Reinforcing Spirals
Recently, social scientists have turned their attention to the role of selected media exposure –
i.e. choosing partisan news sources such as FOX News or MSNBC. The Reinforcing Spirals
Model (Slater 2007, 2015) articulates how attitudes and beliefs are largely responsible for media
choices, and also contribute to the development and maintenance of identities, attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviors in a reciprocal fashion. Essentially, this model does not propose a strict cause and
effect of attitudes/beliefs/behaviors, and media exposure/media effects, rather it argues that these
tend to reinforce each other.

The Structure of Mass Media and Society

In the information age, mass media is more influential and more easily manipulated than
ever before. The collection and dissemination of information through mass media outlets is used
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to exert social influence and persuade people to behave in certain ways. While this is not a
fundamentally new process, the scale of daily data collection and dissemination, and ubiquity of
mass media exposure in modern, digitally connected societies is astounding. The average person
is also no longer simply a consumer of mass media, but an active participant in mass media and
even a producer of content. As scholars and as citizens, we have only begun to understand the
effects of constant interconnectivity and bombardment of media messages on societies and
individuals. Information has become both the most valuable commodity to the largest businesses
– think Google, Facebook, and Amazon – but has also been weaponized by actors seeking to sew
discord, spreading misleading or outright false information through the veneer of authenticity
provided by mass media platforms (McCombie, Uhlmann, and Morrison 2020).

Businesses, politicians, and governments using mass media to influence populations and
spread potentially false or misleading information is not a new phenomenon. In many ways, the
current political climate is rehashing decades old battles, and tech giants are primarily concerned
with making profits, as any other business is. What is new is the structure of mass media, the
scale and presence of digital media, and how individuals interact with mass media as an
institution. At the dawn of internet age, hopeful tech entrepreneurs talked about an era of
unprecedented understanding, empathy, and peace facilitated by instantaneous communication
between anyone around the world who had an internet connection (Morozov 2012). At the very
least, it was hypothesized that if a large portion of the population had access to the breadth of
human knowledge and experience through the internet that society would become more
informed, individuals would consider a wider range of sources and perspectives, and that critical
evaluation of the information that we receive would become the norm (ibid.). It was even posited
by the most hopeful that the internet, by providing free access to information, could defeat
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authoritarianism around the world and usher in a new era of freedom. Instead, the opposite has
occurred (ibid.).

Media consumers did not embrace a broader range of opinions when given access to the
wealth of human knowledge. Nor did they become more educated about issues that they and
society face. In fact, many social scientists have documented an effect where individuals seek out
news sources that support and confirm their previously held beliefs, while rejecting those that
challenge their beliefs. The channels of information on the internet have become more restrictive
rather than more open. This has been mirrored in traditional news media with the growth of
partisan news outlets. Outlets such as FOX News, owned by billionaire Rupert Murdoch’s News
Corp., and conservative talk radio shows hosted by controversial figures such as Rush Limbaugh
and Sean Hannity, are little more than propaganda machines (Conway, Grabe and Grieves 2004).
In 2020, even these traditional news media sources contribute to the spread of biased or outright
false information.

Over the past thirty years, while a wealth of media sources permeates the average
consumer’s landscape, they are controlled by relatively few entities. In the United States alone,
ninety percent of television and film media is currently controlled by only six companies,
compared with over thirty companies in the 1980’s (Lutz 2012). This enormous shift in
homogenization is due to changes in the structure and laws of mass media which began in
earnest following telecom deregulation in the 1990’s (McCabe 2016). The subsequent decades of
mergers and acquisitions by the largest mass media companies have led to a news and
entertainment media landscape that is increasingly dominated by a few points of view. Walt
Disney alone controlled an estimated 38% of all North American Box office earnings in 2019

22

(Coyle 2019). In other words, while we have expanded the number of media outlets that can
meet anybody’s preconceived notions, we have also simultaneously concentrated ownership of
mass media into fewer hands and moved toward a less publicly-oriented model of news media
production and consumption.

Digital media, on the other hand, has been controlled by a few giant corporations for
most of its’ history. Despite the openness and freedom of the internet, companies such as
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter control a disproportionate amount of
information that the average internet user encounters on a daily basis. These websites exert a
great deal of control over the content that appears in people’s news feeds and search results, and
at the same time offer little in the way of verification of information or fact checking. Ironically,
although these companies have demonstrated repeatedly that they are capable of censoring
content, they have facilitated the spread of false information, and in some cases, been complicit
in its dissemination (Iosifidis and Nicoli 2020). This came to a head during the 2016 election
cycle and gave rise to the “fake news” moniker (Moretto Ribeiro and Ortellado 2018; Tandoc,
Jenkins, and Craft 2019). All the while, internet users’ information is constantly collected by
both private and government entities (Bauman et al 2014; Munro 2018).

In addition, nefarious actors have used the internet for personal gain at the expense of
others, eroded the democratic institutions and rule of law in the US, propped up authoritarian
regimes, and covered up crimes against humanity. A few examples of this include the election of
Donald Trump to the US Presidency, mass surveillance conducted by US intelligence agencies
under the veneer of counterterrorism, actions taken by authoritarian states such as Russia and
Iran to suppress dissent and silence activists, and the genocide of minority groups in China and
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Myanmar. In addition, the spread of misinformation on the internet played a major role in the
rise of the terrorist group Islamic State, the 2016 Brexit campaign and subsequent weakening of
the EU, the 2016 election of President Trump and his subsequently disastrous policies at home
and abroad, the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, ascension of far-right parties and emboldening
of neo-Nazis/white supremacists in both Europe and North America, the bolstering of
authoritarian-style leaders in theoretically democratic societies such as Viktor Orban in Hungary,
Erdogan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, and Trump in the United States, the weakening of the
NATO alliance, global inaction on the issues of catastrophic climate change, and the resurgence
of previously eliminated diseases such as measles in developed nations. Taken together, the
structure of modern mass media, and its exploitation by nefarious actors, has contributed to
nothing less than the undermining and collapse of Western Liberal Democracy and the post-Cold
War social order.

Terrorism and The Politics of Fear

Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, particularly regarding
terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. In his 2006/2017 book Terrorism and the
Politics of Fear, David Altheide documented the techniques and social processes by which
political elites and news media constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying
on the public’s perceptions about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy
measures such as the USA PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq
Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017). This is considered the definitive work examining the nexus of mass
media propaganda, political manipulation, and portrayals of terrorist violence.
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In framing and packaging terrorism as a social problem for the US public, the use of
fearful language or imagery has been used to persuade and gain support for social and political
objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Altheide 2006, 2009). For instance, David Altheide
(2006) found that post 9/11 media coverage of terrorism closely resembles earlier coverage of
crime. Both use fear of victimization and ethnocentric ideologies to reinforce ingroup-outgroup
hostilities and employ a process of “othering”. This process involves construction of an inferior
group by the dominant group through the establishment of symbolic boundaries and membership
(Schwalbe et al. 2000).

In the post-9/11 era, othering through discourses of fear and ethnocentrism have been
central to building support for the war on terror (Kam and Kinder 2007). Mass media, however,
is not the only social institution involved in the framing of terrorism and use of fear in social life.
Political leaders often shape and define the problem initially. Media then filters and further
interprets their statements and presents these re-constitutions to the public (Chomsky and
Herman 1988). Media has presented fear inducing messages from politicians to promote many
social, legal, and political agendas in the United States including the “War on Drugs” (Inciardi
and McElrath 2015) and the USA PATRIOT Act (Altheide 2006). In this manner, leaders of
social and political movements may invoke fear and construct moral panics which appeal to the
values and beliefs of dominant social groups while also drawing on the group’s anxieties (Shoon,
Meltzer, and Reese 2008).

The War on Terror has left its mark on the US and the world. Through ongoing wars in
the Middle East, changes in domestic law enforcement priorities, the reorganization of the US
national security apparatus, more restrictive and harsher immigration laws and policies, the
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erosion of civil liberties, resurgence of nationalist groups in US and Europe, increased hate crime
targeting of “Muslims”, Brexit and election of Donald Trump in 2016. While mass media has
devoted a great deal of attention to extremist violence over the past 20 years, other social issues
such as climate change, growing inequality, and public health issues may pose greater threat to
most Americans than terrorism. Yet news coverage of violence, particularly racially charged
violence, sells newspapers, and gets viewers to keep tuning in. When the public is fearful of an
issue such as terrorism, societal elites can, and do, take advantage of the public’s fear. Recently,
Donald Trump proposed a ban on travel from Middle Eastern countries and building a wall along
the southern US border to combat the perceived threat from non-white foreigners who are
presumably coming to commit violent crimes in the US.
Donald Trump’s “Muslim Ban” is not simply the action of one person, but a logical
extension of a worldview promoted by mass media which equates terrorists with foreign, Middle
Eastern, Muslims intent on striking the US homeland. The promotion of Muslims as a national
security threat, simply because of their ethnicity, nationality, and religion, is based in long
standing and systemic racism in the US. Biased media coverage constitutes a racial project which
defines the “Muslim” race as the enemy, emphasizes some threats while minimizing others, and
is tied to deeper issues of who belongs – who is American and who is not. It is no coincidence
that a resurgence of white nationalism followed the largest refugee crisis since the second world
war, which was portrayed as an invasion of Europe and North America by non-white Muslims.

The Terrorism Label: Framing Mass Violence

Terrorism, by most definitions, involves the use of violence to inspire feelings of fear or
dread in a population larger than the immediate victims (see Global Terrorism Database 2017;
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Turk 2004). Before the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism did not occupy the US public’s
attention for prolonged periods of time, nor was it considered the chief domestic and foreign
policy concern of the US. After the attacks, terrorism consistently occupied the list of top 10
problems facing the US (Woods 2007). Following 2015 attacks in Paris linked to the so-called
Islamic State group of Iraq and Syria (commonly referred to as ISIS) polls conducted by Gallup
in December 2015 (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015) found that in the US, forty seven percent of US
adults were worried about being a victim of a terrorist attack, close to the all-time high (Swift
2015). Additionally, trust in government to protect US citizens against terrorist attacks reached
an all-time low, with sixty seven percent of respondents believing that a terrorist attack on US
soil was likely, and only fifty five percent of respondents had confidence that the US government
could protect against future acts of terrorism (McCarthy 2015).

Empirical research and official statistics show that incidents of terrorism on US soil are
rare, typically committed by domestic actors rather than international, and only a minority of
such attacks are associated with Islamic radicals (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009). Anti-US
attacks by Islamic radical groups overwhelming occur against US interests abroad rather than on
US soil (ibid). Nevertheless, since the attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism has remained as
a top issue concerning the US public (Swift 2015; Woods 2007), members of the general public
report greater fear of terrorism victimization than other forms of mass violence (Swift 2015), and
Muslims in the west continue to be targets of retaliatory hate crimes (Byers and Jones 2007) 2.
One thing is clear, this is an enduring fear which does not fully represent the objective threat as
measured by academic research and official statistics.

2

For more information, visit the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics on Hate Crimes 1996-2016 at
https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-publications#Hate

27

Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in political
and media communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment
associates terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of
September 11, 2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell
2011; Woods 2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are
committed by internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately
two-thirds of all terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95
percent between 2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005).
The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied.
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the
modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time,
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response.
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Terrorism, like most crimes, is also stereotyped as a masculine behavior. Female
terrorists are portrayed as transgressing traditional gender boundaries (Berko, Erez, and Globakar
2010). In news media female terrorists are depicted as exceptional cases (Nacos 2005) and
portrayed as subverting their “natural” sexuality and role as mothers (Hamilton 2007). In short,
depictions of female terrorists are shaped by notions of masculinity and gendered understanding
of deviance which emphasize women as either passive participants or a rare exception (ibid), a
bias which has been seen in the academic research into the gender-terrorism relationship
(Jacques and Taylor 2008).

Mass media coverage promoting the fear of terrorism is known to have negative effects
both individuals and society (Altheide 2006; Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014;
Iglarsh 1987; Nellis and Savage 2012; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and Taylor 2008).
Many scholars assert that the risk of terrorism has been overstated in the U.S. by news media and
other societal elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; McCarthy 2015; Papacharissi and
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Swift 2015; Woods 2007, 2011). Since September 11,
2001, terrorism has been ranked in the top 10 of Gallup’s “Most Important Problems” national
survey (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015; Woods 2007).The effects of this heightened fear are not yet
fully understood, however existing research has found that negative effects include changes in
behavior, i.e. information seeking and avoidance (Nellis and Savage 2012), economic costs in
reduced travel (Iglarsh 1987), support for questionable policy agendas such as the Iraq war
(Altheide 2006; Wolfendale 2006), and a number of negative effects associated with increased
anxiety (Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and
Taylor 2008) including post-traumatic stress and negative coping strategies (ibid.). This study
may help identify who is most likely to experience these negative effects of terrorism on society,
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and under which conditions fear is able to proliferate through the U.S. public. Potentially,
findings could support targeted public policy efforts in the future.

Additionally, scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and
terrorists is harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg
2008). The stereotyping of Muslims in western media has also been used as a recruitment tool by
violent organizations such as ISIL/ISIS (Stern and Berger 2015). US political discourse have
demonized Muslims as a social problem (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008;
Norris et al 2003), promoting the image of Muslims as potential terrorists by describing terrorism
almost exclusively in relation to Islamic radicals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks, hate crimes directed against Arab- and Muslim-Americans, or those perceived to be, rose
dramatically. This change has been directly linked to the September 11th attacks by scholars
(Byers and Jones 2007).
Constructing “Muslims” as the Enemy

Understanding how the US political and media elites frame terrorism is pertinent when
radical groups such as ISIS, the so-called Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, are known to
recruit members using the argument that Western powers – particularly the US – demonize,
oppress, and alienate Muslims (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). A notable example of this
is then candidate Donald Trump’s response to ISIL/ISIS inspired attacks in 2015: calling for a
ban on all Muslims entering the US (Zurcher 2015). ISIL/ISIS is known to use media clips of US
politicians such as Donald Trump discussing ISIS, the Middle East, and Islam in recruitment and
propaganda materials (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). Theoretical and empirical research
has also shown that individuals who join radical organizations often experience feeling of
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alienation, isolation, and resentment towards a mainstream society which rejects and stigmatizes
them (Cottee 2011; Hamm 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Sageman 2004).
Omi and Winant’s Racial Formation Theory (1986, 1994, 2015) provides the basis of
analyzing the fear of terrorism and the framing of terrorism as “Muslim” violence as a racial
project. It is a long-established social fact that racism is embedded in US social institutions. This
bias is reflected in popular beliefs about crime and violence, and institutional behavior. This
dissertation research explores the fear of terrorism in US society through the lens of institutional
racism. While the September 11th attacks changed American’s awareness of terrorism, racialized
perceptions of crime and suspicion of foreigners have existed in the US for a long time. Fear of
terrorism then is in large part a measure of racial tension in the US. Fear of terrorism is also a
surrogate for fear, distrust, and animosity that that Americans have about foreigners, particularly
non-white foreigners, beyond any objective risks posed by terrorist attacks. The perceptions that
the US public have about terrorism are shaped by both pre-existing beliefs about non-white
foreigners (on a social-psychological level) and by social institutions (on a macro-level), namely
mass media and political leadership. Additionally, Racial Threat Theory (Blalock 1967) suggests
that minority groups pose a threat to the majority when they increase in size and compete for
political power and economic resources. The majority group uses various methods of social
control, both legitimate and illegitimate, to reinforce dominance over minority groups.

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, political leaders seized on the
public’s fear to build support for the continuing wars in the Middle East, expansion of
surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the creation of a robust
drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US public’s historical
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xenophobic tendencies, which was now attentive to people of Middle Eastern, North African,
and Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of anti-Muslim
sentiment in the US which developed out of this period, encouraged by political leaders and
media outlets, culminated in the 2016 Presidential race in which Donald Trump famously called
for a ban on Muslims entering the US. The present dissertation argues that public fear of
terrorism is a proxy measure for racial anxieties and one of many perceived threats to the
dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This is fueled by nearly two
decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a foreign, Arab, Muslim
threat to the US homeland and way of life.

Conflating race with religion and nationality has a long history in the US. I argue, as have
others, that Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature, rather than a primarily religious
discrimination (Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). This is
prominently on display in the changing U.S. Census categories. Over time, the US Census
denoted Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and other nationalities as distinct “races" and called "Hindu"
a race in 1920, 1930, and 1940, illustrating the muddled nature of our racial thinking (Pew
Research Center 2020). Islamophobia also plays on historical constructs of Orientalism similarly
to how Jews were portrayed in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and
Späti 2019). and Islamophobic attitudes are more prevalent in those who favor Right-Wing
Authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). Muslims are also viewed less favorably and deserving
of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and Modood 2009). Some
scholars have linked new racialization, such as Muslim racialization in the US and Europe, to
increases in the movement of population groups globally, which prompts reactions from
dominant social groups in destination countries to maintain status (Gans 2017).
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Similar arguments have been made in Samuel Huntington’s controversial book The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), which articulates an argument that in
the post-Cold War world is characterized by civilizations which share a common cultural
heritage rather than nations-states. Furthermore, according to his analysis, Western civilizations
(which includes primarily The United States and Europe) are declining in importance, influence,
and power. The future of global politics, as Huntington sees is, will be characterized by struggles
between the eight great civilizations, primarily focused on the conflicts between Western,
Islamic, and Sinic (Chinese) civilizations.

Perhaps the most prominent, and controversial, cultural argument within academic and
policy circles as well as the general public is the role of Islamic extremism in explaining
terrorism. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has almost exclusively been
associated with radical Islam in Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular opinion,
despite mainstream academic research showing a diversity in terrorist groups (Altheide 2006,
2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011). Nevertheless,
scholars have proposed that certain cultural forces – such as radical Islam - may make groups
more likely to engage in terrorist violence during a conflict.

Outline of the Following Chapters

The following chapters use three related datasets to examine the influence that media and
politics exert on public perceptions of terrorism and mass violence. I also address the social
construction of race, and the “Muslim” race more specifically. Table 1.1, below, provides an
outline of the questions, data, samples, methods, and measures in the following chapters.
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Table 1.1 Summary of Dissertation Research Questions, Data, Sample, Methods, and
Measures
Chapter
and Focus
II –Agenda
Setting

Research
Question
When is the
public most
worried
about
terrorism?

Data
Source
Gallup’s
Most
Important
Problem
(also GTD;
ProQuest;
APP; BLS)

Sample

Methods

Dependent
Variable
Percent of public
identifying
“terrorism” as the
MIP

240
Months

Descriptive
and
Correlational
Analyses

III –
Framing
Effects

Who is
labelled as
a terrorist?

NexusUni
(also GTD)

312
Transcripts
(clustered
around 57
incidents
with 65
suspects)

MixedEffects
Logistic
Regression
(Multi-Level
Modelling)

Use of the
“terrorism/
terrorist” frame
in broadcast news
transcripts

IV –
Reinforcing
Spirals

Who is
worried
about
terrorist
attack
compared
to a mass
shooting?

Fall 2017
Granite
State Poll

506 New
Hampshire
Adults

Survey
Weighted
Logistic
Regression

Reported fear of
a terrorist attack;
reported fear of a
mass shooting

Independent
Variables
Number of
terrorist events
and casualties;
number of
newspaper
articles and
Presidential
remarks about
“terrorism”;
unemployment
rate
Date of incident;
expert guest;
number killed in
incident; weapons
used; suspect
race/ethnicity;
suspect
birthplace;
suspect
ideology/religion
Sex; age; gun
ownership;
religious
attendance; vote
in 2016 election;
selective media
exposure

First, in Chapter 2, I examine public opinion data over time to assess how occurrence and
characteristics of terrorism events, media coverage, and other macro-level factors influence
changes in public perception of terrorism as a problem facing the US. I find that, at least in
bivariate analyses, public concern about terrorism is not related to occurrence of violence, but to
the amount of attention given to terrorism by news media and politicians. I then work to
deconstruct the terrorist frame/label by analyzing how suspected perpetrators of mass violence
are labelled as “terrorists” by the US news media. While the other data sets both found strong
evidence of media effects on public opinion, this dataset examines racial/ethnic biases in the
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content of news reporting on terrorism. I find that the “terrorist” label is applied based on a
suspect’s race/ethnicity, and/or religious/ideological affiliation, even when controlling for
characteristics of the attack such as weapons used and number of casualties. Finally, I analyze
the relationship between political beliefs and selective media exposure on members public
perceptions of their risk of mass violence victimization in a representative NH survey. I find that
controlling for sociodemographic factors, lifestyle factors, and prior political beliefs, individuals
who selectively consumer partisan media are more likely to report elevated levels of worry about
victimization in a terrorist attack compared to a mass shooting.

In the following chapters, examine a social issue which has become particularly salient in
the 21st Century: Terrorism. This is a risk which has been promoted as a grave threat by the
media and political elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007); threat that is feared by Americans
not because they are likely to experience it, but due to the foreignness of the perpetrators and the
extreme consequences of this violence (Black 2004; LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009; Woods
2011), a typology of violent behavior that is welded to specific groups and ideologies in our
minds following a galvanizing event (Nagar 2010; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Powell 2011),
and a phenomenon which has fundamentally altered the institutional structure of the United
States, if not the entire world, over the past 19 years (Altheide 2006, 2017; Kam and Kinder
2007; LaFree 2009; Woods and Arthur 2014). In short, this project examines the causes and
consequences of the fear of terrorism as a fear of “Muslims” in the United States. Specifically, I
focus on the fear of terrorism in the tumultuous social period in the US leading up to the 2016
Presidential election. I do so with three data sources and methods. These data sources are drawn
from national public opinion polls from Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP), broadcast
news transcripts from NexisUni and the Fall 2017 wave of the Granite State Poll (GSP). I expand
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on current research by examining the fear of terrorism from the intersecting perspectives of
criminological theory, critical media studies, and racial formation theory.

In terms of broader impact and policy implications, this research addresses the role of
mass media coverage on fear of terrorism, which is known to have negative effects to individuals
and society. Scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and terrorists is
both harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008),
and can be used as a recruitment tool by violent organizations such as ISIS (Stern and Berger
2015). I attempt to better understand how US news media portrayals of terrorism perpetuate bias
against Muslims, while suggesting how these depictions can be modified to increase security of
minority groups and counter extremist narratives.

In conclusion, this dissertation examines the fear of terrorism in the US as a reflection of
racial and other identity-based anxieties which is framed and communicated to the general public
via mass media and leveraged by politicians to achieve power. In modern society, there are many
risks, and terrorism is only one of them. In the case of the terrorism, the September 11, 2001
attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. constitute a galvanizing event which fundamentally
altered the perception of terrorism as a problem in the United States, both within US institutions
and individual perceptions. The subsequent media coverage and politicking around terrorism
amplified historic xenophobic attitudes in the US and contributed to the racialization of Muslims
as a group that poses an existential threat to the US way of life. This has had far reaching
consequences not only for the US, but the entire world, and contributed to the collapse of the
post-Cold War social order.
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CHAPTER II. MEDIA, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC OPINION OF
TERRORISM AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THE US

Since the events of September 11, 2001, terrorism has become a central discussion in US and
global politics. Members of the US public have reported heightened fear of terrorism following
these attacks, and concerns of terrorism as one of the top problems facing the United States have
endured well past the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon (Swift 2015; Woods
2007). Combatting these groups has been the primary justification for the US-led wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009).

The rise to prominence of the group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL to in 2014,
and attacks carried out by ISIL-trained groups in Europe and ISIL-inspired individuals in the US,
reignited public concerns of terrorist violence in the US. In combination with the refugee migrant
crisis in the Middle East and Europe precipitated by the escalation of the Syrian and Iraqi Civil
Wars, this culminated in then-candidate Donald Trump proposing a “total ban” on Muslims
entering the United State following the ISIL-Inspired San Bernardino, CA attack in December
2015, and the eventual signing of Executive Order 13769 in January 2017. Many scholars have
argued that the threat posed by terrorist groups to the US homeland is overstated, and that the
fear of terrorism has been intensified by continued attention from mass media and politicians
(Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; LaFree 2009; Woods 2007, 2010).

This chapter explores the agenda setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) role of mass media
and political elites by examining the relationship between mass media and political elite attention
to “Terrorism” as a topic, and the US public’s perception of Terrorism as a social problem facing
the US. Specifically, I hypothesize that increased coverage of and attention to “terrorism” by
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politicians and mass media will be associated with increased worry about terrorism as a problem
facing the US, even when accounting for actual terrorist violence. I do this with a mixed-method
analysis of Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey, the newspaper articles about “terrorism”
from Pro-Quest, and Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” from the American
Presidency Project. Additionally, I examine other factors which may influence public opinion
such as the number of terrorist attacks in the US, casualties resulting from terrorist attacks in the
US, and the unemployment rate. Finally, I explore specific events which coincide with “peaks”
in the trends of public worry about “Terrorism” as the Most Important Problem facing the US.

Politicians and mass media both play a central role in shaping the discussion surrounding
terrorism and influencing public opinion (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017; Woods 2007). In these
conversations, Islamic radical groups such as Al Qaeda have dominated the thoughts of
politicians and media narratives alike (Kunda 1999; Norris et al 2003; Papacharissi and Oliveira
2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011, 2014). Consequently, “radical Islam” and
“terrorism” have become practically interchangeable terms in the US discourse (ibid).
Combatting these groups has also been the primary justification for the US-led wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009).

Background

The relationship between the media, politics, and the public has been explored in many
different disciplines and perspectives. Three works have been particularly influential in critical
media studies and sociology: Edward Hermann and Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent:
The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), Barry Glassner’s The Culture of Fear: Why
Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things (2000, 2009), and David Altheide’s Terrorism and
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the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017). Taken together, these works assert that 1. Mass media is profitdriven and functions as propaganda and manipulates public opinion; 2. Politicians and mass
media incite fear by overstating risks and directing the public’s attention to particular topics; and
3. Politicians capitalize on fear to win office and pursue policy objectives. Altheide (2006, 2009)
examined this process in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, highlighting how the
fear of terrorism was instrumental in the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act and related
legislation, restructuring of the US federal government, the continuing occupation of
Afghanistan, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second edition of Terrorism and the Politics of
Fear (2017) also examines the emphasis on terrorism in the 2016 Presidential campaign, and
support for then-candidate Trump’s proposed ban on Muslim’s entering the US.

Additionally, terrorism has been increasingly tied to domestic law enforcement issues
(LaFree 2009) and immigration policy (Woods and Arthur 2014). And while Islamic radical
groups are portrayed as primarily having anti-US grievances, criminological research suggests
that they may have more significant local or regional grievances than those that they are
purported to have against the United States (LaFree Yang, and Crenshaw 2009; Stern 2009).
Moreover, most terrorist attacks occur in close geographical proximity to the operational base of
the group. This means that the overwhelming majority of attacks against US interests by groups
such as Al Qaeda occur abroad, not on US soil (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw 2009). Among
terrorist groups with alleged anti-US stances and grievances, only 3 percent of attacks carried out
actually targeted US interests (ibid).

Currently, through a variety of methods, the literature has established that after the
attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has been portrayed as the chief national security threat
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by US policymakers and media outlets (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and
Arthur 2014). Additionally, this body of literature has found that “terrorism” has become almost
exclusively associated with Islamic radicals, and that counterterrorism policy has increasingly
been discussed alongside domestic law enforcement and immigration policy (ibid). Survey data
and some peer reviewed studies have also demonstrated that gender, age, media exposure, and
geographical location are all significant predictors of individuals’ fear of terrorism (Brück and
Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008). Additionally, previous
studies have suggested that societal elites and media coverage of terrorism may influence
perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime
(Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007).

Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in political
and media communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment
associates terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of
September 11, 2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell
2011; Woods 2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are
committed by internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately
two-thirds of all terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95
percent between 2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005).
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The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied.
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the
modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time,
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response.
Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model – Influence of Violent Events on Politics, Mass Media, and
Public Opinion

Based on previous literature, I propose a theoretical model in which a violent event
occurs, is discussed by politicians and mass media (the content of which is dependent on
characteristics of the attack, suspect, and victims), and is then communicated to the public,
influencing their perceptions of risk, visualized in figure 2.1. The public gets most of their
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information about violent events from mass media. A violent event may be deemed terrorism
under particular circumstances (e.g. if the suspect is Muslim). The public learns about events,
and the language used to describe events, from mass media. Politicians may also draw attention
to events and offer their own interpretations. This is typically mediated by mass media, however
in the digital age politicians may also communicate directly with supporters. Information flow is
broader now than ever before, and many people are directly or indirectly informed by internet
sources that politicians and traditional mass media outlets don’t control. In many cases, internet
sources can respond very quickly to spread rumors, which traditional mass media and others may
pick up. Misleading and false information can spread more widely than later corrections. Social
media companies such as Google and Facebook, which are increasingly used as primary news
sources for Americans (Mitchell, Holcomb, and Weisel 2016), have made attempts to mediate
the flow of information on their platforms with varied degrees of success. The success of the
Russian Intelligence US election interference campaigns of 2016 in spreading misinformation to
the Us public demonstrate the pitfalls of relying on social media for accurate information about
world events (McCombie, Uhlmann and Morrison 2020). Ultimately, both traditional mass
media and digital outlets act as a “filter” between events, politics, and the public with some more
able to tailor the message presented to the public than others.

Data and Methods

In this chapter, I analyze public opinion and perceptions of terrorism as a problem facing
the US using monthly observations from a variety of data sources. I employ descriptive and
bivariate statistics analyses, and qualitative interpretation of data and graphics. All data used in
this chapter are either (a) publicly available, or (b) available through UNH Library subscription.
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All data will either be available to the general public, reported in aggregate form, or sufficiently
anonymized by the original organization. This data does not require and IRB application per
UNH Policy. Table 2.1 reports variables and relevant descriptive statistics.
Table 2.1 Description of Variables – Monthly Observations
Terrorism as Most Important Problem: Percent of Respondents Identifying “Terrorism” as the Most
Important Problem Facing the US from Gallup’s Most Important Problem Poll (N = 258)
Range: 0-24.24
Mean: 3.77
Std. Dev.: 5.32
Skewness: 1.91
Terrorist Attacks in US: Number of terrorist attacks in the US 1995-2016 from the Global Terrorism
Database (N = 264)
Range: 0-13
Mean: 1.99
Std. Dev.: 2.36
Skewness: 2.03
Terrorism casualties in US: Number of US terrorism casualties 1995-2016 from the Global Terrorism
Database (N = 264)
Range: 0-17840
Mean: 74.38
Std. Dev.: 1098.90
Skewness: 16.10
Newspaper Articles about “Terrorism”: Mean number of US newspaper articles about “terrorism”
across six major US newspapers 1995-2016 from ProQuest (N = 264)
Range: 14-1180.33
Mean: 116.13
Std. Dev.: 130.32
Skewness: 4.98
Presidential Remarks about “Terrorism”: Number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism”
1995-2016 from American Presidency Project (N = 259)
Range: 0-53
Mean: 10.93
Std. Dev.: 7.92
Skewness: 1.86
Unemployment Rate: Percent of workers counted as “unemployed” 1995-2016 from US Bureau of
Labor Statistics (N = 264)
Range: 3.8-10
Mean: 5.92
Std. Dev.: 1.66
Skewness: 1.08
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Gallup’s Most Important Problem (MIP) In September 1935 Gallup began asking
American citizens about the “most important problem” facing the nation and the question has
appeared on almost 200 Gallup surveys since (Smith 1985). According to Smith (1985:264),
“the most important problem question provides a grand overview of social change, describes
history from the perspective of the participants, and helps to define distinct historical periods and
identify turning points.” Although the wording has varied, the MIP question has asked, “What
are your chief worries these days – what things bother or upset you the most? What do you fear
the most?” or “What bothers you or angers you the most about America today?” Respondents
are then asked to rank-order a list of possible problems in both foreign and domestic affairs.
Included in the list of domestic problems are economic issues ranging from inflation and
unemployment to job concerns, trade, and labor (Smith 1985). The MIP variable records the
average yearly percentage of individuals ranking economic concerns as the most important
problem facing the US. Figure 2.2 graphs the monthly percent of respondents selecting terrorism
as the most important problem. This graph shows a mean of 3.8 percent of respondents reporting
terrorism as the most important problem facing the US. This figure also shows a skew of 1.9
with a minimum of 0 percent, and a maximum of 24.2 percent reporting terrorism as the most
important problem facing the US. The high spike in late 2001-early 2002, of course, reflects the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon 9/11. A secondary spike in
2016 reflects high-profile ISIL-related attacks in Paris, France, San Bernardino, California, and
Brussels, Belgium.

44

Figure 2.2 Monthly Percent of Respondents Saying Terrorism is the Most Important
Problem Facing the US (Gallup) 1995-2016

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collects detailed information about terrorist
incidents, and currently includes over 100,000 incidents worldwide. Data is collected on the
perpetrators, attack type, weapons used, target, location, date, casualties, and more. This also
includes a description of the event, and up to three news stories referencing the incident. Figure
2.3 graphs the number of terrorist attacks per month in the US from 1995-2016. This graph
shows averages of 1.99 attacks, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 13 attacks in a month.
From this graph, more terrorist attacks occurred between 1995 and 2003, terrorist attacks
decreased in frequency from 2004 to 2014, and dramatically increased again in 2015-2016.
Figure 2.4 graphs the number of terrorism casualties – both fatalities and wounded – per month
in the US from 1995-2016 using an ordinal measure for ease of interpretation. This graph shows
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a mean of 74.4 terrorism casualties in the US per month. The number of terrorism casualties in
the US per month is extremely skewed at 16.1, with a minimum number of casualties of 0 and a
maximum 17,840 terrorism casualties in a month: September 2001.The second highest casualty
terrorist event is the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. Other notable, high-casualty terrorist attacks
in the Us include: the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing; the 2009 Fort Hood shooting; the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; 2015 San Bernardino ISIL-Inspired attacks; and 2016 Pulse
Nightclub shooting.

Figure 2.3 Number of Terrorist Attacks in the US 1995-2016 (Global Terrorism Database)
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Figure 2.4 Number of Terrorist Attack Casualties in the US (Ordinal) 1995-2016 (Global
Terrorism Database)

ProQuest and Nexis Uni Are search engines that allow users to search print news articles and
broadcast transcripts from around the world. Sampling is possible by searching for keywords in
broadcast transcripts. Monthly counts of news article about terrorism in newspapers such as the
New York Times, Washington Post, Fox News, etc. can provide an estimate of how much
attention news organizations are devoting to terrorism. Figure 2.5 graphs the number of
newspaper articles about “Terrorism” per month from 1995-2016 for six major US newspapers:
The New York Times; Washington Post; Los Angeles Times; Chicago Tribune; Wall St. Journal;
and the Boston Globe. The mean number of articles per month for all six papers is 116.1, with a
minimum of 14 and maximum of 1180.3 mean articles per month. A spike in reporting is seen
starting in 1995, especially in the NY Times, representing coverage of the 1995 Oklahoma City
Bombing. The largest spike corresponds with the September 11, 2001 attacks. The spike in
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articles in the Washington Post during 2012/2013 primarily reflects increased news coverage of
the 2012 Benghazi attacks and subsequent congressional hearings, as well as coverage of the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing. The subsequent, smaller spike in late 2015 reflects coverage of
the ISIL-relates Paris and San Bernardino attacks.
Figure 2.5 Number of Newspaper Articles About “Terrorism” 1995-2016 (ProQuest: NY
Times, Washington Post, LA Times, Chicago Trib., Wall St. Journal, Boston Globe)

The American Presidency Project is a publicly accessible collection of over 110,000
communications transcripts including letters, documents, and public remarks made by the
President of the United States. Time periods of document coverage range from 1789 to present
day (Woolley and Peters 2019). The dataset was founded as a collaborative project by John T.
Woolley and Gerhard Peters of the University of California, Santa Barbara. The number of
presidential remarks discussing terrorism during a certain time period can provide an estimation
of how much attention political institutions are devoting to terrorism. Figure 2.6 graphs the
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number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism” from 1995-2016. This graph shows a
spike during President Clinton’s tenure reflecting the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and 1996
Centennial Olympic Park Bombing. President Bush’s term shows a particularly large spike
following the September 11, 2001 attacks, with a subsequent spike reflecting the 2004 Beslan
School Siege and his 2004 reelection campaign. President Obama’s tenure saw spikes in 2009
which correspond to shooting at military recruitment centers in Arkansas, the National Holocaust
Museum shooting, the FT Hood shooting, and attempted underwear bombing of an airliner.
Additional spikes in 2011 correspond with the killing of Osama bin Laden by Seal Team Six in
2011, the rise to prominence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in 2014, and the 2015 Paris and San
Bernardino ISIL-related attacks.
Figure 2.6 Number of Presidential Remarks about “Terrorism” 1995-2016 (American
Presidency Project)
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The Unemployment Rate data for each month is sourced from the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Officially, the unemployment rate is a measure of persons actively seeking gainful
employment as a percentage of all workers in the United States. As defined by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, “persons are classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively
looked-for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work. Persons who were not
working and were waiting to be recalled to a job from which they had been temporarily laid off
are also included as unemployed. Receiving benefits from the Unemployment Insurance (UI)
program has no bearing on whether a person is classified as unemployed.” (Bureau of Labor
Statistics 2019). Figure 2.7 graphs the US unemployment rate from 1995-2016, showing a mean
of 5.92 percent, minimum of 3.8 percent and maximum of 10 percent unemployment in each
month. This graph also shows prominently the 2008 recession, which is responsible for the 10
percent unemployment rate high.

Figure 2.7 US Unemployment Rate 1995-2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics)
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Analysis

Based on the graphics produced in Figures 2.2-2.7, Terrorism as the Most Important
Problem appears to be most influenced by the September 11, 2001 attacks, and increases again
following the ISIL-Related attacks in Europe and North America in 2015. News coverage of
“terrorism” and Presidential remarks about “terrorism” follow a similar pattern. The number of
terrorist attacks in the US increased slightly from 1995-2000, declined from 2001-2005, and
began to increase again around 2013. The number of terrorism casualties (including dead and
wounded) rose from 1995 to 2001. This has a first peak in the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing,
which resulted in over 500 casualties, and then a second peak in the September 11, 2001 attacks
with nearly 3000 fatalities, and thousands more wounded directly and indirectly. Terrorism
casualties and the overall number of incidents in the US dropped dramatically after 2001 until
about 2014. After 2014, casualties and incidents began to increase again as US politics became
increasingly contentious, and the Islamic State (ISIL) group began to inspire terrorist attacks
around the world. While this partly mirrors overall violent crime statistics in the US, anti-police
and ISIL-related attacks spiked in 2015 and 2016. Not included in this data set is a subsequent
spike in White Nationalist/White Supremacist terrorist attacks in 2017 and 20183.
Prior to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Gallup’s Most Important Problem survey was not
coded for “Terrorism” as an answer. Following this attack, researchers began to include
“Terrorism” as an option. From 1995 to 2000, only two small spikes in July 1996 (from 0% to
3.4%) and September 1998 (0.1% to 3.4%) occurred. These correspond to the Centennial
Olympic Park Bombing in Atlanta, GA, and the bombings of US Diplomatic Facilities in East
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For more information, visit the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s 2018 Hate Crime Statistics reports at
https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate-crime/2018
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Africa by Al Qaeda. The biggest spike in Terrorism as the Most Important Problem Occurred
following the September 11, 2001 attacks. Between August 2001 and March 2003, the percent of
respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem increases from approximately
0 percent to 24.24 percent, marking the highest observed increase in US history. Perception of
Terrorism as the Most Important Problem declined after March 2003, with a few notable spikes.

Between August 2007 and January 2015, Terrorism as the Most Important Problem
remained under 5 percent monthly, with the exception of a spike to 5.13 percent in January 2010,
following an attempted airline bombing using explosives smuggled in underwear. In 2015, the
public’s attention returned to terrorism following the rise of the groups Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant. Following attacks in Paris and San Bernardino in November and December 2015,
Terrorism as the Most Important Problem increased again to approximately 16 percent.
Table 2.2 reports correlation coefficients between variables (Pearson’s r) and statistical
significance. Bivariate statistics reveal support for the proposed path model. Terrorist incidents
in the US are somewhat positively and significantly correlated with Presidential remarks
(r=.122), but not Terrorism as MIP. Terrorism casualties in the US are strongly positively and
significantly correlated with both Newspaper articles (r=.507) and somewhat positively
correlated and significant with Presidential remarks (r=.136) but not Terrorism as MIP.
Terrorism as the MIP is strongly positively and significantly correlated with Newspaper articles
(r=.650) and Presidential remarks (r=.634), and somewhat negatively and significantly correlated
with the Unemployment rate (r= -.148). Additionally, to account for delays between events and
changes in public opinion, Terrorism as MIP with a 1-month lag was also examined. With a 1month lag, Terrorism as MIP is strongly positively and significantly correlated with Newspaper
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articles (r=.722) and Presidential remarks (r=.646). Due to non-normality in measures and
differences between predicted values and observed values, more sophisticated statistical and
Time-Series analyses such as ARIMA are not possible at this time. Figures 2.8-2.12 visually
compare trends and correlations in terrorism as the most important problem and independent
variables.
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s r) with Statistical Significance
Num. US
Terror
Attacks
Num. US Terror
Attacks
Num. US Terror
Casualties
Num. Presidential
Remarks
Num. Newspaper
Articles
Unemployment
Rate
TerrorMIP (1 mo.
lag)

Num. US
Terror
Casualties

Num.
Presidential
Remarks

Num.
Newspaper
Articles

Unemploym
ent Rate

Terror MIP
(1 mo. lag)

1.0

-

-

-

-

-

.144

1.0

-

-

-

-

.122*

.136*

1.0

-

-

-

.116

.507***

.64***

1.0

-

-

-.223***

.034

-.159*

-.053

1.0

-

.060

.088

.646***

.722***

-.153*

1.0

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Figure 2.8 visually depicts the correlations shown in Table 2.2. The low correlation
coefficients between Terrorism as the Most Important Problem and the number of terrorist
attacks in the US, as well as number of terrorist casualties in the US is demonstrated by the lack
of clear trend lines in either correlation. Those that do have significant correlation coefficients
with Terrorism as the Most Important Problem – the number of presidential remarks about
terrorism, number of newspaper articles about terrorism, and the unemployment rate, do show
scatterplot relationships. However, the scatterplot also shows that these relationships, even when
relatively linear, are oddly shaped. Even the highest correlation coefficient between Terrorism as
the Most Important Problem and Mean Number of Newspaper Articles (r=.722; p<.001) shows
several outliers in the scatterplot.
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Figure 2.8 Scatterplot Matrix of Variables

Figures 2.9 through 2.13 graph trend lines of terrorist incidents in the US, terrorist
casualties in the US, newspaper articles about “terrorism”, presidential remarks about
“terrorism” and the unemployment rate against the percent of US adults identifying “terrorism”
as the most important problem facing the US monthly from 1995-2016. These graphs also
visually show the strength of associations between measures. For example, both Figures 2.9 and
2.10 show weak, not statistically significant correlations of the number of terrorist attacks
(r=.060) and number of terrorist casualties in the US (r=0.88), respectively, with the percent of
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respondents who identify “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US. These weak
relationships suggest that the US public is not simply responding to the occurrence of terrorist
events, or the lethality of terrorist events when they report how concerned they are about
terrorism.

Figure 2.9 Terror as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Number of Terror Attacks in US Overlay
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Figure 2.10 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and US Terrorism Casualties (Ordinal) Overlay

Figures 2.11 and 2.12 show support for the agenda setting power of mass media and
political elites. Elite cues, as shown here through newspaper articles and presidential public
remarks, are the most highly correlated with the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as
the most important problem facing the US. Graphed in Figure 2.11, the mean number of
newspaper articles across six major US newspapers has a very strong positive correlation of .722
which is statistically significant (p<.001). This means that as the number of newspaper articles
per month about “terrorism” increases, so does the percentage of respondents identifying
“terrorism” as the most important problem increase.
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Figure 2.11 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Mean of Newspaper Articles Overlay

Similarly, Figure 2.12 graphs the number of Presidential public remarks about
“terrorism” against the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important
problem facing the US, showing a statistically significant (p<.001), fairly strong positive
correlation (r=.646). Essentially, as the number of Presidential public remarks about “terrorism”
increases, so to do the percent of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important
problem facing the US. Much of this may be accounted for by the large spikes following the
September 11, 2001 attacks, however these correlations do find evidence to support the key role
that societal elites and mass media outlets play in shaping the public’s perceptions about
terrorism. Interestingly, as shown previously in Table 2.2 and Figure 2.8, the number of
newspaper articles about “terrorism” and the number of Presidential public remarks about
“terrorism” are fairly strongly and positively correlated with each other (r=.64, p<.001) as well.
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As one increases, so does the other. This lends some support to the path model proposed in
Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.12 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Number of Presidential Remarks Overlay

Figure 2.13 graphs the monthly US unemployment rate against the percent of respondents
identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US from 1995-2016. These
measures have a statistically significant and negative relationship (r=-.153, p<.0%) albeit the
correlation coefficient is weak. This means that as the unemployment rate increases, the percent
of respondents identifying “terrorism” as the most important problem decreases. This is likely
the result of immediate economic concerns associated with high unemployment overriding all
other perceived social problems. Once our ability to put food on the table is threatened, all other
concerns are secondary, as day to day survival takes precedence. The 2007/2008 global
economic recession likely contributed to the relatively low percent of respondent’s identifying
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“terrorism” as the most important problem between 2007 and 2014, despite counterterrorism
remaining a priority for the US government during this period.

Figure 2.13 Terrorism as MIP (1 Mo. Lag) and Unemployment Rate Overlay

Again, Figure 2.14 graphs the percent of respondents indicating “terrorism” as the most
important problem facing the US from 1995-2016, with markers added relating spikes in the
trend line to specific incidents which occurred around the same time. Fourteen key events which
correspond to peaks in the trend were identified from the Global Terrorism Database. These
include: the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing; the 1996 Centennial Olympic Park Bombing; the
1998 US Embassy Bombings in Kenya; the September 11, 2001 attacks, the build up to the 2003
US invasion of Iraq, the 2004 Beslan School Siege; the 2005 7/7 London Bombings; the fiveyear anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks; the 2010 attempted underwear bombing; the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombing; the beginning of US airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq in 2014, the
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2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack; 2015 Paris Attack by ISIL, and 2015 San Bernardino Attack by
ISIL-inspired individuals.

Figure 2.14 Terrorism as MIP and Major Events

Discussion

Of the fourteen events which correspond to peaks in the trend line of the percent of
respondents who identify “terrorism” as the most important problem facing the US, ten are
terrorist attacks. The most notable of these attacks are the September 11, 2001 attacks by Al
Qaeda, and the 2015 ISIL-Related attacks in Paris, France and San Bernardino, CA. All but two
attacks were carried out by Islamic Radicals. Two were carried out by far-right
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organizations/individuals. Below is a description of the ten terrorist events which are associated
with peaks in the graph in Figure 2.14.

On the morning of April 19, 1995, the deadliest domestic terror attack in the US occurred
when a truck bomb of more than 300 pounds of fertilizer-based explosives detonated outside the
Alfred P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City, OK. The OKC Bombing, as it is commonly
known, resulted in 168 fatalities and approximately 650 wounded (see GTD Incident
199504190004). Timothy McVeigh was eventually convicted of the bombing, saying the
bombing was in retaliation for what he perceived as government overreach in its handling of the
Branch Davidian standoff at Waco, TX, and the standoff at Ruby Ridge, ID. McVeigh, who was
known to associate with individual of various far-right ideologies, was executed for the bombing
in 2001. The bombing resulted in renewed attention to terrorism by academics and the US
Government and Law Enforcement agencies. Just over a year after the bombing, President
Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act into law. The law was partly
designed to give law enforcement agencies greater authority in counterterrorism investigations
and also adopted harsher punishments for individuals convicted of terrorism.

In July of 1996, Eric Rudolf, a member of the far-right organization Army of God planted
and detonated a pipe-bomb at the Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta, GA. The bombing
resulted in the death of 1 victim and wounding of an additional 111, including several law
enforcement officers (see GTD Incident 199607270003). Authorities famously mistook the
individual who found and reported the explosive device for the perpetrator. Eric Rudolf was
apprehended years later in North Carolina, and subsequently convicted of the bombing.
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In August of 1998, Al Qaeda operative conducted coordinated attacks against the US
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The US Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya was attacked by suicide
bombers who detonated a truck bomb outside. The truck bomb killed 12 Americans claimed the
lives of 224 victims in total. It is estimated that an additional 4000 people were wounded in the
attack. The attack in Tanzania also involved a vehicular bomb. Suicide bombers detonated
explosives outside the US Embassy in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 11 people and wounding
85 more (see GTD Incidents 199808070002, 199808070003).

On the Morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the terrorist organization
Al Qaeda, mostly from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, hijacked four planes with the intent of crashing
them into the World Trade Center in New York, The Pentagon Arlington, VA, and the US
Capitol Building in Washington, D.C. Three of the four attacks were successful. The planes
bound for New York destroyed the World Trade Center, killing approximate 2,770 people, and
wounding over 21,000 more victims. The plane bound for Arlington was successful in striking
the Pentagon, which resulted in approximately 190 fatalities and another 106 wounded. The
fourth plane, bound for Washington D.C., was forced down over Shanksville, PA and resulted in
at least 44 deaths and 9 additional wounded. Commonly known as the September 11, 2001
attacks, or simply 9/11 attacks, the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda are the deadliest terrorist
incidents in history (see GTD Incidents 200109110004, 200109110005, 200109110006,
200109110007). The effects of the 9/11 attacks on both the US and the world are profound and
continue nearly twenty years later. Most notably, the USA PATRIOT Act and related legislation
are still largely in effect today, and the Global War on Terror has resulted in the continued
presence of US Troops in Middle Eastern conflicts.
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In September of 2004, a large group of Chechen and Ingush rebels, estimated to be
between 30 and 35 in number, seized control of a school in Beslan, Russia. The suspects took
approximately 1200 children, parents, and teachers hostage in the school gym. The standoff and
subsequent confrontation with Russian police and military forces resulted in at least 344 deaths
and over 727 additional wounded (see GTD Incident 200409010002).

In July of 2005, Al Qaeda operatives carried out a series of attacks commonly known as
the London 7/7 Bombings. Four suicide bombers detonated explosives aboard four different
trains in London at approximately the same time. These attacks killed 56 People and wounded at
least 784 more (see GTD Incidents 200507070001, 200507070002, 200507070003,
200507070004). These bombings were the deadliest terrorist attacks in the UK since the end of
the Northern Ireland conflict in 1998.

Attempted Underwear Bombing. 25 December 2009. A Nigerian national associated with
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attempted to detonate an explosive device on
Northwest Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit. The explosive device failed; however, an
intervening passenger was wounded in an altercation (see GTD Incident 200912250024). The
attempted bombing was subsequently used as justification for use of controversial body scanners
in US airports.

A series of attacks from 15-19 April 2013 in Massachusetts commonly known as the
Boston Marathon Bombing were carried out by bothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The
brothers were immigrants from the Dagestan region of Russia, a predominantly Muslim area that
was highly impacted by the Chechen wars. The initial incident involved setting off improvised
explosives near the finish line of the 2013 Boston Marathon, killing 3 and wounding at least 132
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others. The brothers later killed an MIT police officer, and a subsequent bombing attempt was
thwarted by police. A gunfight between police and the suspects resulted in the death of
Tamerlan, Tsarnaev and 16 additional injuries. One of the responding officers later died from
wounds sustained. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was apprehended after surrendering to police shortly
thereafter (see GTD Incidents 201304150001, 201304150002, 201304180001, 201304190009).

Responsibility for the Charlie Hebdo attack of January 2015 was claimed by Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and carried out by two assailants who were born and raised in
France: Cherif and Said Kouachi. The attack was carried out as revenge for the paper’s depiction
of the Prophet Muhammad in a political comic and resulted in11 deaths and another 11 wounded,
including the suspects (see GTD Incident 201501070001).
On November 13th, 2015, a series of coordinated attacks were carried out in Paris,
France, and the Paris suburb Saint Denis. A total of 13 assailants trained by the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, killed 137 people and wounded at least 413 more in eight highly
organized attacks. This included a suicide bombing at Comptoir Voltaire restaurant, a bombing
and shooting in Bataclan concert hall which killed 93 and wounded 217, as well as shootings at
the terrace of La Belle Equipe bar Cafe Bonne Biere, Le Carillon and Le Petit Cambodge
restaurants, all in Paris, and three suicide bombers at a football (soccer) match in the Paris suburb
of Saint Denis near the Stade de France. This was the deadliest series of terrorist attacks ever in
France and was intended as retaliation for US led allied airstrikes against ISIL in Iraq and Syria
(see GTD Incidents 201511130002-201511120009).

San Bernardino attack by ISIL-Inspired individuals Syed Rizwan Farook, a US-born
Pakistani-American and Tashfeen Malik, a naturalized US citizen from Pakistan used firearms
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and explosives in an assault against coworkers which ended in a pursuit and shootout with
police. 16 people were killed in the incident, including the suspects, and another 17 were
wounded in the attack (see GTD Incident 201512020012). The ISIL-Related attacks in Paris and
San Bernardino prompted Donald Trump’s proposal of a “Muslim Ban” to combat terrorism.

The data analyzed in this chapter generally support the previous theoretical and empirical
literature examining the relationship between mass media and public perceptions of terrorism. It
does appear that mass media coverage and attention from politicians has the strongest correlation
with Terrorism as the Most Important Problem. This supports both the Agenda Setting and Elite
Cues theories of media effects and public opinion. I also find support for theories which assert
that societal elites and media coverage of terrorism influences perceptions of risk more than
actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and
Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007).

Additionally, qualitative evidence examining trends in the public perception of terrorism
as the most important problem facing the US points to the importance of key events in shaping
public opinion. The two major spikes in the data following the September 11, 2001 attacks and
2015 ISIL-Related attacks demonstrate that first, public perceptions of terrorism in the US were
permanently altered following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, and second,
that the public does appear to respond with greater fear and worry to attacks carried out by
Radical Islamic groups than those carried out by individuals and groups with other ideologies.

In the case of the most important problem, I find evidence that both the President and
prominent news outlets exert an influence on the public’s perception of social problems facing
the US, and that they influence each other. Politics and mass media are key in telling us what a
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social problem is and controlling the broad conversation. This supports both a model of power
articulated nu Mills (1956) and Hermann and Chomsky (1988) propaganda model of mass
media. This states that media is used by social elites that build support for policy objectives
among the public. This was written as a rebuttal to the popular notion that mass media is often at
odd with politics and able to hold politicians accountable. In the modern era, mass media has
largely not held the current administration accountable for their disastrous policies. In fact, one
could argue that almost all mass media outlets prefer a Trump Presidency because it directly
increases their viewership and revenue. Trump sells newspapers and gets people to tune in to the
news.

Additionally, I do not find support for the economic threat hypothesis (Blalock 1967).
Instead, based on recent research such as Mutz (2018), status threat is likely driving the fear of
terrorism and associated anti-Muslim sentiments. Interestingly, I find that the public is less
concerned about terrorism during economically challenging times. If economic insecurity does
amplify feelings of racial threat, it does not do so in an easily measurable way, at least not with
the data that is currently available. Immigration research has additionally found that antiimmigrant politics are pursued in both good and bad economic times, and that social institutions
are primarily responsible for engendering anti-immigrant attitudes (Tichenor 2002). This is
supported by other research which has found that fears and concerns about labor market
competition are not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Heinmueller et al 2015).

This analysis does have limitations, namely in that the data cannot be analyzed with more
sophisticated regression or time-series techniques as it is currently available. Therefore, it is not
able to formally test hypotheses about these relationships, or control for the influence of multiple
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variables. Other data sources may perhaps be better able to assess the theories outlined in this
and previous works. At the end of this analysis, it can be said that it does appear that public
opinion on issues such as terrorism is most influenced by mass media coverage and attention
from political elites. This is further supported by data analyzed in other parts of this project. The
following chapter examines the content of news media stories about terrorist events, focusing on
news media’s role in framing evets. I add to the existing literature on the framing of terrorism by
examining how terrorist suspects are portrayed on US television news. Then, I examine the
influence that selective exposure to partisan mass media has on individual members of the public
and their worry about victimization in either a terrorist attack or a mass shooting.
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CHAPTER III. QUANTITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF BROADCAST
NEWS MEDIA FRAMING OF SUSPECTED TERRORIST
PERPETRATORS

Why are some people labelled as terrorist and others are not, even when they commit the
same acts? The overall focus of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which socially
constructed meanings applied to similar behaviors at different times and places affect the
public’s perceptions of mass violence. What it is, how it affects individuals and society, how
individuals and social institutions respond to perceived violence all differ greatly by which label
is used to describe the incident. More specifically, this dissertation examines the role that mass
media plays in shaping our ideas and beliefs about violence.

The previous chapters demonstrated that mass media shapes public perception by setting
agendas and drawing attention to certain topics as newsworthy and that elite cues do reflect
differences in opinion among members of the public. The following chapter finds that selective
partisan media exposure can amplify one’s existing beliefs in a measurable way. This chapter is
focused on the content of those media messages and examines how mass media frames terrorism
and contributes to how the public conceives of terrorism. Specifically, to add to the body of
literature on the topic of media framing of terrorism, I assess whether media coverage is racially
biased in its framing of terrorist suspects in a quantitative content analysis of broadcast news
transcripts from NexisUni. With data from the Global Terrorism Database, I find that when
controlling for characteristics of the attacks such as weapons used and number of people killed,
that Muslim suspects are more likely to be labeled terrorists. In short, Muslims suspects are more
likely to be framed or labelled as terrorists by news media for the same behavior.

68

Max Weber’s (1945) concept of the “Ideal Type” as a proverbial yardstick for understanding
social action has a particular utility in understanding why some acts of mass violence are labelled
as “terrorist attacks” and why other, similar acts of mass violence are not labelled as “terrorist
acts”. The ideal type of a terrorist attack is perhaps best exemplified by the September 11, 2001
attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon carried out by the al Qaeda organization. This
attack involved civilian, sub-state actors from one society and culture inflicting extreme violence
on other civilians in another society and culture (Black 2004). These attacks occurred far outside
the norms of conventional warfare, were conducted by covert actors, and based on
communication from al Qaeda leadership, were intended to strike fear into the population of the
United States. When using this concept of the ideal type to analyze media content, it can be
presumed that a suspect is more likely to be labelled as a “terrorist” when he or she more closely
conforms to the constructed ideal type of what a terrorist attack is and/or who a terrorist is: i.e. a
Middle Eastern, Muslim male.

Race and ethnicity have long been used as a means of dividing people in the US (Feagin
2006, 2013; Omi and Winant 2015). In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks,
political leaders seized on the public’s fear to build support for the continuing wars in the Middle
East, expansion of surveillance capabilities, stricter enforcement of immigration laws, and the
creation of a robust drone warfare program. This was accomplished in part by playing on the US
public’s historical xenophobic tendencies, which was now attentive to people of Middle Eastern,
North African, and Central/South Asian backgrounds (i.e. “Muslims”). The recent wave of antiMuslim sentiment in the US which developed out of this period has been encouraged by
opportunistic political leaders and media outlets. The present dissertation argues that public fear
of terrorism is a proxy measure for racial, cultural, and other identity-based anxieties and one of
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many perceived threats to the dominant culture in America posed by non-white foreigners. This
is fueled by nearly two decades of propaganda efforts and media portrayals of terrorists as a
foreign, Arab, Muslim threat to the US homeland and way of life.

When a mass violence event occurs in the US, most people will learn about the event through
mass media. Mass media does not only report on events, but also offers interpretations of events
and contributes to individuals’ views. The other analyses present in this dissertation both found
that media effects play a significant role in the public’s perceptions of mass violence. The earlier
studies addressed two important aspect of media effects: agenda setting – or how topics become
“newsworthy” and reinforcing spirals – or how selective media exposure can strengthen preexisting views. This portion of the study focuses on another critical piece of media effects:
framing - i.e. the use of words, phrases, and images to portray particular messages. Specifically, I
examine the content of broadcast news media to determine who is portrayed as a terrorist.

In this project, I argue that among suspected perpetrators of terrorism in the US,
individuals who are Middle Eastern, foreign born, or associated with radical Islam are more
likely to be framed or labelled as terrorists by US news media, controlling for characteristics of
the event. The terrorist label is embedded with racialized meaning. In effect, terrorism is treated
interchangeably with “Muslim” violence. If fear of terrorism is reflective of fear of “Muslims”,
then among suspected perpetrators of terrorist violence, individuals who are “Muslim” – i.e.
Middle Eastern or associated with Radical Islam – are more likely to be framed or labelled as
terrorists by news media. Previous literature has not looked specifically at how individual
suspects are portrayed, instead focusing on groups and ideologies. This research has focused
almost exclusively on newspapers, while most people get their news from television. Previous
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treatment of the connection between radical Islam, race, and ethnicity has also been flawed.
While many have examined the connection between Islam and portrayals of terrorism, race,
ethnicity, and religion have been treated as interchangeable in this literature. I argue that this
may not be the case – i.e. appearing to be Middle Eastern is just as important – if not more – than
an alignment with radical Islam, or the individual’s immigration status.

Background

Terrorism, by most definitions, involves the use of violence to inspire feelings of fear or
dread in a population larger than the immediate victims (see Global Terrorism Database 2019;
Turk 2004). After the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism has frequently occupied the list of
top 10 problems facing the US (Woods 2007) and remains a top issue that the US public wants
the Government to address. Following 2015 attacks in Paris linked to the so-called Islamic State
group of Iraq and Syria (commonly referred to as ISIS of ISIL) polls conducted by Gallup in
December 2015 (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015) found that in the US, forty seven percent of US
adults were worried about being a victim of a terrorist attack, close to the all-time high (Swift
2015). Additionally, trust in government to protect US citizens against terrorist attacks reached
an all-time low, with sixty seven percent of respondents believing that a terrorist attack on US
soil was likely, and only 55 percent of respondents had confidence that the US government could
protect against future acts of terrorism (McCarthy 2015).

Empirical research and official statistics often paint a different picture about the risk of
terrorism than what is popularly believed. This research shows that incidents of terrorism on US
soil are rare, typically committed by domestic actors rather than international, and only a
minority of such attacks are associated with Islamic radicals (LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw
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2009). Anti-US attacks by Islamic radical groups overwhelming occur against US interests
abroad rather than on US soil (ibid). Nevertheless, since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
terrorism has remained as a top issue concerning the US public (Swift 2015; Woods 2007),
members of the general public report greater fear of terrorism victimization than other forms of
mass violence (Swift 2015), and Muslims in the west continue to be targets of retaliatory hate
crimes (Byers and Jones 2007) 4. One thing is clear, this is an enduring fear which does not fully
represent reality. Below, I discuss the research questions which guide this analysis, the broad
contributions of the study, the theoretical background, and the research design of each part of
this dissertation.

Media coverage on fear of terrorism is known to have negative effects to individuals and
society (Altheide 2006; Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Iglarsh 1987; Nellis and
Savage 2012; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007; Toohey and Taylor 2008). The War on Terror has been
used to justify disastrous policies domestically and abroad – including the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq. Many scholars assert that the risk of terrorism has been overstated in the U.S. by news
media and other societal elites (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; McCarthy 2015; Papacharissi
and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Swift 2015; Woods 2007, 2011). Since September
11, 2001, terrorism has been ranked in the top 10 of Gallup’s “Most Important Problems”
national survey (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015; Woods 2007).The effects of this heightened fear
are not yet fully understood, however existing research has found that negative effects include
changes in behavior, i.e. information seeking and avoidance (Nellis and Savage 2012), economic
costs in reduced travel (Iglarsh 1987), support for questionable policy agendas such as the Iraq

4

For more information, visit the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics on Hate Crimes 1996-2016 at
https://ucr.fbi.gov/ucr-publications#Hate
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war (Altheide 2006; Wolfendale 2006), and a number of negative effects associated with
increased anxiety (Atkinson and Young 2012; Farook Malik 2014; Pat-Horenczyk et al 2007;
Toohey and Taylor 2008) including post-traumatic stress and negative coping strategies (ibid.).
This study may help identify who is most likely to experience these negative effects of terrorism
on society, and under which conditions fear is able to proliferate through the U.S. public.
Potentially, findings could support targeted public policy efforts in the future.

Additionally, scholars have also argued that stereotypes of Muslims as radicals and
terrorists is harmful to minority populations (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg
2008). The stereotyping of Muslims in western media has also been used as a recruitment tool by
violent organizations such as ISIL/ISIS (Stern and Berger 2015). US political discourse have
demonized Muslims as a social problem (Byers and Jones 2007; Gottschalk and Greenberg 2008;
Norris et al 2003), promoting the image of Muslims as potential terrorists by describing terrorism
almost exclusively in relation to Islamic radicals. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks, hate crimes directed against Arab- and Muslim-Americans, or those perceived to be, rose
dramatically. This change has been directly linked to the September 11th attacks by scholars
(Byers and Jones 2007).

Understanding how the US political and media elites frame terrorism is pertinent when
radical groups such as ISIS, the so-called Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, are known to
recruit members using the argument that Western powers – particularly the US – demonize,
oppress, and alienate Muslims (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). A notable example of this
is then candidate Donald Trump’s response to ISIS inspired attacks in 2015: calling for a ban on
all Muslims entering the US (Zurcher 2015). ISIS is known to use media clips of US politicians
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such as Donald Trump discussing ISIS, the Middle East, and Islam in recruitment and
propaganda materials (Farwell 2014; Stern and Berger 2015). Theoretical and empirical research
has also shown that individuals who join radical organizations often experience feeling of
alienation, isolation, and resentment towards a mainstream society which rejects and stigmatizes
them (Cottee 2011; Hamm 2009; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011; Sageman 2004). I attempt to
better understand how US news media portrayals of terrorism perpetuate bias against Muslims,
while suggesting how these depictions can be modified to increase security of minority groups
and counter extremist narratives.

Framing Theory

My research project takes a minimalist approach to framing, as articulated by Woods
(2011). ‘Frames’ can be described as “identifiable characteristics of mass-mediated news content
that are of interest to scholars. While frames may have a range of causes and effects, they exist
first of all as words, images and symbols that appear on paper and in other media. News frames
may be found in a variety of communication outlets. Taking many different forms, they may
appear as phrases such as ‘the cold war’, single words such as ‘communist’, images such as a
photo of the Berlin Wall or particular patterns or styles in which words, phrases and images
appear in news content (Woods 2011, p. 201).” With this research, I apply this concept by
examining the use of certain “frames”, i.e. the words, images, and symbols used to portray a
particular message. I focus on how, when, and why particular frames such as “Terrorism” and
“Mass Shooting” are used by US news media and understood by the general public.

Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars, and consequently one of the
most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman (1993) described framing as a
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“fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into detail to define what ‘frames’ and
‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood concepts (Entman 1993), others
interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are explicitly defined. Some researchers
see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse (Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize
frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999), and further still, framing can refer to
the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the exact definition of framing varies
across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently used by political elites and media
sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world (Chomsky and Herman 1988).

The importance of framing in studies of news media has been articulated from scholars in
many disciplines. David Altheide (2006; 2009) documented how political elites and news media
constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying on the public’s perceptions
about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy measures such as the USA
PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Benford and Snow (2000)
argue that framing processes are an essential aspect of social movement formation. Chomsky and
Herman (1988) articulated a propaganda-model of news media and asserted that media framing
is frequently used to influence public opinion and used as a tool by political elites to further
specific political goals.

In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to persuade and
gain support for social and political objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988; Altheide 2006,
2009). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life, particularly regarding
terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. For instance, David Altheide (2006) found that
recent media coverage of terrorism closely resembles previous coverage of crime. Both use fear
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of victimization and ethnocentric ideologies to reinforce ingroup-outgroup hostilities and employ
a process of “othering”. This process involves construction of an inferior group by the dominant
group through the establishment of symbolic boundaries and membership (Schwalbe et al. 2000).
In the post-9/11 era, othering through discourses of fear and ethnocentrism have been central to
building support for the war on terror (Kam and Kinder 2007). Mass media, however, is not the
only social institution involved in the framing of terrorism and use of fear in social life. Political
leaders often shape and define the problem initially. Media then filters and further interprets their
statements and presents these re-constitutions to the public (Chomsky and Herman 1988). Media
has presented fear inducing messages from politicians to promote many social, legal, and
political agendas in the United States including the “War on Drugs” (Inciardi and McElrath
2015) and the USA PATRIOT Act (Altheide 2006). In this manner, leaders of social and
political movements may invoke fear and construct moral panics which appeal to the values and
beliefs of dominant social groups while also drawing on the group’s anxieties (Shoon, Meltzer,
and Reese 2008).

Racialization of Muslims
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, increased attention to “Muslims” a previously
overlooked group of recent immigrants has resulted in the racialization of a diverse group of
people, who mostly originate in the Middle East and North Africa. Racialization refers to the
social process by which new racial/ethnic groups are defined and set apart from other groups
(Omi and Winant 1986, 1994, 2015). In this way, the defining of groups from the Middle East,
North Africa, and South Asia as racialized “Muslims”, and the framing of Terrorism as
“Muslim” violence constitutes a “Racial Project” as defined by Omi and Winant (1986, 1994,
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2015). Racial projects are the activities that assign meaning to race, how racial constructs and
ideas are used in language, thought, imagery, and interactions, and the process by which racial
constructs and ideologies are reified and situated within social structures. Essentially, racial
projects connect socially constructed meanings of race to the organization of society and day to
day life along racial lines (ibid.)

I argue, as have others, that Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature
(Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). Some scholars have linked
racialization to increases in the movement of population groups globally, which prompts
reactions from dominant social groups in destination countries to maintain status (Gans 2017).
Others have linked Islamophobic attitudes to specific political orientation in the US, specifically
those who favor right-wing authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). Additionally, scholars have
found that Islamophobia plays on historical constructs of Orientalism, similar to how Jews were
portrayed in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and Späti 2019).

In the case of US and European Muslims, much of the increase in Islamophobia has
occurred since the 1990’s, especially following the 9/11 attacks (Skenderovic and Späti 2019),
when national security and law enforcement agencies around the world struggled to grapple with
the fallout of those attacks (Nebhan 2017). Islamophobia is fundamentally a racial process
(Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Constadine 2017; Garner and Selod 2015; Taras 2013), even
if the intricacies of race, ethnicity, religion, racialization, and racism involved with Islamophobia
are difficult to disentangle (Taras 2013), and not always based on skin color (Dunn, Klocker, and
Salabay 2007; Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015). Despite the difficulties in
disaggregating the intersection of race, ethnicity, and religion when studying Islamophobia other
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scholars have emphasized that racialization theory is a good way to understand it (Garner and
Selod 2015).

While constructions of race and racism are central to Islamophobia, the relationship is
complex, due to the diversity of Muslims in the real world. Anti-Muslim rhetoric plays on
negative stereotypes of Islam, as well as perceptions of threat and inferiority (Dunn, Klocker,
and Salabay 2007). The racialized perceptions that Muslims do not belong are not necessarily
based on skin color, but many ethnic markers (ibid.) Additionally, Muslims are viewed less
favorably and deserving of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and
Modood 2009). Instead they perceived more as a threat than a disadvantaged group (ibid.).
Studies indicate that Muslims of many skin colors and nationalities experience discrimination
across Western societies including the US (Galonnier 2015; Herda 2018; Mansson McGinty
2020; Selod 2019), the UK (Moosavi 2015), Canada (Wilkins 2018), Ireland (Carrand Haynes
2015), and Australia (Dunn, Klocker and Salabay 2007).

Even white privilege appears to be unable to fully override Islamophobia (Selod 2015).
While studies have found that whiteness can lend Muslim converts respectability, it is precarious
in the face of the association between Islam and race (Moosavi 2015). This can also vary on
social contexts. A study by (Galonnier 2015) comparing the experiences of white converts to
Islam in the US and France found that French and American converts report different
experiences with race, implying that the racialization of Muslims and the meanings attached to
the intersection of race and religion vary in different social contexts.

The Terrorism Label: Framing Mass Violence
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Currently, through a variety of methods, the literature has established that after the
attacks of September 11, 2001 terrorism has been portrayed as the chief national security threat
by US policymakers and media outlets (Altheide 2006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and
Arthur 2014). Additionally, this body of literature has found that “terrorism” has become almost
exclusively associated with Islamic radicals, and that counterterrorism policy has increasingly
been discussed alongside domestic law enforcement and immigration policy (ibid). Survey data
and some peer reviewed studies have also demonstrated that gender, age, media exposure, and
geographical location are all significant predictors of individuals’ fear of terrorism (Brück and
Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008).

Additionally, previous studies have suggested that societal elites and media coverage of
terrorism may influence perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news
coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess 2008; Nellis and Savage 2012;
Woods 2007). Furthermore, mass violence events with a higher number of casualties receive a
greater amount of media attention (Lankford and Madfis 2018). White offenders are seldom
discussed in terms of their race in news coverage of mass shooting events (Mingus and Zopf
2010). However, news coverage over-emphasizes the race/ethnicity of non-white offenders
(Chuang 2012; Mingus and Zopf 2010) and frames them in terms of their “foreignness” (ibid.)

These studies do leave some substantial gaps. For example, these studies have mostly
focused on narratives and how terrorism is linked ideologically driven portrayals groups. Little
empirical research has explicitly investigated how individuals are portrayed as terrorists or nonterrorists in mass media, and this research has overwhelmingly used analyses of print newspapers
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to the neglect of other sources. These studies also typically equate race/ethnicity,
religion/ideology, and foreignness or rely on one measure, i.e. adherence to the Muslim religion,
as a proxy for all three concepts. I assert that this may be over-simplifying the relationship,
although I also acknowledge that these concepts are difficult to disentangle in the real world.

Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is used to convey a
specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval (Kunda 1999). This
specific threat has also been constantly framed as a “new” form of violence in US mass media
(Norris et al. 2003). Similar to other crimes, terrorism is framed in a particular way in media
communications. Political discourse, media portrayals, and popular sentiment associates
terrorism almost exclusively with Islamic radicals, especially since the attacks of September 11,
2001 (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods
2011). However, the majority of terrorist acts executed in the United States are committed by
internal actors rather than foreign aggressors. The FBI classifies approximately two-thirds of all
terrorist plots between 1980 and 2001 as “domestic.” That figure rose to 95 percent between
2002 and 2005 (FBI 2005).
The “terrorism” label has both broad and specific implications when it is applied.
Altheide (2006) found that terrorism goes beyond a simple narrative, rather when an incident is
labelled as terrorism, it becomes the “definition of the situation”. This framing of violence
creates a sense that all Americans are potential victims of evil terrorists, and the military are
portrayed as our protectors against terrorist violence. Terrorists are portrayed as faceless
clandestine actors who strike from the shadows, as a foreign threat to our way of life, they use
weapons of mass destruction, and are almost exclusively shown as Muslim radicals in the
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modern era (Kunda 1999; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods
2011, 2014). The threat of terrorism is therefore both vague and specific at the same time,
portrayed as a threatening outgroup, or an “other” which demands a swift military response.

Media is the primary institution that conveys messages about risk to the public (Altheide
2006, 2009), and television is still the preferred news medium for most Americans (Mitchell and
Weisel 2016), with over half of US adults reporting that they often get news from television
sources. The first part of this study will examine how suspected perpetrators of terrorism are
portrayed in US news media using quantitative content analysis techniques. Specifically, I first
generate a sample of terrorism suspects from a list of terrorism incidents in the United States
with identifiable perpetrators as defined by the Global Terrorism Database. Then, with that list
of names, I sample broadcast news transcripts from Lexis Nexus Academic that discuss the
suspect and then code transcripts for use of the “terrorism” label, i.e. assigning a 0/1 value to a
transcript. This allows me to test hypotheses about whether characteristics of the attack or the
suspect predict the labelling of terrorism using multilevel modelling techniques, i.e. mixedeffects logistic regression. Incidents are used as a clustering variable, and transcripts are the unit
of analysis. I hypothesize that controlling for characteristics of an attack, a suspect’s ethnicity,
immigration status, and religious/ideological affiliation will significantly predict use of the
terrorism label by broadcast news programs. Additional coding is done for the number of times
“terrorist” or “terrorism” are used in a transcript, whether a transcript mentions race, ethnicity,
religion, or national origin of the offender.

Previous research has found that since the September 11, 2001 attacks, terrorism has been
associated almost exclusively with Radical Islam in the US news media (Altheide 2006, 2009;
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Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2011). Inaccurate stereotypes
regarding terrorism and terrorists have dominated political discussions and mass media, as well
as public perceptions. A number of empirical studies in conjunction with official statistics have
demonstrated that elements of Islamophobia, i.e. fear of Muslims as a constructed “other”, play
an increasingly prominent role in shaping US discourse. A content analysis of US news coverage
of terrorist incidents since 9/11 showed that media outlets consistently tried to attribute terrorist
incidents to radical Islamic terrorist, even if this was not actually the case (Powell 2011).
Additionally, previous studies have suggested that media coverage of terrorism may influence
perceptions of risk more than actual terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime
(Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007).

Another content analysis looked at US news media portrayal of politically violent groups
that mostly target civilians across the globe (Nagar 2010). They found that Islamic groups were
more likely to be labeled as terrorist groups, and that conservative-leaning sources are more
likely to use this frame. Interestingly, they did not find a significant difference in rates of
portrayal of terrorism before and after 9/11, suggesting that framing of terrorism over time in US
news media has relied on the same stereotypes of terrorism. In contrast, a mixed-methods study
compared framing of terrorism in two US based and two UK based newspapers showed that
terrorism is consistently associated with al Qaeda, the September 11th attacks, national security,
and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008).

An experimental study by Woods (2011) tested the social-psychological effects of news
media framing of terrorism, finding that news stories that associated terrorism with radical Islam
resulted in higher perceived threat, increased fear, and feelings of dread than stories about
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terrorism alone. In fact, terrorism not linked with radical Islam did not have any significant effect
on perceptions of threat. A frame incorporating both radical Islamic terrorism and the threat of a
nuclear attack provoked the highest level of fear and dread. This suggests that not only are
incidents involving Islamic terrorism perceived as more threatening, but also that the type of
attack and the scale of the attack also importantly influences the public’s perceptions and
media’s framing of violence as terrorism.

Data and Methods
This study addresses when the “terrorist” frame is applied to suspects/perpetrators of
mass violence, focusing only on incidents which occurred in the United States. To investigate
this, I employ a quantitative content analysis of broadcast news transcripts from 1992-2016,
exploring why certain violent perpetrators are framed as terrorists. Media is a key social
institution in communicating risks to the public (Altheide 2006, 2009; Glassner 2009; Woods
2007) and how violence is framed can influence the public’s perception of danger (Woods 2011).
Sampling is limited to US media sources and will focus on incidents of mass violence considered
terrorism by the Global Terrorism Database, an open source academic collection of terrorist
incidents around the world from 1970-2018 run by the University of Maryland. This database
includes a wide range of violent incidents such as mass shootings, bombings, arson, vehicular
attacks, chemical/biological/nuclear attacks, etc. (GTD 2019). Incidents are coded to capture a
variety of information on the incident including type of attack, casualties, characteristics of the
suspect, and transcripts are coded for use of framing words such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’,
whether the transcript discusses the suspects race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin.
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A quantitative content analysis is not particularly different from a survey. In a traditional
survey, the researcher creates a questionnaire and checks boxes based on the respondents’
answers to questions. In quantitative questionnaires, these questions are close-ended, and
answers are mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. In quantitative content analysis, the
researcher creates a questionnaire using the same strategies and standards that they would use for
any other survey. However, in this case the researcher checks boxes in the questionnaire based
on the content of a document or communication (see Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2005).

Using a suspect-based approach to investigate media frames essentially means that search
terms reference a particular individual who is believed to be involved in a terrorist attack. For
example, search terms follow this style by using terms such as “Timothy McVeigh” or “Rizwan
Farook”. Currently, most studies of framing terrorism have focused on the processes of
developing frames – i.e. the social construction of the terrorism frame and the processes and
motivations for framing terrorism in a particular way. Alternatively, studies of how the terrorism
frame is deployed have focused on when groups/organizations and general ideological
motivations are framed as terrorism by news media. Expanding the framing of terrorism
literature, my content analysis focuses on the social characteristics of specific offenders rather
than a group or organizational analysis. Moreover, this study examines the characteristics of
attacks, such as weapons used, and targets chosen and their effect on how violence is framed as
terrorism – or not. This study also incorporates a new data source – broadcast news transcripts as previous studies tend to focus only on major newspapers. This is particularly important, as in
the 21st century, newspaper readership has significantly declined and most people get their news
from television, with social media rapidly increasing as a primary news source (see Mitchell,
Gottfried, Barthel, and Shearer 2017; Mitchell, Holcomb, and Weisel 2017). Analysis uses
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mixed-effects logistic regression techniques to model the effects of suspect race/ethnicity place
of birth, and religious/ideological affiliation on the use of the term(s) “Terrorism” “Terror
Attack(s)”, or “Terrorist(s)” in broadcast news transcripts, while controlling for characteristics of
the attacks and the transcripts.

Data Sources

The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) collects detailed information about terrorist
incidents, and currently includes over 100,000 incidents worldwide. Data is collected on the
perpetrators, attack type, weapons used, target, location, date, casualties, and more. This also
includes a description of the event, and up to three news stories referencing the incident.
Sampling cast the widest net possible while still using strict criteria for inclusion. This not only
provides us with a variety of attacks which differ greatly in style and execution, but also provides
a firm null
The GTD defines terrorism as “The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by
a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion,
or intimidation” (START 2017). Within this blanket definition, the GTD also specifies that the
act must be intentional, must involve some level of violence or threat of violence against persons
or property, and that perpetrators must be sub-national actors5. In addition, the GTD includes
three criteria which can be required or not, allowing for researchers to specify the strictness of
their definitions:

1. The act must be aimed at pursuing political, economic, religious, or social goal.

5

For more information, see the Global Terrorism Database Codebook at
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/downloads/Codebook.pdf
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2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some message to
a larger audience than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

It is evident that this definition can include many incidents which are not clearly defined as
terrorism. One of the main problems researchers of terrorism face is the ambiguous nature of the
variable, which frequently overlaps with hate crimes, organized crime, and insurgencies. For the
purposes of this research, only incidents which occurred within the United States from 19922016, which meet all terrorism criteria, and are considered “successful” attacks6 were sampled.
These search criteria include diverse incidents from the1995 Oklahoma City bombing, to the
2009 Fort Hood Shooting, to the September 11th Hijackings.

Nexus UNI (hereafter NU) Is a collection of published documents which can be search and
retrieved for use in academic research. Lexis Nexus Academic allows users to search print news
articles and broadcast news transcripts from around the world. Sampling is possible by searching
for keywords in broadcast news transcripts section, focusing on major network and cable news
programs, such as NBC, CNN, FOX News, etc.

Sampling
Sampling for the second phase of this study will occur in two stages and involves a
hybrid cluster sampling and stratified sampling technique. The first stage involves sampling from
the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The first stage also records clustering variables such as
incident and suspect characteristics. To be included in the analysis, and incident must: 1. Have

6

For more information on advanced search criteria, see the Global Terrorism Database at
www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
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occurred in the United States between 1992 and 2016; 2. appear in the GTD; 3. have resulted in
at least one casualty; 4. meet all three GTD criteria for classification as “terrorism”, 5. include
description(s) of an identifiable suspect(s). This sampling stage yielded 57 incidents with 65
suspects for inclusion. The second sampling stage involves searching suspects’ names in Nexus
Uni (NU), and then recording transcripts in a stratified according to seven broadcast news
organizations. To be included in the final sample, a suspect’s name must appear in at least one
broadcast news transcript from a major network – i.e. ABC, CBS, CNN, FOX, MSNBC, NBC,
and PBS – returned by the NU search engine. Transcripts are then coded for their use of the
“terrorism” frame. It is notable that the September 11, 2001 attacks were intentionally excluded
from this analysis. Some sociologists have argued that these attacks now constitute the “ideal
type” of terrorism (see Black 2004, Weber 1945). Table 3.1 below describes variables collected
and summarizes descriptive statistics.
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Table 3.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics
Incident Characteristics
Number of People Killed (mean =
6.32, SD = 22.90, range = 0-168,
skewness = 6.46)
Primary Weapon Type
Firearms (coded 1, 61.40%)
Explosives/Incendiary (coded 2,
19.30%)
Vehicle (coded 3, 5.26%)
Melee (coded 4, 10.53%)
Other (coded 5, 3.51%)
Year (range = 1992-2016)

Suspect Characteristics
Susp. Race/Ethnicity
White (coded 1, 52.31%)
Black (coded 2, 18.46%)
MENA (coded 3, 27.69%)
Asian (coded 4, 1.54%)
Susp. Place of Birth
US Born (coded 0, 70.77%)
Foreign Born (coded 1, 29.23%)
Susp. Ideology
Radical Islam (coded 1, 47.69%)
Far-Right (coded 2, 43.08%)
Far-Left (coded 3, 6.15%)
Other (coded 4, 3.08%)
Sex
Male (coded 0, 95.38)
Female (coded 1, 4.62)

N = 57

N = 65

Transcript Characteristics
News Organization
ABC (coded 1, 17.63%)
CBS (coded 2, 18.27%)
CNN (coded 3, 20.19%)
FOX News (coded 4, 12.50%)
MSNBC (coded 5, 10.26%)
NBC (coded 6, 12.82%)
PBS (coded 7, 8.33%)
About Incident
No (coded 0, 14.42%)
Yes (coded 1, 85.58%)
Expert Guest
No (coded 0, 59.94%)
Yes (coded 1, 40.06%)
Use of Terror Frame
No (coded 0, 47.12%)
Yes (coded 1, 52.88%)
N = 312

Bivariate Analysis

Bivariate analyses used to test association of variables found that many measures do appear
to be associated with the use of the “terror frame” in broadcast news transcripts. Figures 3.1
through 3.6 chart these relationships. Chi-squared and Pearson’s r test results are reported as
well. Figures 3.1-3.3 examines the relationship between characteristics of the attack and use of
the terror frame. All variables showed statistically significant relationships. Specifically, the type
of weapon used in the incident (p<.001) is significantly associated with use of the terror frame in
a Chi2 test. It appears that attacks using explosives, vehicles, and melee attacks are discussed
with the terror frame more frequently. Additionally, both the number of people killed in the
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incident (r=.16, p<.01) and the year in which the incident took place (r=.17, p<.01) are weakly
and positively correlated with use of the terror frame. This means that incidents which result in a
higher number of deaths and incidents which occurred more recently are more frequently
discussed with the terror frame in broadcast news transcripts.

Figure 3.1 Use of Terror Frame by Incident Characteristics (Weapon Type) 1992-2016
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Figure 3.2 Use of Terror Frame by Incident Characteristics (Num. Killed) 1992-2016

Figure 3.3 Use of Terror Frame by Incident Characteristics (Year) 1992-2016
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Figures 3.4-3.6 charts the relationship between characteristics of the transcripts
themselves and use of the terror frame, which are used as control variables in multivariate
models. Results of Chi2 tests are reported. Whether the transcript is about the incident or not
about the incident (p<.05) – i.e. less than 10% of transcript discusses the incident – is
significantly associated with use of the terror frame. Specifically, it appears that when transcripts
are about the incident, they more frequently use the terror frame. Whether or not the transcript
featured and expert guest (p<.001) is also significantly associated with use of the terror frame.
Differences in use of the terror frame by news organization (p=.243) was also tested but does not
reveal a significant relationship.

Figure 3.4 Use of Terror Frame by Transcript Characteristics (About Incident) 1992-2016
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Figure 3.5 Use of Terror Frame by Transcript Characteristics (Expert Guest) 1992-2016

Figure 3.6 Use of Terror Frame by Transcript Characteristics (News Org.) 1992-2016

92

Figures 3.7-3.9 chart characteristics of suspects and the use of the terror frame in
broadcast news transcripts. The results of Chi2 tests are reported. The suspect’s race/ethnicity
(p<.001) is significantly associated with use of the terror frame. Specifically, it appears that the
terror frame is used more frequently when suspects are Black and Middle Eastern/North African
(MENA). The suspects place of birth (p<.001) is also significantly associated with use of the
terror frame. Specifically, it appears that foreign born suspects are discussed with the terror
frame more frequently than US born suspects. Finally, the suspect’s ideological affiliation is also
significantly related to use of the terror frame (p<.001). Specifically, transcripts more frequently
us the terror frame if the suspect has a Radical Islamic ideology/motivation compared to FarRight, Far-Left, and Other ideologies.

Figure 3.7 Use of Terror Frame by Suspect Characteristics (Race/Ethnicity) 1992-2016
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Figure 3.8 Use of Terror Frame by Suspect Characteristics (Place of Birth) 1992-2016

Figure 3.9 Use of Terror Frame by Suspect Characteristics (Religion/Ideology) 1992-2016
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Mixed-Effects Logistic Regression Analysis (Multilevel Modelling)
This analysis uses mixed-effects logistic regressions with a random intercept on the
incident in order to estimate the effect of predictor variables on use of the terrorist/terrorism
frame in broadcast news media transcripts. Because of the complicated, clustered nature of the
data, a traditional logit model is not sufficient to estimate effects. Logistic regression is
commonly used in social research and is appropriate for models which use a categorical
dependent variable such as use of terrorism. These models report the logged odds (L) of the
likelihood of a particular category of the dependent variable being selected.

Li = ln[P(yi = 1)/P(yi = 0)]

The logged odds that y = 1 for the ith observation are subsequently estimated as a linear
function of independent variables. β0 represents the model’s Y-intercept, while β1X1i ; β2X2i ; etc.
represent X-variable predictors. This portion of the model describes the fixed-effects, or the
value of Y as a function of X1, X2, etc. effects that are the same for all groups. The addition of the
random intercept U0j term allows for the possibility that the mean level of y is systematically
higher or lower among some groups.
Li = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + … + βmXmi + U0j

Null Hypothesis: All attacks can be considered terrorism by GTD definitions- therefore,
controlling for incident characteristics, we should not expect to find significant differences in use
of the terrorist frame in broadcast news media.

Alternative Hypothesis: Controlling for characteristics of the incident and differences
between transcripts, characteristics of the suspects such as race/ethnicity, place of birth, and
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ideological affiliation will significantly predict use of the terrorist frame in broadcast news
media.

Essentially, this is to say that based on previous scholarship, I expect to find significant
bias in news transcripts use of the “terrorism frame” based on the suspects’ apparent
race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideological affiliation, even when accounting for factors such
as the number of people killed, the type of weapon used when the incident occurred. Specifically,
I hypothesize that transcripts will be more likely to use the “terrorism frame” is the suspect is
ethnically Middle Eastern/North African (MENA), foreign born, or associated with radical Islam
compared to suspects who are White, US born, and associated with other ideologies – for the
same behaviors.

Results

This analysis attempts to disentangle the related measures of suspect race/ethnicity, place of
birth, and ideological affiliation. This proves to be a difficult task, and post results analyses
reveal the need for a re-coding of race/ethnicity and ideology variables. Table 3.2 presents multilevel logistic regression results. Table 3.3 presents a crosstabulation of binary race/ethnicity and
ideology measures, which are then used to recode race/ethnicity and ideology into a threecategory variable, which is used to compare suspects who are not MENA, but associated with
Radical Islam, and people who are MENA and associated with Radical Islam to other suspect
who are neither MENA or associated with Radical Islam.

First, I begin with the analysis in Table 3.2, which shows results from 4 different mixedeffects logistic regressions. Models test whether the suspect’s characteristics, especially
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race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideological affiliation, significantly predict use of the terror
frame in broadcast news transcripts, even when controlling for characteristics of the incidents
and transcripts. Model 1 tests the suspect’s race/ethnicity, Model 2 tests the suspect’s place of
birth, Model 3 tests the suspect’s ideological affiliation, and Model 4 tests all variables together.
Incident ID numbers are used a grouping variable (N = 312; Groups = 57). Figures 3.4-3.6
visually depict predicted probabilities of suspects characteristics in Table 3.2, Models 1-3.
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Table 3.2 Predictors of Use of Terror Frame in Broadcast News Transcripts: MixedEffects Logistic Regression with a Random Intercept – Odds Ratios Reported
Model 1 - OR(SE) Model 2 - OR(SE) Model 3 - OR(SE) Model 4 - OR(SE)
About
2.67(1.44)
2.44(1.31)
2.48(1.28)
2.63(1.40)
Year
1.08(0.04)*
1.08(0.04)*
1.06(0.03)
1.05(0.03)
Expert Guest
6.47(2.49)***
6.70(2.61)***
7.01(2.77)***
7.06(2.79)***
Num. Killed
1.03(0.03)
1.05(0.05)
1.02(0.02)
1.03(0.02)
Weapon Used
Firearms
Explosives
4.56(3.18)*
2.15(1.56)
2.74(1.60)
2.17(1.34)
Vehicle 18.81(19.38)**
13.69(15.18)*
8.92(7.77)*
9.08(8.05)*
Melee
6.97(6.34)*
10.22(9.73)*
2.66(1.95)
2.21(1.73)
Other
5.24(7.01)
2.90(4.14)
26.15(39.63)*
34.51(57.20)*
Susp. Race
White
Black
5.03(3.38)*
0.84(0.76)
MENA
8.41(5.11)***
0.39(0.35)
Asian
0.28(0.52)
3.21(5.80)
Susp. Nat’l
US Born
Foreign Born
5.74(3.54)**
1.13(0.59)
Susp. Ideology
Radical Islam
Far-Right
0.07(0.03)***
0.04(0.03)***
Far-Left
0.06(0.05)***
0.04(0.03)***
Other
0.01(0.02)**
0.01(0.01)**
Cons.
2.64(2.02)*
3.19(2.47)*
3.05(1.94)
2.56(1.69)
Group-Level
Random Effect
Estimate (SE)
Estimate (SE)
Estimate (SE)
Estimate (SE)
Random
1.07(0.28)
1.27(0.28)
0.64(0.29)
0.60(0.30)
Intercept
LR Test vs
.000
.000
.073
.097
Fixed Effects
N = 312
N = 312
N = 312
N = 312
Groups = 57
Groups = 57
Groups = 57
Groups = 57
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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In model 1, the year in which the incident occurred, appearance of an expert guest, weapon
type and race/ethnicity of the suspect are all statistically significant predictors of the use of the
“terrorism frame”. With each additional year, the odds that a transcript will use the terrorism
frame increase about 8 percent (multiplied by 1.08, p<.05) showing that the terrorism label is
more commonly used in recent years. The inclusion of an expert guest in a broadcast news
transcript increases the odds that the terrorism frame will be used in a transcript by 547 percent
(multiplied by 6.47, p<.001) compared to transcripts that do not include an expert guest. The
number of people killed did not significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. The type of
weapon used did significantly predict use of the terrorism frame. Compared to attacks which
primarily used firearms, an attack that used explosive or incendiary weapon(s) increased the odds
of using the terrorism frame by 365 percent (multiplied by 4.56, p<.05), an attack which used
vehicle(s) increased the odds of using the terrorism frame by 1781 percent (multiplied by 18.81,
p<.01), and melee attacks increased the odds of using the terrorism frame by 597 percent
(multiplied by 6.97, p<.05). Other attacks did not significantly predict use of the terrorism frame.
Finally, the suspect’s apparent race/ethnicity did significantly predict use of the terrorism frame.
Compared to transcripts about white suspects, transcripts about Black suspects increase the odds
of using the terrorism frame by about 403 percent (multiplied by 5.03, p<.05), and transcripts
about MENA suspects increase the odds of using the terrorism frame by about 741 percent,
(multiplied by 8.41, p<.001).
In model 2, the effect of suspects’ place of birth is assessed along with control variables
instead of suspects’ race/ethnicity. Again, year is a significant predictor of use of the terrorist
frame (p<.05), adding an additional year increases the odds of transcripts using the terrorism
frame by 1.08. Also, having an expert guest on the transcript increases the odds of using the
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terror frame by about 570 percent (multiplied by 6.70, p<.001). Neither whether the transcript is
about the incident or the number of people killed had statistically significant effect in model 2.
The type of weapon used again predicted use of the terrorism frame. Compared to attacks using
firearms, vehicular attacks increased the odds of using the terrorist frame by about 1269 percent
(multiplied by 13.69, p<.05), and melee attacks increased the odds of using the terrorist frame by
about 922 percent (multiplied by 10.22, p<.05). Neither explosive/incendiary attacks or other
attacks were significantly different from firearm attacks in model 2. Finally, compared to
suspects who are US-born, suspects who are foreign-born increase the odds of transcripts using
the terrorism frame by about 474 percent (multiplied by 5.74, p<.01). In both model 1 and model
2, the group-level random effects, in this case incidents, are statistically significant. This means
that in these models, there are significant differences between incidents not explained by the
variables included in the models.
Model 3 tests the effect of suspects’ ideological affiliation on use of the terrorism frame
along with control variables. In model 3, whether the transcript is about the incident, the year
that the incident took place in, and the number of people killed in the incident do not
significantly predict use of the terror frame. The presence of an expert guest on a transcript is
still significant (p<.001), increasing the odds of the transcript using the terror frame by about 601
percent (multiplied by 7.01). The weapon used also still significantly predict use of the terror
frame. Compared to firearm attacks, vehicular attacks (multiplied by 8.92, p<.05) and other
attacks (multiplied by 26.1, p<.05) both increased the odds of transcripts using the terrorism
frame. Explosive/incendiary attacks and melee attacks did not significantly predict use of the
terror frame compared to firearm attacks in model 3. Suspect ideology did significantly predict
use of the terror frame. Compared to suspects with radical Islamic ideologies, suspects with far-
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right ideologies (multiplied by 0.07, p<.001), far-left ideologies (multiplied by 0.06, p<.001),
and suspects with Other ideologies (multiplied by 0.01, p<.001) all decreased the odds of the
terror frame being used by broadcast news transcripts. Figures 3.10-3.12 chart the probabilities
of a transcript using the “terrorism” frame by suspect characteristics in models 1-3. Interestingly,
when accounting for suspect ideology, the group-level random effects are no longer statistically
significant.

Figure 3.10 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Race/Ethnicity
with 95% Confidence Intervals (Model 1)
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Figure 3.11 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Place of Birth with 95%
Confidence Intervals (Model 2)

Figure 3.12 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Ideology with 95%
Confidence Intervals (Model 3)
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Model 4 then combines all variables tested in models 1 through 3, assessing the effect of
suspects’ race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideology on use of the terrorism frame together with
control variables. In model 4, the presence of an expert guest increases the odds of transcripts
using the terror frame by about 606 percent (multiplied by 7.06, p<.001). The type of weapon
used also significantly predicts use of the terror frame. Compared to firearm attacks, both
vehicular attacks (multiplied by 9.08, p<.05) and Other attacks (multiplied by 34.51, p<.05)
increased the odds of use of the terror frame. Explosive/incendiary attacks and melee attacks
were not significantly different from firearm attacks in model 4. Additionally, whether the
transcript was about the incident, the year in which the incident occurred, and the number of
people killed in the incident are not statistically significant in model 4. As for suspect
characteristics, when race/ethnicity, place of birth, and ideology are all included together, the
only variable which significantly predicts use of the terrorism frame is suspects’ ideology.
Suspects with radical Islamic ideologies are more likely to have the terrorist label used in a news
transcript, and this mediates the effects of the suspects’ race/ethnicity and place of birth.
Specifically, compared to suspects with radical Islamic ideologies, suspects with far-fight
ideologies (multiplied by 0.04, p<.001), far-left ideologies (multiplied by 0.04, p<.001), and
Other ideologies (multiplied by 0.01, p<.001) all decrease the odds of transcripts using the
terrorism frame, net of all other variables. Again, when accounting for suspect ideology, the
group-level random effects are no longer statistically significant. Essentially, accounting for
ideology/religion makes all the difference, and there are no longer significant differences
between incidents beyond what is accounted for in the model.

The mediation of both the effect of race/ethnicity and place of birth is unexpected, however
due to the high overlap in these categories, i.e. all MENA suspects are also associated with
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radical Islam, the independent effects of these variables could be masked in this multivariate
relationship. Sensitivity to model specification is addressed by refining how measures are
estimated in regression models. Two additional analyses were performed as well: a
crosstabulation using “streamlined” binary variables for race/ethnicity (1 = MENA; 0 = Other),
and ideology (1 = Radical Islam; 0 = Other Ideology), the results of which are shown below in
Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Crosstabulation of MENA and Radical Islam with Chi2 Test
Not-Radical
Islam
Not-MENA
162

Radical Islam

Total

72

234

MENA

0

78

78

Total

162

150

312

Pearson Chi2 = 112.32

p<.001

The crosstabulation results reveal that the suspect’s race/ethnicity and ideology significantly
related (Chi2=112.32, p<.001). In particular, the table notes that all 78 cases where the suspect is
MENA are also associated with Radical Islam. The number of cases involving not-MENA
suspects are split between ideologies of radical Islam (N = 72) and other ideologies (N = 162),
and cases involving suspects associated with radical Islam are almost evenly split between
MENA (N = 78) and suspects of other race/ethnicities (N = 72). The absence of cases in the
MENA/Not-Radical Islam category (N = 0) is likely concealing any independent effect that the
suspects’ race/ethnicity may have on use of the terrorism label by broadcast news media when
suspect ideology is also accounted for in the regression analyses in Table 3.2. In short, the
operationalization and specification of race, ethnicity, and religion/ideology is particularly tricky.
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Discussion

The overall focus of this chapter is to evaluate the extent to which socially constructed
meanings applied to similar behaviors at different times and places affect the public’s
perceptions of mass violence. What it is, how it affects individuals and society, how individuals
and social institutions respond to perceived violence all differ greatly by which label is used to
describe the incident. Who is a terrorist? Based on previous literature, the “terrorist” is portrayed
most commonly as a “Muslim” man who is foreign, appears Middle Eastern, and is motivated by
radical Islamic ideology.

There is research suggesting that characteristics of the attack may influence whether or
not an event is labelled as terrorism, for which I find mixed support. This chapter does not
necessarily find support for studies that have suggested that mass violence events with a higher
number of casualties receive a greater amount of media attention (Lankford and Madfis 2018).
At least, I find that events with greater casualties are not more likely to be called terrorist attacks.
Interestingly, I find support for Altheide’s (2006; 2017) finding that the use of “experts” is a key
part of communicating the terrorist threat to the public. In this chapter, I find that when a news
program features an “expert” guest, the incident is more likely to be framed as terrorism. There is
also a suggestion in the literature that terrorists are perceived as using explosives or
unconventional weapons (Woods 2011), for which I also find some support. Specifically, when
suspects use weapons other than firearms, they are more likely to be labelled as terrorists.

Western societies and the antagonism felt toward Islam and Muslims is racial in nature
(Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Taras 2013). I find support for the
assertions that in the case of US, much of the increase in Islamophobia has occurred since the

105

1990’s, especially following the 9/11 attacks (Skenderovic and Späti 2019), and that
Islamophobia is racially based (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Constadine 2017; Garner and
Selod 2015; Taras 2013). The interaction of race, ethnicity, religion, racialization, and racism
involved with Islamophobia are difficult to disentangle (Taras 2013), and I do find support for
this. In my analysis, race/ethnicity, birthplace, and religion/ideology are all significantly
associated with use of the terrorist label in news transcripts. Interestingly, these measures seem
to act as a proxy for the construct of “Muslim”. Despite the difficulties in disaggregating the
intersection of race, ethnicity, and religion when studying Islamophobia, I agree with scholars
who assert that racialization theory is appropriate way to understand the framing of Muslims as
terrorists (Garner and Selod 2015).

The strongest findings in this chapter are that the application of the terrorist label is
racially biased. Some research has found that in mass murder events, white offenders are seldom
discussed in terms of their race in news coverage (Mingus and Zopf 2010). News coverage also
over-emphasizes the race/ethnicity and “foreignness” of non-white offenders (Chuang 2012;
Mingus and Zopf 2010). I do find support for this in my analyses of broadcast news transcripts.
Non-white and foreign-born suspects are more likely to be labelled as terrorists, than white and
US-born suspects. However, whiteness does not shield a suspect from the “terrorism” label if
they are associated with Islam. This chapter finds evidence that “Muslims” have been racialized
in the US – though this is not based entirely on nationality or skin color. Islamophobia plays on
historical constructs of Orientalism, similar to how Jews were portrayed in Europe and the US in
the early 20th Century (Skenderovic and Späti 2019). White privilege appears to meet its limit
when an individual is associated with Islam, which has also been found by other researchers
(Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015).
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Both Middle Eastern and non-Middle Eastern Muslims are more likely to be called
terrorists than their non-Muslim counterparts. The effect is larger for non-Middle Eastern
Muslims. This could be due to an implicit assumption that Middle Eastern suspects are
“terrorists”, whereas suspects of other racial/ethnic backgrounds could have been committing
another type of crime – hence clarification is needed. These suspects are Muslim, ergo they are
still terrorists in the eyes of the public, despite lacking the Middle Eastern appearance. Another
explanation is that Middle Eastern suspects may be presumed to have a motivation for
committing terrorism. However non-Middle Eastern suspects engaging in the same behavior
might be considered particularly abnormal – again requiring clarification from news media
reporting on the incidents.

It is true that whites and non-whites clearly have different lived experiences and media
constructions in the US. Consequently, we should understand the “Muslim” lived experience to
be distinct from whiteness as well, at least in popular discourse, regardless of skin color. The
data analyzed in this chapter provides evidence that “Muslims” are not considered to meet the
cultural standards of “whiteness” in the US today. Analysis of media coverage of terrorism
suspects reveals that even when a white person adopts Muslim ethnic markers, they find
themselves facing the same media construction as a non-white Muslim.
Additionally, I assert that markers of “Muslim” racialization include an association with
terrorism. Prior research demonstrated that when a mass shooter is white, media rarely discusses
their race. Consequently, when a mass shooter is non-white, media over-emphasizes the
suspect’s race in their reporting. There are precedents for defining religious groups as “races” in
US history, particularly when considering how Jews were portrayed in the early 20th Century. I
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find parallels in social trends primarily occurring in the early 21st Century, to “Orientalism” of
earlier eras in this chapter. Other research found that while white converts to Islam can still
benefit from greater respect in society, their whiteness is precarious, and they can lose some of
the benefits of their whiteness. My research finds that, at least in news reporting about terrorism
suspects, association with Islam essentially “revokes” a suspect’s whiteness.
The case of conspiracy theories about President Obama’s religion and birthplace provide
a very visible example of the racialization of Muslims and Islamophobia is in. Race was a
constant factor in Obamas candidacy and Presidency (Fraser 2009). President Obama is often
cited as the first Black President (ibid.). Although his father was a black Kenyan, he can equally
claim white parentage from his mother. Narratives about Obama’s race shifted throughout his
campaign and Presidency but always portrayed a “foreignness” that was presumed to be
threatening to white voters. During the 2008 Presidential campaign, a right-wing conspiracy
theory emerged that Barack Obama was secretly Muslim (Layman et al 2014). This is easily
disproven, as Barack Obama to practice a Christian faith, and was also controversially his
association with Reverend Jeremiah Wright (McKenzie 2011). Another far-right conspiracy
theory which gained traction during Obama’s Presidency claims that Obama was not born in the
United States (Hughley 2012), also known as the Birther movement. These conspiracy theories
about race and foreignness endure, despite plain evidence that Obama is a Christian, and natural
born citizen. These claims, however, do not come from a place of good faith (Hughley 2012).
President Obama’s multiracial heritage is largely the unspoken motivation for these conspiracy
theories which were embraced by conservatives (Hughley 2012; Layman et al 2014).
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The previous chapter demonstrated the agenda setting power of the President and news
media. I found that the public is more concerned about terrorism as a problem when more
Presidential remarks and news media stories discuss terrorism as a topic. This chapter
demonstrates that the content of those news stories is racially biased, and more likely to portray
“Muslims” as terrorists than non-Muslims for the same behavior. The following chapter analyses
how selective exposure to media messages influences an individual’s fear of a terrorist attack
compared to a mass shooting, assuming that the labels have different connotations and racial
meaning attached to them.

109

CHAPTER IV. COMPARING PUBLIC FEAR OF TERRORIST ATTACKS
TO PUBLIC FEAR OF MASS SHOOTINGS

During the 2016 Presidential Campaign the threats and realities of extreme violence in the
United States – particularly terrorist attacks and mass shooting incidents – took a prominent role
in candidates’ policy platforms. My dissertation investigates whether members of the public are
more likely to worry about a terrorist attack or a mass shooting based on their media
consumption habits and political beliefs. I also specifically account for indicators that are known
to be associated with individuals’ fear of violent crime victimization. Specifically, I use data
from the Fall 2017 Granite State Poll to test how selective exposure to partisan mass media
predicts individuals’ expressed fears of being victimized in either a terrorist attack or a mass
shooting, while controlling for individual characteristics, including background factors, and prior
political leanings. I argue that fear of terrorism and fear of mass shootings is not only a response
to violence, but also to the politics, messages, and meanings that surround events of extremist
violence.

The rise to prominence of the group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL in 2014, and
attacks carried out in 2015 and 2016 by ISIL-trained individuals in Europe and ISIL-inspired
individuals in the US reignited public concerns of terrorist violence in the US. In combination
with the refugee migrant crisis in the Middle East and Europe precipitated by the escalation of
the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars, terrorism, immigration, and gun violence emerged as wedge
issues during the 2016 US election cycle (Albertson and Kushner Gadarian 2016). This
culminated in then-candidate Donald Trump proposing a “total ban” on Muslims entering the
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United State following the ISIL-Inspired San Bernardino, CA attack in December 2015, and the
eventual signing of Executive Order 13769 in January 2017.

Throughout the 2016 Presidential campaign, Donald Trump espoused a view that foreign
terrorist organizations, immigrants broadly, and Muslims in particular, are a threat to the US
homeland and the American way of life. Winning the Presidency using racially charged language
equating Muslims and other non-White immigrants as dangerous criminals and leveraging the
US public’s fear of victimization in ISIL-inspired attacks, the Trump administration has
subsequently pursued many controversial policies in the US and abroad under the guise of
combatting terrorism and enacting immigration control. These policies include the “Muslim
Ban” and southern border wall.

Conversely, candidate Hillary Clinton emphasized gun control policies as a means to curb
mass shootings, an issue which became central to the democratic candidate’s platform (Albertson
and Kushner Gadarian 2016; Brogan et al 2020). Incidents of mass violence which occurred
during the 2016 campaign season – such as the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, FL and
attack on police officers at a Black Lives Matter rally in Dallas, TX – provoked very different
responses from candidates Trump and Clinton according to news sources at the time (Chozick et
al 2016; Nelson, Lind, and Golshan 2016). This culminated in the 2016 Democratic Convention,
which included victims of the Orlando shooting speaking on gun control policy. Clearly, each
candidate conceptualized the danger facing US society in 2016 differently and thus
communicated distinct messages about the threat posed by violent extremists to the US public.
They also proposed opposing solutions to combatting the alleged problem(s), i.e. a “Muslim
Ban” versus and “Assault Weapon” ban.
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These divergent views on the nature of extremist threats – and the solutions to fighting
them – are not new but have been promoted to the US public through mass media outlets for
decades. Political elites and news media both play a central role in shaping the discussion
surrounding incidents such as terrorism or mass shootings, and subsequently influencing public
opinion (Altheide 2006, 2009; Woods 2007). In media conversations about terrorism, Islamic
radical groups such as Al Qaeda have dominated the thoughts of politicians and media narratives
alike (Kunda 1999; Norris et al 2003; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011;
Woods 2011, 2014). Consequently, “radical Islam” and “terrorism” have become practically
interchangeable terms in the US discourse (ibid). Combatting these groups has been the primary
justification for the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued presence of US
forces in the Middle East (LaFree 2009). All of this came to a head again in 2016.
In this chapter, I examine the effect that this politicking around mass violence – and the
promotion of particular in partisan mass media – have on the US public, who play an important
role in selecting the country’s leadership? To assess this question, I include measured of
individuals’ vote cast in the 2016 Presidential election (i.e. Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton),
and how frequently individuals watch local TV news, listen to National Public Radio, and listen
to Conservative Talk Radio to predict how worried respondents are about victimization in a
terrorist attack or in a mass shooting. Additionally, I account for background characteristics of
sex and age which have previously been shown to predict individuals’ fear of violent crime
victimization, as well as lifestyle factors of gun ownership and religious attendance.
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Terrorism and the Politics of Fear

The traditional fear of crime literature has consistently found that certain sociodemographic
factors are associated with fear of crime victimization – i.e. women and older people are more
fearful of crime than men and younger people (Akers et al 1987, Callanan and Teasdale 2009,
Franklin and Franklin 2009, Henson and Reyns 2015, Lagrange and Ferraro 1989, Rader and
Haynes 2011, Reid and Konrad 2004, Smith and Torstensson 1997, Stafford and Galle 1984,
Warr 1984). Although these findings are consistent in the empirical literature, theoretical
explanations about these findings are still debated. It has been proposed that women and older
people feel less able to defend themselves against violent crime, and therefore feel more
vulnerable and report being more fearful (Henson and Reyns 2015, Smith and Torstensson 1997,
Warr 1984). Additionally, some scholars have asserted that women in particular are fearful of
sexual assault and related crimes, and therefore express more fear about crime generally (see
Henson and Reyns 2015, Reid and Konrad 2004), although this explanation is rejected by some
scholars (Franklin and Franklin 2009). Finally, it has been proposed that through gender
socialization women are more likely to express emotions such as fear and are therefore more
likely to articulate fear of crime (Rader and Haynes 2011). The fear of crime literature has also
examined the role of community factors, gun ownership, and media consumptions in predicting
fear of crime (Adams and Serpe 2000, Callanan 2012, Carvalho and Lewis 2003, Chiricos,
Padgett, and Gertz 2000, Custers and Van den Bulck 2011, Glassner 2009, Hartnagel 1979,
Kohm 2009, Holbert, Shah and Kwak 2004, Williams and Dickinson 1993).

This literature is not sufficient to explain fear of a terrorist attack or fear of a mass shooting.
Women and older people may be less able to resist or defend themselves in these events, but only

113

marginally compared to others when considering terrorist attacks and/or mass shootings. Because
of the extreme and unpredictable nature of this violence, and the frequent public settings, it is
unlikely that factors such as sex or age would greatly influence a victim’s ability to protect
themselves. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that mass violence perpetrators are more
likely to select women or older people as targets due to this perceived vulnerability. Some
exceptions may exist with recent “incel” attacks, however these occurred after the Fall 2017
survey data used in this study.

In general, humans are not adept at assessing risks objectively. This is especially true for
high-impact, low-probability events (Woods 2007). On the other hand, discrepancies between
public perceptions and objective risks as assessed by experts has been observed on a multitude of
issues. The general public often lacks information about topics, or even rejects evidence that
disagrees with core beliefs. In some cases, experts may be distrusted by segments of the public.
This has been demonstrated in research about public trust in the science of vaccines and climate
change. Public perceptions of crime rates and prevalence of violent offenses are also frequently
out of line with what official statistics reflect, terrorism and mass shootings being misunderstood
in a similar vein.

To fully understand the fear of terrorism and the fear of mass shootings, I turn to David
Altheide’s (2006, 2017) Terrorism and the Politics of Fear, which outlines the social process by
which politicians and mass media create propaganda and leverage the public’s assumptions about
risk and danger to pursue and win political office, enact policy objectives, and sell products. This
work forms the theoretical backbone of this project. The existing literature in this area has
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focused mostly on media effects, however quantitative investigations of the public’s views and
behaviors in response to mass media and politics have not been extensively studied.

Defining and Measuring Terrorism and Mass Shootings

There is debate about whether incidents of mass violence such as terrorist attacks and mass
shootings have increasing in frequency and severity in the US in recent years. According to a
study done by the FBI, the number of “active shooter” events increased by an average of 16
percent annually in the US between 2000 and 2013 (Blair and Schweit 2014). Data available
from the Global Terrorism Database also show approximately a 32 percent average annual
increase in the number of terrorist incidents in the US from 2001 to 2017 (START 2019).
However, it is important to note that the overall trajectory of violent crime rates in the US over
the past 50 years has been downward – including gun violence and terrorist events7. The
discrepancy in results found between studies and datasets are often the results of inconsistencies
in the definitions and measurement of “terrorist attacks” and “mass shootings”.

No single, firm definition or set of criteria for measuring either terrorist events or mass
shootings that is widely agreed upon. Additionally, incidents of mass violence vary greatly from
one place to another. For example, despite the amount of news coverage devoted to terrorism
over the past 20 years, terrorist events are relatively rare occurrences in the US. Conversely,
terrorist events occur in comparatively higher frequency in Europe, and relatively are common
occurrences in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Beyond this, mass media
coverage of violent crime has increased inversely to violent crime rates in the US (Altheide

7

For more information, see the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) at
https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr and the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
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2006, 2017; Glassner 2009). It appears that mass media over-emphasizes the prevalence and
severity of extremist mass violence in the US. Violent events such as terrorist attacks or mass
shootings can dominate news cycles for weeks or months (ibid.). In an interconnected media
environment, it is nearly impossible to escape depictions of extreme violence.

While definitional criteria of terrorist attacks and mass shootings are not mutually exclusive,
i.e. many terrorists commit mass murder with firearms, there are some distinctions between
them. For example, terrorist attacks can be carried out with a variety of weapons, definitions of
terrorism do not require a minimum fatality threshold, and many mass shooters do not have clear
motivations. However, I argue that terrorism and mass shootings share common characteristics
which make them appropriate for a comparison of public perception. Terrorism and mass
shootings are both typically conceptualized as extreme stranger violence, involving mass murder,
and usually occur in a public place (see GTD, RAND definitions). While this is not always the
case, and definitional ambiguity dominates academic discussions, the messages that the general
public receive about terrorism and mass shootings are similar in this respect. The risk of
victimization in a terrorist attack or mass shooting is also extremely low, occurring relatively
infrequently, and only representing a small proportion of deaths in the U.S. annually (see
Kockanek 2019). Despite this, news media gives a good deal of attention to these events.

Both concepts share a degree of definitional ambiguity. Definitions of terrorism typically rely
on motivational factors to determine if a violent act is “terrorism” or not. Many of these
definitions describe terrorism as violence in pursuit of a political, social, economic, or religious
goal; occurring outside the context of legitimate warfare; targeting mostly civilians; conducted
by sub-state actors; and intended to influence a larger audience than the immediate victims.
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Technical definitions such as this are typically developed by governments, individual agencies,
and academics for a variety of purposes including prosecuting offenders, crafting public policy,
and conducting scholarly research.

Mass shootings have a similar definitional ambiguity. In some ways, these definitions are
more specific, i.e. specifying a weapon type, however in others there is disagreement about the
criteria for an event to qualify as a mass shooting. A 2015 report from the RAND corporation on
definitions and measurement of mass shootings in the United States notes that while the FBI
defines mass murderer as someone who kills four or more people in a single incident, not
including themselves, it does not define a mass shooting (Smart 2015). Instead, several
organizations and researchers have offered their own definitions of mass shooting which often
draw on the FBI definition of mass murder (ibid.). What is not agreed upon in defining mass
shootings is the number of people who are killed or wounded (some definitions only count
fatalities, some include all casualties), whether to include the attacker in fatality counts, the
motivations of the attackers (e.g. some include gang violence and domestic violence), and the
venue of the attack (i.e. only counting events which occur public versus anywhere). This
ambiguity makes studying trends in mass shootings very difficult, as different data sources will
often lead to different conclusions about where, when, how frequently, and ultimately why these
events occur8.

Additionally, the academic and policy research on terrorism and mass shootings, where most
of these definitional debates play out, do not play a significant role in the general public’s
understanding of what a terrorist incident/mass shooting is, what trends and patterns exist in

8

For more information, read the full report from RAND Corp. at https://www.rand.org/research/gunpolicy/analysis/essays/mass-shootings.html
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mass violence, and what risk individuals face (Altheide 1006, 2009; LaFree 2009; Turk 2004;
Woods 2007). Members of the general public are not widely seeking out academic research on
mass violence to investigate, weigh evidence, and form their perceptions, rather they rely
primarily on news media to get information about terrorism and mass shooting events (ibid.).
Media attention to both terrorism and mass shootings has increased since 2000, while research
on the number of terrorist and mass shooting events has not clearly shown an increase in
incidents or fatalities. Conversely, several studies have found a link between news media
consumption and worry or fear of crime, including mass violence (Callanan 2012; Chiricos,
Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Custers and Van den Bulck 2011; Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004;
Lowe and Galea 2017; Nellis and Savage 2012; Williams and Dickinson 1993).

Although data sources disagree on exact numbers, by most measures the risk of victimization
in a terrorist attack and the risk of victimization in a mass shooting is comparatively similar in
the United States (see Smart 2018; START 2017). Both terrorist attack and mass shooting events
have a low probability of affecting us as individuals, but a have high impact on victims when
they do occur (Woods et al 2008). Social Psychological research has found that individuals often
have difficulty evaluating the risk of low probability, high impact events, sometimes
overestimating their likelihood, sometimes under-estimating (Woods et al 2008). While exact
estimates on the number of people killed in terrorist attacks and mass shootings in the U.S. every
year vary by data source (Smart 2018), both are far from the leading cause of accidental death,
dwarfed by traffic fatalities (Olaisen et al 2019), falls (ibid.), prescription opioid overdoses
(ibid.), suicide (Kochanek et al 2019), and even outnumbered by people killed by police officers
(Tate et al 2020). Some scholars estimate that the likelihood of an individual dying violently – at
least for citizens of wealthy, developed nations – is lower today than at any previous point in
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human history (Pinker 2011). However, when a terrorist attack or mass shooting occurs, it can
dominate news cycles for weeks or even months, likely altering public perceptions of the risk of
violent death (Altheide 2006, 2009, 2017).

Taking the similarities into account, it is reasonable to expect that individuals would report
similar feelings of fear for both terrorist attacks and mass shootings. However, I hypothesize that
this is not the case, and that individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics such as gender and
age, lifestyle factors such as gun ownership, and interaction with social institutions such as
religion and politics, and selective mass media consumption patterns all influence whether
someone is more worried or fearful about victimization in both terrorist attacks compared to a
mass shootings. That is to say, I assert that your politics and media consumptions habits can
predict what you are worried about.

Despite this, mass media, which is the primary source of information about these events for
most Americans (Altheide 1006, 2009; Turk 2004; Woods 2007), frames terrorism and mass
shootings in distinct terms. This means that the labels of “terrorism” or “terrorist” and “mass
shooting” or “mass shooter” are constructed around unique meanings, language, and imagery.
These meanings convey a different threat to the general public. Research on the framing of
extremist violence shows that the associated meanings extend to the presumed motivations of the
offender, e.g. religious motivations such as radical Islam (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and
Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell 2011; Woods 2007, 2011) vs individual motivations such as
mental illness (Wilson, Ballman, and Buczek 2016), the characteristics of the offender, e.g. a
radical, Muslim man (see Chapter 3) vs a troubled, White adolescent (Mingus and Zopf 2010),
and how to respond to the presumed threat, i.e. national security response (Altheide 2006, 2009;
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LaFree 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Norris et al 2003; Powell 2011;
Woods 2007, 2011; Woods and Arthur 2014) vs law enforcement (Lawrence and Birkland 2004;
Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015) or public
health response (Birkland and Lawrence 2009; Wilson, Ballman, and Buczek 2016).

Mass media content, political discussion, and popular attitudes associate terrorism with
Islamic radicals (Altheide 2006, 2009; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008; Nagar 2010; Powell
2011; Woods 2007, 2011). Within the context of US news media, the word terrorism itself is
used to convey a specific threat that is distinct from common crimes or political upheaval
(Kunda 1999). In a content analysis of media coverage of politically violent groups, Nagar
(2010) found that Islamic groups were more likely to be labeled as terrorist groups in US news
media, especially among conservative-leaning sources. Similarly, Powell (2011) found that
media outlets consistently tried to attribute terrorist incidents to radical Islamic terrorists, even if
this was not actually the case, in a content analysis of US news coverage of terrorist incidents
since 9/11. Additionally, in another content analysis Woods and Arthur (2014) found that after
9/11, a variety of “foreign” threats, including terrorism, garnered increasingly negative framing
in US news coverage, including immigration from non-white countries.

Mass shootings, on the other hand, are typically portrayed in a different light. Silva and
Capellan (2019) identify four different types of mass shooters covered in mass media: rampage
shooters, disgruntled employees, school shooters, and lone-wolf terrorists. Mass shooters have
frequently been portrayed as disaffected adolescents (Muschert 2007; Silva and Capellan 2019)
and were even framed as juvenile superpredators in the 1990’s (Muschert 2007). News coverage
rarely highlights the race of a mass shooter, so long as they are white (Mingus and Zopf 2010).
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However, when an offender is non-white, news coverage over-emphasizes their race (Chuang
2012; Mingus and Zopf 2010) and conveys messages about their foreignness to the public (ibid.).
Additionally, mass shootings are frequently discussed in term of mental illness (Wilson,
Ballman, and Buczek 2016) and gun policy (Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and
Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015).

Fear of Crime, Fear of Terrorism, Fear of Mass Shootings
Traditionally, criminological theories of the fear of crime have emphasized individuals’
perceptions of vulnerability (Henson and Reyns 2015; Smith and Torstensson 1997; Warr 1984).
This includes factors such as: suitability as a target, ability to physically resist victimization, and
social/cultural messages about risk of victimization. This has mostly been studies in the context
of “street crime” or interpersonal violence. Terrorist attacks and mass shootings, in contrast to
interpersonal violence, often involve the targeting of civilians in public places, mass violence
events are very difficult to predict, and the victims are selected by happenstance (Black 2004).
Compared to street crimes such as robbery, terrorism and mass shootings rarely involve an
economic motive, but are instead linked to ideology. While it is conceivable that some of the
factors which influence fear of victimization in “street crimes” and interpersonal crimes, the very
different reality of how and why these crimes takes place suggests that other factors may be more
influential.

Currently, most research firms such as Gallup and Pew or news organization surveys
represent most research about how the public understands and interprets mass violence events.
These polls are rarely reported beyond descriptive statistics, are often only available in aggregate
form, and frequently have relatively small samples for their target population. There are also
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several peer-reviewed studies which rely on survey data to analyze fear of terrorism. Findings in
these studies have been largely consistent with previous research on fear of crime, while also
casting doubts on dominant theoretical explanations.

The fear of crime literature has consistently found sex and age to be significant and robust
predictors of fear of crime victimization (Akers et al 1987; Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Franklin
and Franklin 2009; Henson and Reyns 2015; Lagrange and Ferraro 1989; Rader and Haynes
2011; Reid and Konrad 2004; Smith and Torstensson 1997; Stafford and Galle 1984; Warr
1984). This literature has found that women and older respondents are more likely to report
experiencing fear of victimization and also report higher levels of fear than male and younger
respondents (ibid.). The dominant theoretical explanation of this relationship rests on the selfperceived physical vulnerability of the respondent, rather than a statistical likelihood of
victimization (ibid.). That is to say, women and older people worry about crime more not
because they are necessarily likely to be victims, but because they perceive that they are more
suitable targets and less able to physically resist victimization (Henson and Reyns 2015; Smith
and Torstensson 1997; Warr 1984). The notable exception and debate of this finding is that
women are more worried about becoming victims of sexual assault and related offenses than
men, which is also reflected in statistics (see Henson and Reyns 2015; Reid and Konrad 2004).
Some scholars assert that women’s greater fear of victimization reflects a fear of sexual assault
(Reid and Konrad 2004). Others reject this notion (Franklin and Franklin 2009), overestimation
of the gender-fear of crime gap (Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Snedker 2012), or a social learning
theory approach in which women, through social interaction, learn a gendered fear of crime
(Rader and Haynes 2011).
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Many other factors have been linked to fear of crime, or conversely, reduced vulnerability to
fear of crime, particularly location, and community contexts (Adams and Serpe 2000; Carvalho
and Lewis 2003; Hartnagel 1979, Kohm 2009) and mass media consumption habits (Callanan
2012; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Custers and Van den Bulck 2011; Glassner 2009;
Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004; Williams and Dickinson 1993) For example, Adams and Serpe
(2000) find that social integration to one’s community can reduce the fear of crime victimization.
Media consumption has been shown to distort views of crime rates (Callanan 2012, Glassner
2009), amplify perceptions of risk/vulnerability (Custers and Van den Bulck 2011) and increase
fear of crime (Callanan 2012; Chiricos, Padgett, and Gertz 2000; Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004;
Williams and Dickinson 1993). General fear of crime also influences individuals’ susceptibility
to moral panics around particular crimes, such as terrorist attacks or mass shootings (Schildkraut
and Stafford 2015).

Owning weapons such as firearms is perhaps one way that individuals may attempt to
remedy perceived vulnerability to criminal victimization. Essentially, firearm ownership may act
as a protective factor against fear of crime victimization. By owning a firearm, the individual
may believe that they are better able to physically defend themselves from victimization (Strobe,
Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017; Warner and Thrash
2020). Or they may believe that gun ownership will act as a deterrent to criminal victimization
(Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004). Alternatively, those who are most fearful of violent
victimization may be most likely to own a gun. Either way, firearm ownership and percieved risk
of victimization are likely related.
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Then again, gun culture in the United States may influence people’s views about violent
crime. Individuals who own guns frequently own multiple firearms and are more likely to be
involved in organization that promote gun rights (Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017).
Specifically, because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control
policies (Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and
Elsass 2016; Vizzard 2015), gun owners may base their opinions on mass shootings on this
political belief (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017). Alternatively, individuals may purchase
firearms to defend themselves against a perceived threat from a mass shooting (Stroebe, Leander,
and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017).
Previous research has suggested that when mass violence is framed as “terrorism”, the
general public reports more fear and anxiety than when mass violence is not framed as terrorism
(Swift 2015; Woods 2011). Characteristics such as gender, age, media exposure, and
geographical location are all statistically significant predictors of an individual’s fear of
victimization in a terrorist attack (Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012;
Woods et al 2008). Specifically, women are more fearful than men of both crime and terrorism
(ibid.) Women who fear terrorist victimization also engage in more coping strategies, such as
avoiding perceived risky situations and locations and seeking more information about terrorism
(Nellis and Savage 2012). Age has been another consistent predictor of both fear of crime and
fear of terrorism (Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009, Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al
2008). Specifically, older individuals are more fearful than younger individuals (ibid.).

A Michigan study by Woods et al (2008) also found that proximity to a perceived terrorist
target influenced fear of terrorism, particularly among lower socioeconomic status individuals
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and racial minorities experienced. Additionally, previous studies have suggested that societal
elites and media coverage of terrorism may influence perceptions of risk more than actual
terrorism incidents, similar to news coverage of crime (Altheide 2006, 2009; Clarke and Chess
2008; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods 2007). Additionally, research has suggested that the
socio-demographic characteristics of respondents such as gender, age, race, class, and
geographic location influence an individual’s perception of terrorism victimization risk (Brück
and Muller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012; Woods et al 2008). Public opinion
surveys have found similar patterns (McCarthy 2015; Swift 2015).

News media outlets often assume that audiences prefer stories about perpetrators of mass
murder (Lankford and Madfis 2018; Levin and Wiest 2018). An experimental study by Levin
and Wiest (2018) found that respondents are generally more interested in stories featuring heroic
bystanders than perpetrators. However, they also found that individuals in their 40s and more
fearful individuals were most interested in stories about mass murder (ibid.). A meta-analysis of
research conducted in the aftermath of mass shooting incidents found that not only do directly
affected communities experience negative psychological outcomes in the wake of mass shooting
events, but communities that are not directly affected can also experience increases in social fear
and negative effects on perceived safety (Lowe and Galea 2017).

Politics, Identity, and Selective Mass Media Exposure
While there is frequently a link between one’s political leanings and religious affiliation,
some researchers assert that religious and political beliefs are closely linked, and the result of
underlying psychological orientations (Friesen and Ksiazkiewicz 2015). Religious attendance
can have a small effect on political participation (Ammann 2015), although once politically
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active, individuals’ political behavior is not impacted by changes in religiosity (ibid.). Religiosity
can also limit individuals’ ability to acquire and process some types of political information,
particularly when it contradicts their closely held beliefs (Gaskins 2019).

Attending religious services can serve many social functions. One this religion does is
provide a frame of reference for understanding world events. If terrorism is framed as a religious
conflict, i.e. one of Islam vs Christianity, then it is possible that this may influence a religious
individuals’ perceptions of terrorism and how it relates to them personally. Additionally, many
mass violence events have occurred at places of worship. Individuals who attend religious
services regularly may perceive themselves to be at greater risk of victimization. Alternatively,
individuals who see places of worship as potential terrorism targets may engage in avoidant
behavior, not attending regularly.

Studies have also demonstrated bias against Muslims in US public attitudes. US respondents
prefer that foreign aid is given to Christian-majority countries over Muslim-majority countries
(Blackman 2018; Thomas 2004). A 2011 study of public attitudes of Muslims in the US suggests
that Muslims are perhaps the least trusted group by highly religious Americans, and considered
the definitive outsider group (Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011). Conservative Christians in
particular are more likely to hold negative views of groups with religious differences (Yancy,
Eisenstein, and Burge 2017). Another study found that Christians were more likely to have low
levels of respect for Islam (Pevey and McKenzie 2009) compared to other groups. While this
study also found that increased contact with Muslims generally improves attitudes towards
Muslims and Islam, the opposite is true for Evangelicals, who show lower respect for Islam with
increased contact (ibid.). Some scholars have even gone as far as arguing that adherents to
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certain religious sects in the US, such as a plurality of white Evangelicals, share a worldview of
white Christian supremacy (Gorski 2017). Interestingly, measures of religious affiliation have
been shown to have an associate with the number of hate groups in a geographic area (Goetz,
Rupasingha, and Loveridge 2012).

Mass media influences the public in many ways. The primary theoretical explanations which
offer insight into the influential role of American news media discuss Agenda Setting, Framing
Events, and Reinforcing Spirals. Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) describes how
news media shapes public perceptions of events by deciding what is newsworthy – promoting
certain topics over others as deserving of the public’s attention. Theories of elite cues suggest
that individuals form opinions based on cues given by societal elites with whom they identify.
Additionally, media outlets can portray events in various ways with the use of certain words,
phrases, and imagery. This is known as Framing.

Framing generally refers to the process by which mass media uses words, phrases, images,
and symbols to portray a particular message. For example, the phrase “the cold war” and pictures
of the Berlin wall are used to communicate ideas about global power relations during the late
20th century. I focus on the impact of specific frames such as “Terrorist Attack” and “Mass
Shooting” as used by US news media. Framing is a somewhat contentious topic among scholars,
and consequently one of the most critically studied topics in communication literature. Entman
(1993) described framing as a “fractured paradigm”. While some researchers do not go into
detail to define what ‘frames’ and ‘framing’ are, assuming that these are widely understood
concepts (Entman 1993), others interpret framing in different ways, even when the terms are
explicitly defined. Some researchers see framing as a cognitive process and element of discourse
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(Gitlin 1980), others conceptualize frames as an internalized mental structure (Scheufele 1999),
and further still, framing can refer to the substance of communication (Woods 2007). Though the
exact definition of framing varies across disciplines, framing is theorized as a process frequently
used by political elites and media sources to influence perceptions and shape the social world
(Chomsky and Herman 1988).

The importance of framing in studies of news media has been articulated from scholars in
many disciplines. David Altheide (2006; 2009) documented how political elites and news media
constructed terrorism as the chief national security threat, relying on the public’s perceptions
about danger, risk, and feelings of fear to gain support for policy measures such as the USA
PATRIOT Act and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Benford and Snow (2000)
argue that framing processes are an essential aspect of social movement formation. Chomsky and
Herman (1988) articulated a propaganda-model of news media and asserted that media framing
is frequently used to influence public opinion and used as a tool by political elites to further
specific political goals. In framing an issue, the use of fearful language or imagery can be used to
persuade and gain support for social and political objectives (Chomsky and Herman 1988;
Altheide 2006, 2009). Most academic literature examining the use of fear in social life,
particularly regarding terrorism, has highlighted mass media coverage. Most recently, an
emerging area of scholarship based on a theory known as the Reinforcing Spirals Model
examines the interaction between deeply held beliefs and selective mass media exposure.

Attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors are typically thought to influence the selection of media
content and the attention paid to that content. The Reinforcing Spirals model proposed by Slater
(2007, 2015) elaborates a theory of how pre-existing beliefs and selective media exposure
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mutually influence each other in positive feedback loops or reinforcing spirals. Essentially,
Slater (2007, 2015) argues that over time, these feedback loops can play an important role in
social identity formation and maintenance, as well as reinforcement attitudes and behaviors for
political, religious, or lifestyle groups in society (ibid.). The reinforcing spirals model acts as a
framework to understand how both media content and selective media exposure contribute to the
development and maintenance of attitudes, beliefs, ideologies, and behavioral outcomes
associated with these as well (Slater 2007, 2015).

Theories of media effects such as Agenda Setting (McCombs and Shaw 1993) and Framing
Theory (Entman 1993, Gitlin 1980, Scheufele 1999) propose that attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors
are shaped by interactions with social institutions such as mass media. The Reinforcing Spirals
Model (Slater 2007, 2015) model also holds that this relationship is not one way, nor is it a
simple model of cause and effects. In this model social identity and deeply held beliefs, such as
political affiliation or religious beliefs, interact with selective media use habits to reinforce each
other. Typically, this is conceptualized as identity/beliefs and media use supporting each other,
i.e. individuals choose media sources that support their beliefs and this confirmation strengthens
their identity and attachment. In some cases, the reinforcing spiral can lead media consumers
down a proverbial rabbit hole, amplify their pre-existing beliefs, and push individuals to more
radicalized views over time.
The media consumer in the 21st century has a broader choice of platforms to learn the news
of the day. While television remains the favored news source for most Americans (Mitchell,
Holcomb, and Weisel 2016), online news and social media sites are quickly gaining ground,
having already surpassed other traditional news sources such as newspapers and radio (ibid.). In
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some ways, the rapidly changing media landscape allows for exposure to a broader range or
perspectives. At the same time, it is easier than ever for individuals to seek out information that
confirms their previously held beliefs.

Since the 1970s, American politics experienced increasing polarization on racial, cultural,
and social welfare issues (Layman et al 2006), and an increasingly compartmentalized media
environment may play a role. Several studies have documented Wicks et al (2014) found that
conservatives favor conservative talk radio, FOX news, and Christian radio and TV and news
sources, while liberals favor PBS and Facebook. It is important to note that while NPR and PBS
consumers skew toward liberal political orientation, their news coverage is decidedly nonpartisan, unlike conservative news sources. A study of news media consumption by political
ideology from a 2008 survey found that differences in preference do exist, however rejected the
notion that a large portion of any group actively avoids information that contradicts their belief
systems (Weeks et al 2016).

A recent review of four panel surveys (Stromback and Shehata 2019) found support for a
reciprocal relationship between political leanings and certain types of TV news. They also
acknowledge that the research in this area remains unsettled. Bolin and Hamilton (2018) find
support for the reinforcing spirals model when examining issues of climate change and public
opinion. Additionally, studies have found that conservatives are more prone to the effects of
reinforcing spirals than liberals (McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014).
An early study of the effects of conservative talk radio additionally found that listeners to
particular programs such as Rush Limbaugh, held views that were further right than their views
before they started listening to CTR (Jones 2002).
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Some studies have found less consistent results. Beam et al (2016) did not find evidence for
greater polarization among Facebook news users. Additionally, Mort (2012) finds that not all
conservative talk radio hosts share the same outlook, finding differences in content and views
expressed between so called “fiscal conservatives” such as Hannity and Limbaugh, and so called
“culture warriors” such as Ingraham and Savage. However, in recent data collected by Pew
Research, conservatives were found to be distrustful of most mainstream news sources, with the
exception of FOX News. In contrast, liberals were shown to be more trusting of a wider range of
news sources (Jurkowitz, Mitchell, Shearer, and Walker 2020). Other research has found that
conservative media exposure lowers acceptance of the science of climate change, whereas the
opposite was found regarding non-conservative media use (Feldman et al 2014).

Based on bivariate analyses and existing literature, several operational hypotheses are tested
in logistic regression analyses in Table 4.2. These hypotheses are described below. In table 4.2,
statistical significance in two-tailed hypothesis tests are indicated by one star at the .05 level, two
stars at the .01 level, and three stars at the .001 level. Statistical significance at the .10 level is
indicated by a cross “+”. Multivariate logistic regression results reported in Table 4.2 include
Census survey weights calculated by the UNH Survey Center. First, I look at bivariate
relationships between both kinds of fear, and the background factors mentioned in previous
section. Then, multivariate analysis (logit regression) will be used to more formally test the
hypotheses listed earlier, while checking for spurious effects.

Hypothesis 1: Net of other variables, background characteristics of sex, age, gun ownership, and
religious attendance will significantly predict fear of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear
of victimization in a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 1a: Net of other variables, female respondents will be significantly more worried
about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting.
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Hypothesis 1b: Net of other variables, older respondents will be significantly more worried
about victimization in a terrorist attack and younger respondents will be significantly more
worried about victimization in a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 1c: Net of other variables, gun owning respondents will be significantly less worried
about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 1d: Net of other variables, respondents who attend religious services more frequently
will be significantly more worried about a terrorist attack and a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 2: Net of other variables, Donald Trump voters will be significantly more worried
about victimization in a terrorist attack and less worried about a mass shooting compared to
Hillary Clinton and Other voters.
Hypothesis 3: Net of other variables, selective media consumption will significantly predict fear
of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear of victimization in a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 3a: Net of other variables, respondents who watch WMUR News more frequently will
be significantly worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 3b: Net of other variables, respondents who listen to NHPR more frequently will be
significantly less worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and significantly more worried
about victimization in a mass shooting.
Hypothesis 3c: Net of other variables, respondents who listen to conservative talk radio more
frequently will be significantly more worried about victimization in a terrorist attack and
significantly less worried about victimization in a mass shooting.
Data and Measures

Data for this study was collected from the Fall 2017 Granite State Poll. The Granite State
Poll is a quarterly, state-wide New Hampshire public opinion survey conducted by the UNH
Survey Center. It is a representative phone survey using random digit dialing to ask questions of
approximately 500 respondents on each quarterly iteration (UNH Survey Center 2017). These
questions are typically a mix of background information, political opinions, and other items
suggested by researchers or clients. On the Fall 2017 poll, I was able to include a question about
mass violence with two versions: one about “a mass shooting”, the other about “a terrorist
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attack”. One question was asked to a half of the respondents, the second to the other half in the
Fall 2017 survey. Question wording is given below.
“How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a mass shooting?
– very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all”
“How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a terrorist attack?
– very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all”

Table 4.1 below contains information on variables of interest including definitions, coding
practices, and category percentages. Each respondent was randomly assigned only one version of
a question about their fear of themselves or someone they know becoming a victim of mass
violence. Version A asks about fear of victimization in a terrorist attack, Version B ask about
fear of victimization in a mass shooting. Only a small proportion of respondents reported being
“very worried” about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack (6.05%) or a mass shooting
(5.04%). A substantially larger proportion of respondents reported being “somewhat worried”
about becoming the victim of a terrorist attack (27.02%) or a mass shooting (31.78%). Binary
variables for both Version A and Version B are coded to reflect respondents who reported being
either “Somewhat Worried” or “Very Worried” about victimization in a terrorist attack (33.47%)
or a mass shooting (37.11%). These versions were created to use logistic regression techniques.
Due to the relatively small sample size results are somewhat sensitive to model specification. In
a previous version, Ordered Logistic Regression was used, and the results were not
fundamentally different from the current analysis. However, the binary variable appears to better
capture the measured relationships.
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Respondents were asked about several background indicators, some of which are used in this
analysis. Approximately half of the sample is female (50.79%), the age of respondents is
between 18 and 92 with a mean of 52.32 and standard deviation of 17.7, and most respondents
either have completed a college degree (36.4%) or pursued postgraduate education (22.4%), with
the rest having completed some college (24.4%) and a minority having only completed high
school or less (16.8%). An ordinal measure of age is used in this analysis for two reasons: 1, it
allows inclusion of respondents who refused to answer this question, increasing sample size
slightly; and 2, it is used to compare age groups to one another. Additionally, nearly half the
sample does not attend religious services ever (46.84%). Those who do tend to either go less than
1-2 times per month (26.48%), or every week (18.58%), with only a small proportion attending
1-2 times per week (8.10%). Moreover, nearly half of respondents own a firearm or have one in
their household (45.19%).

The Granite State Poll also asks respondents about their political leanings, including party
affiliation and who they voted for in the 2016 Presidential election. Respondents’ voting patterns
in the 2016 presidential election were similar to national results. More than a quarter of
respondents voted for Donald Trump (26.88%), the largest proportion of respondents voted for
Hillary Clinton (44.07%), and the remainder voted for other candidates such as Gary Johnson or
Jill Stein, did not vote, were not eligible, didn’t know, or refused to answer (29.05%).

The Fall 2017 Granite State Poll also asked respondents about their media consumption
habits, including local TV news, NHPR, and conservative talk radio. Over a third of respondents
reported watching WMUR news every day (36.11%), while the remainder watched several times
a week (16.47%), occasionally (27.98%), or never (19.44%). NHPR is popular with respondents
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as well, with about two-thirds of respondents listening either every day (21.48%), several times a
week (15.08%), or occasionally (29.56%), and only one-third never listening (33.93%).
Conservative talk radio has a much smaller audience, and the majority of respondents reported
never listening (75.99%). Of those who do listen to conservative talk radio, only a small
proportion listed every day (5.95%), with the remainder listening several times a week (5.16%)
or occasionally (12.90%).

Analyses use both bivariate analyses comparing fear within and across groups, i.e. Chisquared tests, t-tests, and multivariate tests using logistic regression techniques. These strategies
are used to estimate effects of sociodemographic factors on fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a
mass shooting comparatively. The dependent variable (DV) is self-reported fear – measured on
a four-point Likert scale: “very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, not worried at all”
with a half sample asked about their fear of victimization in a “Terrorist Attack”, and the other
half asked about their fear about victimization in a “Mass Shooting”. Independent variables
include the respondent’s socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. sex, age, education) habits
(religious attendance, gun ownership), political orientation (political party affiliation, voted in
2016 Presidential election) and media consumption habits (watch WMUR News, listen to NHPR,
listen to conservative talk radio).

I hypothesize that sociodemographic factors such as sex, age, education, news consumption
habits, religiosity, and political leanings will significantly predict fear of terrorist attack and fear
of mass shootings. Specifically, I expect the biggest differences in reported fear to fall along
political lines – with Democrats/Clinton voters being more fearful of mass shootings, and
Republicans/Trump voters being more fearful of terrorist attacks.

135

Table 4.1 Variable Definitions (Survey Weighted)
(DV Version A) Fear of Terrorist Attack: How
worried are you that you or someone you know
will become the victim of a terrorist attack?
N = 245
Somewhat/Very worried
(coded 1; 33.43%)
Not too worried/Not worried at all
(coded 0; 66.57%)

(DV Version B) Fear of Mass Shooting: How
worried are you that you or someone you
know will become the victim of a mass
shooting? N = 256
Somewhat/Very worried
(coded 1; 40.17%)
Not too worried/Not worried at all
(coded 0; 59.83%)

Sex: Respondent’s Sex
Female (coded 1; 51.10%)
Male (coded 0; 48.90%)

Voted in 2016: Which presidential candidate
did you voted for in 2016? (collapsed)
Donald Trump (coded 1; 25.65%)
Hillary Clinton (coded 2; 37.59%)
All others (coded 3; 36.78%)

Age Range: Ordinal variable of age
18 to 34 (coded 1; 25.65%)
35 to 49 (coded 2; 23.54%)
50 to 44 (coded 3; 28.16%)
65 and older (coded 4; 18.34%)
NA/Refused (coded 9; 4.31%)

Watch Local News: How often do you watch
WMUR news?
Every Day (coded 4; 35.91%)
Several Times a Week (coded 3;
15.50%)
Occasionally (coded 2; 27.35%)
Never (coded 1; 21.24%)

Gun Owner: Do you have a firearm in your
household?
Yes (coded 1; 43.75%)
All others (coded 0; 56.25%)

NHPR: How often do you listen to NHPR?
Every Day (coded 4; 17.38%)
Several Times a Week (coded 3;
13.59%)
Occasionally (coded 2; 31.25%)
Never (coded 1; 37.78%)

Attend Religious Services: How often do you
attend religious services?
One or more times per week
(coded 4; 17.66%)
One or two times per month
(coded 3; 6.18%)
A few times a year (coded 2; 27.98%)
Never/Don’t Know/NA (coded 1;
48.18%)

Conservative Talk Radio: How often do you
listen to Conservative Talk Radio?
Every Day (coded 4; 6.62%)
Several Times a Week (coded 3;
4.92%)
Occasionally (coded 2; 13.02%)
Never (coded 1; 75.44%)

N = 501
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Bivariate Analyses
Figures 4.1 through 4.4 below chart the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat
worried” or “very worried” about they or someone they know becoming the victim of a terrorist
attack and compare this to the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat worried” or “very
worried” about they or someone they know becoming the victim of a mass shooting. These
charts also include the results of bivariate Chi2 tests, assessing whether group differences in fear
of victimization can be found when respondents are given either a question about a terrorist
attack or a mass shooting.
Figure 4.1 charts the proportion of respondents who are “very” or “somewhat” worried that
they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack, and compares it to the
proportion of respondents who are “very” or “somewhat” worried that they or someone they
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against control variables of sex and age. This
chart also includes the results of bivariate Chi2 tests. Bivariate tests found a significant difference
in reported fear between males and females for both terrorist attack (p<.001) and mass shooting
(p<.01). These analyses did not find a statistically significant difference in fear of terrorist
attacks by age range (p=.275) or fear of mass shootings by age range (p=.128). Although, the
graphical representation suggests that older respondents are more worried about terrorist attacks,
while younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings.
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Figure 4.1 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Sex, Age Range, and Type of Attack
(Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting)

Other variables now also show statistically significant relationships which did not previously.
Figure 4.2 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they
or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and compare this to the
proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they or someone they
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against gun ownership and religious attendance.
This chart also includes the results of bivariate Chi2 tests.

A statistically significant difference in fear of terrorist attacks was not found by gun
ownership (p=.609), however gun ownership is significantly different for fear of mass shootings
(p<.01). Specifically, gun owners are less worried about victimization in a mass shooting than
non-gun owners. Additionally, a statistically significant difference was found in fear of a terrorist
attack by attendance of religious services (p<.001). Specifically, respondents who never attend
are less likely to fear victimization in a terrorist attack than those who attend weekly or more. No
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statistically significant difference was found in fear of a mass shooting by religious attendance
(p=.909).

Figure 4.2 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Gun Ownership, Religious Service
Attendance, and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting)

Figure 4.3 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that
they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and compare this to the
proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they or someone they
know will become the victim of a mass shooting against the candidate voted for in the 2016
Presidential election. The results of bivariate Chi2 tests also included in this chart. A statistically
significant difference in fear of victimization in a terrorist attack found by the candidate that
respondents voted for in the 2016 election (p<.05). Specifically, Trump voters are more worried
about a terrorist attack than other voters. A statistically significant difference in fear of
victimization in a mass shooting was also found for which candidate the respondent voted for in
the 2016 election (p<.001). Specifically, Clinton voters are most worried about mass shootings,
Trump voters are least worried about mass shootings, with others in between.
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Figure 4.3 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Candidate Voted for in 2016
Presidential Election and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass Shooting)

Finally, Figure 4.4 charts the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very”
worried that they or someone they know will become the victim of a terrorist attack and
compares this to the proportion of respondents who are “somewhat” or “very” worried that they
or someone they know will become the victim of a mass shooting against mass media
consumption habits. This includes watching WMUR local news, listening to NHPR, and
listening to Conservative Talk Radio. The results of bivariate Chi2 tests are also included.
Frequency of viewing WMUR News did not show a statistically significant difference in fear of
victimization in a terrorist attack (p=.322) or fear or victimization in a mass shooting (p=.461),
although graphical data suggest that more frequent viewers are more worried about both terrorist
attacks and mass shootings.

Frequency of listening to NHPR did not show a significant difference in fear of victimization
in a terrorist attack (p=.187), however it does show a significant difference in fear of
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victimization in a mass shooting (p<.05). Specifically, listeners of NHPR are more worried about
a mass shooting than non-listeners. Similarly, frequency of listening to conservative talk radio
did not reveal a statistically significant difference in fear of victimization in a terrorist attack
(p=.154), while it does reveal a significant difference in fear of victimization in a mass shooting
(p<.05). Specifically, listeners of conservative talk radio are less worried about a mass shooting
than non-listeners.

Figure 4.4 Percent Somewhat or Very Worried by Frequency of Watching WMUR,
Listening to NHPR, Listening to CTR, and Type of Attack (Terrorist Attack and Mass
Shooting)

Political Leanings and Selective Media Exposure

The reinforcing spirals model plays an important role in conceptualizing the relationship
between political beliefs and selective media exposure. In tables 4.2-4.4 below, I examine the
relationship between selective media exposure and political candidate support in the 2016
election. Bivariate tests of association find that Trump and Clinton voters have different media
preferences. Table 4.2 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election
and frequency of viewing WMUR TV News. Tests of association do not reveal and significant
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differences in watching WMUR news by candidate supported in the 2016 election (Chi2 = 7.46;
p=.280).

Table 4.2 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and watching
WMUR News (Chi2 Reported)
Vote in 2016
Watch WMUR News
Never
Occasionally
Weekly
Everyday
Total
Trump
33
34
16
53
136
33.00%
24.11%
19.28%
29.12%
26.88%
Clinton
37
63
39
84
223
37.00%
44.68%
46.99%
46.15%
44.07%
Other
30
44
28
45
147
30.00%
31.21%
33.73%
24.73%
29.05%
Total
100
141
83
182
506
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Chi2 = 7.46
p=0.280
Table 4.3 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election and
frequency of listening to NHPR. Bivariate tests of association do find significant differences in
listening NHPR (Chi2 = 44.36; p<.001). Clinton voters make up the majority of daily NHPR
listeners (63.89%), while Trump voters make up the largest portion of respondents who never
listen to NHPR (39.31%).

Table 4.3 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and listening to
NHPR (Chi2 Reported)
Vote in 2016
Listen to NHPR
Never
Occasionally
Weekly
Everyday
Total
Trump
68
38
17
13
136
39.31%
25.50%
22.37%
12.04%
26.88%
Clinton
49
63
42
69
223
28.32%
42.28%
55.26%
63.89%
44.07%
Other
56
48
17
26
147
32.37%
32.21%
22.37%
24.07%
29.05%
Total
173
149
76
108
506
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Chi2 = 44.36
p<.001
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Table 4.4 examines the association between candidate support in the 2016 election and
frequency of listening to conservative talk radio. Again, this table and tests of association show
significant differences in listening to conservative talk radio (Chi2 = 123.19; p<.001). Trump
voters make up the overwhelming majority of daily CTR listeners (80.00%). Conversely, Clinton
voters represent over have of respondents who never listen to CTR (52.73%).

Table 4.4 Bivariate Association Between Political Candidate Support and listening to
Conservative Talk Radio (Chi2 Reported)
Vote in 2016
Listen to Conservative Talk Radio
Never
Occasionally
Weekly
Everyday
Total
Trump
61
29
22
24
136
15.84%
44.62%
84.62%
80.00%
26.88%
Clinton
203
17
1
2
223
52.73%
26.15%
3.85%
6.67%
44.07%
Other
121
19
3
4
147
31.43%
29.23%
11.54%
13.33%
29.05%
Total
385
65
26
30
506
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Chi2 = 125.19
p<.001

Clearly, liberal leaning voters favor NHPR and conservative leaning voters favor CTR.
However, the reinforcing spirals model predicts that selective exposure to partisan media
contributes to the maintenance of political attitudes, and in some cases can amplify pre-existing
beliefs on political issues.

Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses

These multivariate analyses use a series of logistic regressions to estimate the effects of
predictor variables including socio-demographics, political leanings, and media consumption on
fear of victimization in a terrorist attack and fear of victimization in a mass shooting,
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respectively. Logistic regression is commonly used in social research and is appropriate for
models which use a categorical dependent variable such as binary fear of terrorist attack. These
models report the log odds (L) of the likelihood of a particular category of the dependent variable
being selected.
Li = ln[P(yi = 1)/P(yi = 0)]
The log odds that y = 1 for the ith observation are subsequently estimated as a linear
function of independent variables. β0 represents the model’s Y-intercept, while β1X1i ; β2X2i ; etc.
represent X-variable predictors. This portion of the model describes the value of Y as a function
of X1, X2, etc.
Li = β0 + β1X1i + β2X2i + … + βmXmi
Table 4.5 shows the results of three mixed-effects logistic regressions. Model 1 compares
logistic regression results of fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on demographic
variables of sex, and age, as well as gun ownership and religious attendance. Model 2 compares
logistic regression results of fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on sex, age, gun
ownership, religious attendance, and adds measures of support for political candidates voted in
2016. Model 3 compares fear of terrorist attack and fear of mass shooting on sex, age, gun
ownership, religious attendance, voted in 2016, and adds measures of mass media consumption
watch WMUR news, listen to NHPR and listen to conservative talk radio. The ‘Odds’ columns
give odds ratios corresponding to exp(β), interpreted as multipliers for odds of respondents
reporting being “somewhat” or “very” worried about victimization in a terrorist attack. Odds
ratios greater than 1.0 represent positive effects, while odds ratios less than 1.0 represent
negative effects. Based on bivariate analyses and existing literature, several operational
hypotheses are tested in logistic regression analyses in Table 4.5. These hypotheses are described
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below. In table 4.5, statistical significance in two-tailed hypothesis tests are indicated by one star
at the .05 level, two stars at the .01 level, and three stars at the .001 level. Statistical significance
at the .10 level is indicated by a cross “+”. Multivariate logistic regression results reported in
Table 2 include Census survey weights calculated by the UNH Survey Center.

Table 4.5 Survey weighted logistic regression comparing fear of terrorist attack to fear of
mass shooting on demographics, lifestyle, political candidate support, and selective media
consumption (Odds Ratios Reported)
Variable

Model 1 – OR(SE)
Terrorist
Mass
Attack
Shooting

Model 2 – OR(SE)
Terrorist
Mass
Attack
Shooting

Model 3 – OR(SE)
Terrorist
Mass
Attack
Shooting

Sex
Male
Female
Age Range
18-34
35-49
50-64
65+
NA/Ref.
Gun in HH
No/NA/Ref.
Yes
Relig. Attd.
Never/NA
Few x/Yr.
1-2x/Mo.
Weekly+
Voted 2016
Trump
Clinton
Other
Media Use
WMUR
NHPR
CTR
Constant

6.06(2.40)***

2.06(0.73)*

7.37(3.11)***

1.88(0.68)+

8.24(3.47)***

1.86(0.71)

0.44(0.24)
1.06(0.54)
0.50(0.27)
0.68(0.48)

0.47(0.23)
0.46(0.22)
0.38(0.17)*
0.19(0.19)+

0.40(0.21)+
0.90(0.46)
0.48(0.26)
0.70(0.49)

0.61(0.30)
0.47(0.23)
0.34(0.16)*
0.27(0.28)

0.38(0.21)+
0.88(0.45)
0.38(0.22)+
0.62(0.46)

0.45(0.24)
0.32(0.16)*
0.23(0.11)**
0.22(0.19)+

1.54(0.58)

0.50(0.17)*

1.42(0.54)

0.56(0.20)+

1.49(0.56)

0.48(0.17)*

2.61(1.09)*
0.85(0.54)
3.16(1.85)*

0.68(0.27)
0.57(0.35)
0.70(0.30)

2.49(1.05)*
0.65(0.40)
2.54(1.49)

0.59(0.24)
0.57(0.33)
0.81(0.38)

2.57(0.56)*
0.74(0.47)
2.79(1.72)+

0.43(0.19)+
0.58(0.34)
0.70(0.32)

0.40(0.18)*
0.39(0.19)+

3.46(1.65)**
1.55(0.81)

0.72(0.40)
0.65(0.35)

2.84(1.45)*
1.60(0.88)

0.26(0.15)*
N = 245

0.66(0.46)
N = 256

1.04(0.17)
0.91(0.17)
1.73(0.44)*
0.08(0.07)*
N = 245

1.47(0.27)*
1.42(0.24)*
0.95(0.23)
0.18(0.19)+
N = 256

0.13(0.06)***
N = 245

1.47(0.81)
N = 256

Two-tailed hypothesis tests
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, +p<.10
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Results of Multivariate Logistic Regression Analyses (Survey Weighted)
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 1 examines the relationship in Figures 4.1
and 4.2 more closely, confirming the relationships found in that bivariate analysis, and revealing
new ones. First, when examining the fear of terrorist attack results, the control variable sex
(p<.001) is a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack, however age range is not.
Specifically, for female respondents the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a
victimization in a terrorist attack increase by 6.06 times. Gun ownership is not a significant
predictor of fear of victimization in a terrorist attack, however religious attendance is.
Specifically, compared to individuals who do not attend religious services, attending religious
services 1-2 times per year (p<.05) increases the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a
terrorist attack by 2.61 times, and attending religious services weekly or more frequently (p<.05)
increases the odds of being “very” or “somewhat” fearful of a terrorist attack by 3.16 times.
Comparatively, when examining the fear of mass shooting results in Table 4.5 – Model 1,
the control variables sex (p<.05) and age range are both statistically significant predictors of fear
of a mass shooting. Specifically, for female respondents the odds of reporting being “very” or
“somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting increase 2.06 times, while
respondents who are 65 or older (p<.05) decreased the odds of reporting being “very” or
“somewhat” fearful of mass shooting victimization by 0.38 times compared to 18-34 year old
respondents – a result which runs contrary to previous fear of crime findings. This means that
younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings than older respondents.
Respondents who did not answer the question about age were also less likely than 18-34 year old
respondents to report being “somewhat” or “very” worried about becoming the victim of a mass
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shooting (p<.10). Additionally, gun ownership (p<.05) was a significant predictor of fear of mass
shooting, decreasing the odds of an individual being “somewhat or “very” worried about
victimization in a mass shooting by half, however attending religious services was not.
The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 2 retains the variables tested in Model 1
and adds measures of Presidential candidate support in the 2016 election, examining Figure 4.3
in detail. First, the regression results of fear of terrorist attack still finds that sex (p<.001) is a
significant predictor of fear of victimization in a terrorist attack. Female respondents are 7.37
times more likely to report being “very” or “somewhat” fearful than male respondents. Age is
statistically significant only at the p<.10 level when comparing 35-49 year old respondents to 1835 year old respondents, decreasing the odds of reporting feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried
about victimization in a terrorist attack by 60 percent. Gun ownership is not a significant
predictor of fear of a terrorist attack. The effect of religious attendance (p<.05) is partially
mediated in Model 2. Specifically, attending religious services a few times per year increases
fear of victimization in a terrorist attack by 2.49 times compared to respondents who never attend
religious services. Respondents who attend weekly or more frequently are no longer statistically
significantly different from individuals who never attend, at least in terms of how worried they
are about victimization in a terrorist attack in Model 2.
Adding respondents’ support for political candidates finds that voting for Clinton (p<.05)
decreased the odds of fearing victimization in a terrorist attack by 60 percent when compared to
Trump voters. Respondents who voted for other candidates, did not vote, refused, etc. (p<.10)
were also significantly less likely to fear victimization in a terrorist attack, though only at the
p<.10 level. Compared to Trump voters, respondents choosing the “Other” category decreased
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the odds of being more fearful of a terrorist attack by 61 percent. Figure 4.5 charts the predicted
values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack against candidate
voted for in the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included. This graphic does reflect
that Trump voters are significantly more worried about terrorist attacks than Clinton and Other
voters.

Figure 4.5 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried about
a Terrorist Attack by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential Election with 95% CI

Comparatively, the fear of mass shooting regression results in Model 2 also maintain
variables tested in Model 1, while adding measures of support for 2016 Presidential candidates.
In Model 2, both sex (p<.10) and age are statistically significant predictors of fear of
victimization in a mass shooting, though Model 2 does show partial mediation of some
relationships in Model 1. Specifically, for female respondents, the odds of reporting being “very”
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or “somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting is now1.88 times higher than
male respondents, and only significant at the p<.10 level. Again, compared to 18-34 year old
respondents, 65+ year old respondents are decrease the odds of reporting being “very” or
“somewhat” fearful of mass shooting victimization by 66 percent. Younger respondents are more
worried about mass shootings than older respondents, hoverer they are not significantly different
from respondents who refused to answer the age question in Model 2. Gun ownership (p<.10) is
still a significant predictor of fear of mass shooting, however now only at the p<.10 level.
Having a gun in the household decreases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat”
worried about victimization in a mass shooting by 44 percent. Religious attendance was not a
significant predictor of fear of victimization in a mass shooting in Model 2.

Support for political candidates again revealed statistically significant relationships for
fear of a mass shooting, voting for Clinton (p<.01) increases the odds of reporting being “very”
or “somewhat” worried about victimization in a mass shooting 3.46 times compared to
respondents who voted for Trump. Respondents who voted for “Other” candidates, or did not
vote, were not statistically significantly different from Trump voters. Figure 4.6 charts the
predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack against
candidate voted for in the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included. This
visualization also reflects that Clinton voters are significantly more worried about terrorist
attacks than Trump and Other voters.
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Figure 4.6 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried about
a Mass Shooting by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential Election with 95% CI

The multivariate analysis in Table 4.5 – Model 3 retains variables tested in Model 2, and
adds the media consumption variables asking how frequently respondents watch WMUR news,
listen to NHPR, and listen to conservative talk radio, examining Figure 4.4 in detail. Model 3
largely finds similar relationships to Model 2, however some effects are mediated by the addition
of mass media consumption measures. First, the regression results of fear of terrorist attack still
find that sex (p<.001) is a significant predictor variable. Specifically, for female respondents, the
odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack
increase by 8.42 times compared to male respondents. Comparing the fear of mass shooting
regression in Model 3 reveals similar patterns to Model 2, while partially mediating some
relationships. Sex is no longer a statistically significant predictors of fear of victimization in a
mass shooting. Figure 4.7 charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of
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victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting against sex election with 95% confidence
intervals included.

Figure 4.7 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Sex with 95% CI

In Model 3, Age is a significnt predictor of both fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a
mas shooting. Compared to 18-35 year old respondents, both 35-49 year old respondents (p<.10)
and 65+ year old respondents (p<.10) are 0.38 times less likely to report feeling “somewhat or
“very” worried about victimization in a terrorist attack, although this is only significant at the
p<.10 level. When examining fear of a mass shooting, compared to 18-35 year old respondents,
50-64 year old respondents (p<.05) decrease the odds of reporting feeling “somewhat” or “very”
worried about victimization by 68 percent, 65+ year old respondents (p<.01) decrease the odds
by 77 percent, and respondents who refused (p<.10) decrease the odds by 78 percent. Figure 4.8
charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack
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and a mass shooting against age with 95% confidence intervals included. This reflects that
younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings that older respondents.

In Model 3, Gun ownership (p<.05) is a significant predictor of fear of a mass shooting,
however it is not a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack. Having a gun in the
household decreases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried about
victimization in a mass shooting by 52 percent compared to non-gun owners. Figure 4.9 charts
the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a
mass shooting against gun ownership election with 95% confidence intervals included. This also
reflects the decreased worry about mass shooting victimization by gun owners.

Figure 4.8 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Age Range with 95% CI
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Figure 4.9 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Gun Ownership with 95% CI

Religious attendance is a significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack as well, and for
fear of a mass shooting at the p<.10 level in Model 3. Specifically, compared to respondents who
never attend religious services, those who attend a few times per year (p<.10) are 2.57 times
more likely to report feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried about victimization in a terrorist
attack, and respondents who attend weekly or more frequently (p<.10) are 2.79 times more likely
to repost feeling “somewhat” or “very” worried. Attending religious services a few times per
year decreased the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat” worried about victimization in
a mass shooting by 57 percent compared to respondents who never attend. Figure 4.10 charts the
predicted values of “very” or “somewhat” worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a
mass shooting against religious attendance with 95% confidence intervals included, visualizing
the relationhips described in Model 3.

153

Figure 4.10 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Religious Service
Attendance with 95% CI

Measures of political candidate support and fear of a terrorist attack and fear of a mass
shooting found in Model 2 are mediated and partially mediated by the inclusion of mass media
consumption variables in Model 3, respectively. Voting for Clinton and “Others” is no longer a
significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack compared to voting for Trump. The inclusion of
selective mass media consumption measures does mediate the effect of political candidate
support on fear of a terrorist attack from Models 2 to Model 3. However, as in Model 2, voting
for Clinton (p<.05) is still a significant predictor of fear of a mass shooting compared to voting
for Trump. Voting for Clinton increases the odds of reporting being “very” or “somewhat”
worried about victimization in a mass shooting by 2.81 times, slightly less than Model 2 and
representing a partial mediation effect in Model 3. “Other” voters are still not significantly
different from Trump voters. Figure 4.11 charts the predicted values of “very” or “somewhat”
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worried of victimization in a terrorist attack and a mass shooting against candidate voted for in
the 2016 election with 95% confidence intervals included.

Figure 4.11 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Candidate Voted for in 2016 Presidential
Election with 95% CI

Figure 4.12 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Watching WMUR TV
News with 95% CI
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Figure 4.13 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Listening to NHPR with
95% CI

Figure 4.14 Probabilities of Respondents Reporting Being Very or Somewhat Worried
About a Terrorist Attack and a Mass Shooting by Frequency of Listening to CTR with
95% CI
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Discussion

The study of media effects is a unique contribution to the literature examining the politics of
fear. It provides clear evidence that not only does mass media influence the public’s views on
mass violence, but what type of media individuals choose is associated with worry about one
type of violence versus another. This study set out to test whether an individual’s political
orientation and selective media consumption habits are associated with elevated fear of a terorrist
attack compared to fear of a mass shooting. In a series of mulltivariate logistic regression
analyses, I find that selective media exposure does significantly predict fear of a terrorist attack
and fear of a mass shooting separately, and based on the media outlet chosen. More frequent
listeners of conservative talk radio are more worried about victimization in a terrorist attack, and
more frequent listeners of NHPR are more worried about a mass shooting. Furthermore, the
effect of selective media exposure are observed even when accounting for political leanings, and
mediate or partially mediate the effect of political candidate support. This finding includes
controls for sex, age, gun ownership, and religious attendance.

Controlling for sociodemographic factors which have been found to generally predict fear of
violent crime victimization in other studies (i.e. Sex and Age) and lifestyle factors (e.g. Gun
Ownership and Religious Attendance), I find evidence for my assertion that fear of terrorism and
fear of mass shootings is not simply a response to the violence of these tragic events, but also a
response to the meanings, messages, and politics that are associated with the frames “Terrorist
Attack” and “Mass Shooting”. The framing of mass violence events is used to communicate
distinct messages about the nature of risk, the threat to society, and how the general public
should interpret the events. This is done in response to characteristics of the attack and
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perpetrators, priorities of law enforcement and politicians, and how newsworthy mass media
deems the event to be. This in turn serves to shape individuals’ worldviews, opinions on political
topics, and perceptions of risk and danger. However, individuals are also likely to seek out
information sources and politicians that conform to their previously held beliefs. In this manner,
the worldview, politics, media cycle becomes somewhat of a feedback loop. Combined with the
algorithm-driven content creation and distribution systems of the internet age and the 24-hour
news cycle, this makes it increasingly difficult to escape the propaganda. Essentially, the politics
of fear becomes amplified in modern media systems.

Based on the analyses in this study, factors which are associated with elevated fear/worry
about victimization in a terrorist attack or a mass shooting can be divided into three categories: 1.
Factors which may influence Self-Assessed Perceptions of Vulnerability – i.e. Sex, Age, Gun
ownership; 2. Factors which may influence respondents’ World-Views and Political Views – i.e.
voting patterns, party affiliation, religious attendance; and 3. Interactions with Social Institutions
– particularly mass media consumption habits. It is noteworthy that these factors are alo
interrelated in the reinforcing spirals model (Slater 2007, 2015).

Perceptions of Vulnerability
A good deal of prior ciminological research has found that a respondent’s sex and age is a
consistent and statistically significant predictor of fear of crime, at least when examining
perceptions of conventional “street crimes” (Akers et al 1987, Callanan and Teasdale 2009,
Franklin and Franklin 2009, Henson and Reyns 2015, Lagrange and Ferraro 1989, Rader and
Haynes 2011, Reid and Konrad 2004, Smith and Torstensson 1997, Stafford and Galle 1984,
Warr 1984). This analysis reveals similar findings, while also challenging popular theories of
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why these individuals report greater fear of victimization. Specifically, female respondents are
more likely to express fear of both a terrorist attack and a mass shooting in every model tested.
However, female respondents are more worried about terrorist attacks than mass shootings. The
significant discrepency between this and sex differences in fear of a mass shooting are
counfounding. Previous research has also found that female respondents report greater levels of
fear and woory about terrorists attacks (Brück and Muller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage
2012), which I also find. My findings also call into question dominant theoretical explanations of
why previous research has consistently found that female respondents express more worry of
victimization than male regardless of the crime assessed.

Several explanations have been offered as to why female respondents report higher levels of
fear of violent victimization (see Franklin and Franklin 2009; Henson and Reyns 2015, Rader
and Haynes; 2011; Reid and Konrad 2004; Smith and Torstensson 1997, Warr 1984). The first, is
that women are generally less physically able to resist violent victimization than men, while the
second emphasizes women’s concern about victimization as a response to the percieved risk of
sexual assault. A third possible explanation is that women are more likey to express fear than
men, regardless of whether they are experiencing fear or worry at similar rates. The first
explanation is the most plausibly related to the findings in this study. The second is inadequate
for explaining this particular findings, as neither terrorist attacks or mass shootings typically
involve sexual assault or related crimes. The third explanation is beyond the scope of what this
study can test, and is better addressed by qualitative methods.

Age is the second most consistent predictor of fear of violent victimization, in the fear of
crime literature which is again typically explained in terms of the victim’s self-assessed ability to
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resist victimization. This study did find that in some models, fear of terrorism was elevated
among older respondents, as predicted. However models testing fear of mass shootings found the
opposite effect. Younger respondents are more worried about mass shootings that older
respondents. This is likely is related to perceptions of mass shootings as occuring in places that
younger people frequent – schools, concerts, etc. – and may believe that are more vulnerable to
this type of violence. Age is a significant factor in n individuals’s fear ov mass violence
victimization, but not in the way that the classic fear of crime literature would suggest.

World-View, Lifestyle, and Political Beliefs

Perceptions of individual vulnerability do play a part in explaining why individuals may feel
more fear or worry about victimization in a mass violence event, however in the case of this
study, it does not fully explain why individuals are more likely to report elevated fear of a
terrorist attack versus a mass shooting and vice versa. This study also tested factors which
measure individuals’ worldviews and political orientations, in the form of religious attendance
and vote cast in the 2016 Presidential election.

Gun ownership was also found to be associated with a reduced the fear of mass shooting
victimization. Though this is a lifetyle factor, which has been somewhat controversial in its role
in the fear of crime literature. Gun owners may concievably believe that they are more able to
resist victimization in a mass shooting, and that they percieve their vulnerability to be lower by
having a weapon to protect themselves. Anecdotal evidence would appear to support this
proposition as well. However, in this chapter I do not find evidence to support the protective
factor or deterrence theories. Protection and deterrence mechanisms by which gun owners
evaluate their risk of victimization would not explain the disparity if worry among gun owners
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between terrorist attacks and mass shootings. Instead, I find support for the hypotheses that
because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control policies
(Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass
2016; Vizzard 2015).

Religious attendance was a statistically significant predictor of fear of a terrorist attack in
Model 1, and approaching statistical significance in Models 2 and 3. The literature investigating
the relationship between religious attendance and political attitudes is mixed in tis findings.
However, some studies do suggest that certain religious groups may hold overly negative views
of other religious groups, especially those which they believe to be antagonistic to their own. In
this case, it is possible that due to the association of terrorism with Muslims, more religious
individuals may view terrorism as an inherently religious or cultural conflict. That is to say,
religious individuals may susbscribe to the “Clash of Civilizations” argument in how they
understand terrorism and the relationship between the Islamic world and the Western world. I
find support for research which has found that some Christian denominations hold antagonistic
views of Muslims and Islam (Gorski 2017; Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012). This
is particularly pronounced among conservative Christians in the US (Yancy, Eisenstein, and
Burge 2017), who may feel a greater status threat from “foreign” groups with religious
differences. Again, this supports the notion that traditionalist views of the US as a whiteChristian dominant society result in Muslims being reported as the least trusted group by highly
religious Americans, and considered the definitive outsider group (Gorski 2017; Hinze,
Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012; Yancy, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017).
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Political orientations were statistically significant in nearly every model, for both fear of
terrorist attack and fear of mas shooting. Individuals who voted for Donald Trump in the 2016
election are more likely report being fearful of terrorist attacks, while individuals who voted for
Hillary Clinton in the 2016 election are more likely to report being fearful of mass shootings.
This result is not terribly surprising, as Trump emphasized terrorism as a threat to the US
homeland throughout his campaign, and used racially charged rhetoric to win the presidency,
while Clinton and other Democratic politicians have emphasized gun control as a policy
objective. In the US, both political parties use the politics of fear to attempt to win office and
enact policy objectives, however the effects of leveraging the fear of terrorism have proven to
have much more insidious in the past two decades.

Media Consumption Habits

The association between media consumption and fear of terrorism has been somewhat
studied, with some research finding a link between the frequency of media consumption and the
level of reported fear. The present study includes multiple mesaures of media consumption:
frequency of watching local TV news, frequency of listening to NHPR, and frequency of
listening to Conservative talk radio. In previous research, a link between the frequency or
amount of news consumed was associated with higher or lower reported fear of terrorism. In the
current study, watching more local TV news is associated with elevated fear of a mass shooting,
but not aterrorist attack. This may be due to the timing of the survey, which occurred in the
immediate aftermath of the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting.

More frequent listening to NHPR was associated with higher reported fear of a mass
shooting, but not a terrorist attack, and more frequent listening to Conservative talk radio was
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associated with higher reported fear of a terrorist attack, but not a mass shooting. All statistically
significant media effects inculded control estimates for socio-demographics, lifestyle and
worldview factors, and political orientations. What this demonstrates is the reciprocal siloing
effect of mass media – certain media outlets promote certain views, and individuals choose
media outlets which confirm their previously held beliefs. The feedback loop of mass media in
the digital age is amplified by content algorithms which promote content similar to previously
consumed media.

Some previous research theorizes that the reinforcing spirals effects is symmetrical, i.e. both
conservatives and liberals are similarly affected by partisan media. I do not support this point
with my analyses, and I assert that my findings point to an asymmetrical effect of reinforcing
spirals, which are more pronounced in conservative media sources. Even though not all
conservative talk radio host share the same outlook (Mort 2012), I find evidence that supports the
perspective that conservatives are more prone to media reinforcing spirals (see McCright 2011,
McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014). It is reasonable to presume that much of the
worry about mass shootings reported by WMUR viewers and NHPR listeners is in response to
the October 2017 Las Vegas shooting. Given the high-profile nature of this event, it is very
telling that CTR listeners are not more worried about a mass shooting but are more worried about
a terrorist attack. These findings also support research that asserts conservative media pushes
individuals further from reality than liberal preferred media such as NHPR. Conservative media
sources frequently contradict scientific research and influence individuals’ perceptions on critical
issues such as climate change and public health (see Bolin and Hamilton 2018 for an example).

Limitations
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Several limitations to this anallysis exist as well, including temporal effects, cross sectional
data, and ambiguous findings. The survey used in this analysis was conducted shortly after 2017
Las Vegas Mass Shooting. This likely influenced results. Notably, evidence for this is found in
the increased worry about a mass shooting – but not a terrorist attack – by more frequent viewers
of Local TV news channel WMUR. While New Hampshire is physically very distant from Las
Vegas, a large amount of media coverage of the event concieveably elevated public concern of
mass shootings as an issue.
This analysis also relies on cross-sectional data and therefore can’t determine causality.
Ideally, the Reinforcing Spirals Model calls for longitudinal data to evaluate the reciprocal
relationship between attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and selective mass media exposure. This
data is cross-sectional in nature, and only able to test associations at one particular time and
place, New Hampshire in October 2017.

Because of the limitations, the findings in this chapter are somewhat ambiguous. It is not
possible to establish which comes first, attitudes, beliefs, and beghaviors, or selective media
exposure. The Reinforcing Spirals Model does suggest that not such cause-and effect
relationship exists, instead positing that the relationship is a dynamic and self-reinforcing
process. What this study does demonstrate is that media effects, particularly selective exposure
to partisan media, does have a measureable effect on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors above and
beyond one’s core beliefs.
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Implications beyond the current study

The politics of fear has been leveraged by both political parties in recent election cycles. The
techniques for winning political office in the US differ little between parties, although the
specific policy proposals and objectives pursued are vastly different in their intent and effect.
The fear of terrorism has deliberately been leveraged to oppress vulnerable minority groups
within the US, and as justification to continue to pursue the War on Terror in the Middle East. In
the second edition of Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2017), he argues that the
Trump Presidential campaign is the result of more than a decade of propaganda shaping
American’s perceptions and fears. Altheide very successfully outlined the process of how
politicians and mass mediaworked together to build a case for the Iraq war in the years following
the September 11, 2001 attacks. This paper agrees with this proposition and Altheide’s findings,
however, I will note that the Trump campaign leveraged the racist and xenophobic attitudes
present throughout US history, simply directing the distrust, anger, fear, and loathing at Muslims
and other recent immigrants.
The politics of fear – particularly those policies carried out as a response to the fear of
terrorism – have profound consequences, even today. At the time of the writing of the paper, the
War on Terror is entering it’s 18th year. Thousands of US Troops have lost their lives in the
Middle Eastern wars, along with millions of Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, Yemenis, Kurds, and
others as effects of the war on terror spread and destabilize an entire region of the world.
Countless others bear the physical and psychological scars of these conflicts. Under the USA
PATRIOT Act, US intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies have sweeping surveillance
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powers, and the NSA alone collects millions of private communications every day, all in
cooperation with major telecom companies.

The 2016 Presidential election is perhaps the most visible way in which the racialized fear of
terorrism has been leveraged by societal elites to win office, accrue power, and gain wealth. The
right-wing populist politics of the current era play on blatantly racist and discriminatory policies
to combat the alleged threats of terrorism and other violence committed by Muslims and
immigrants. Minority groups – especially those percieved as “Muslim” – have been increasingly
victimized in the wake of the 2016 populist movements and white supremacist groups have
become bolder in recent years (Levin and Reitzel 2018). Additionally, the Trump administration
has separated families aprehended attempting to cross the southern border and keeping asylum
seekers and other immigrants in concentration camps reminiscent of the darkest chapters in
human history. All the while, powerful societal elites have taken the opportunity to enrich
themselves and their cronies, directing attention towards supposed threats of non-white
foreigners and away from the arguable more severe threats to the long-term security of the US
such as global climate change, growing income and wealth inequality, looming mass automation
of jobs, skyrocketing healthcare costs, and government corruption. Whether or not the US will
deal with these issues depends on a firm public vioce, willing politicians, and changes to
structural conditions which promote these drastic inequalities.
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CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The world has changed. Digital technology, globalization, deindustrialization, and migration
have reorganized societies around the globe. Many parallels are apparent between the social and
structural forces that classical sociological theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were
writing about during the Industrial Revolution and the current day. The US economy has
reorganized around a post-industrial mode of production (due to the twin forces of offshoring
and automation), resulting in the decline of communities once based around factory production,
and the increased importation of consumer goods. At the same time, global migration, often from
poorer regions to richer regions, has become a political wedge issue around the world. All the
while, mass media now reaches more people than ever before and penetrates our lives more
deeply due to the expansion of both traditional and digital media sources. Today we are
constantly bombarded with messages from innumerable sources, and false or misleading
information is increasingly prolific and difficult to distinguish from facts.

As a society we are in a state of Anomie as understood by Durkheim (1897) and Merton
(1938). Many are unsure of their place in the world and feel anxious in the face of drastic
change. They want answers or something to blame. So-called populist politics have emerged in
wealthy nations as a response to this anomic state. Some may blame powerful actors that hoard
resources and rig systems in their favor. Some may blame foreigners for their problems, i.e.
Muslims are terrorists, Mexicans are taking jobs/criminals, China is unfairly trading, etc., rather
than looking at how structural conditions have produced their perceived plight. Racism and
xenophobia are not new to the US and have been part of our society since its inception.
However, today, politicians across the globe effectively capitalize on these racist and xenophobic
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feelings using the modern media landscape to speak directly to a section of the population that
attributes their anomic state – caused by structural changes – to the influences of foreign nonwhite “others”. This includes a reality TV host who embraced the racially charged rhetoric that
many people had been harboring for years and won the Presidency despite being the less popular
candidate.

The structural changes that have occurred, and are still unfolding to this day, certainly have
affected the lives and well-being of populations around the globe. In this case, I contend that a
substantial part of the US population is afraid, anxious, and unsure of their place in the world in
the face of a globalized, digital, deindustrialized, and increasingly diverse and multicultural
society. When combined, these forces can produce a sense that a valued and traditional culture
and way of life is under attack or in decline. This may even be partly true as factories close and
shift the means of production to robots or overseas, as children grow up and move to urban areas
in search of employment, and as economic inequality deepens. However, the causes of these
anxieties associated with changing social structures are often misattributed to foreigners and
becomes cloaked in the language of social identity.

This social construction of the foreigner-as-threat is useful for societal elites who want to
rally support and make money, while deflecting blame for social inequalities on the current
structures. This is plainly evident by rhetoric used regularly by President Trump who often
places blame for US social problems on groups such as Muslims, Latin American immigrants,
and China. Even the frenetic response to the current COVID-19 pandemic by the Trump
administration has continually shifted blame to foreigners, to the neglect of effective domestic
measures. The paradox of anti-immigrant sentiment is that those who are most opposed to
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immigrant groups are often those who have the least contact with them and face the least actual
“threat”. For instance, Republicans who live further away from the Mexican-US border are more
likely to support a building a wall on the southern US border than those who live within 350
miles of the border (Jones 2017). The perception of a threat – and not necessarily the reality of
the threat – fuels anxiety.

Both the bottom-up effects of anomic anxieties on the individual level, and the top-down
machinations of power- and wealth-seeking elites manipulating public sentiment contribute to a
distorted view of reality along a whole host of issues. For another example, public opinion
research finds that people believe crime rates to be the same or increasing even when violent
crime rates are going down by all official measures (Glassner 2009). Researchers have found
that public perception of crime – and resulting calls for particular ill-suited policies on crime – is
reflective of significant mass media attention to it (Altheide 1996, 2006, 2017; Glassner 2009).
The expansion of mass media into so many aspects of life and 24-hour news has made news
coverage of bad things a part of daily life more so than in previous eras; and with all the social
changes taking place already, the combination turns into perceptions of reality that may not be
reflective of actual things going on.

Consequently, in the study of the causes and consequences of terrorism, I assert that it is
essential to evaluate what the term “terrorism” means, not just academically, but especially in
common discourse. How is this term understood and used by news media, politicians, and the
public? Who is labelled as a “terrorist”, and under what conditions? Why is it that Ramzi Yousef
is portrayed as part of a conspiracy trying to topple the West, while Timothy McVeigh is
portrayed as a quiet loner who is the unfortunate product of his circumstances? Why is Nidal
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Hasan a radicalized extremist while James von Brunn is a racist old man? Why are Sayeed
Farook and Tashfeen Malik ISIL sleeper agents, while Dylann Roof is a troubled kid? I argue
that, in addition to the violence committed, it has to do with their race, ethnicity, birthplace, and
religion. Specifically, I assert that in popular discourse, news media coverage, and political
communications that Muslims are disproportionately portrayed as “terrorists”, and that this is an
integral part of the racialization of Muslims in the US. Essentially, to be Muslim is to be
associated with terrorism. This is part of a larger social phenomena whereby the anxieties and
anomie caused by structural changes invoke a status threat, and are attributed to a grab bag of
foreigners and “others” who pose a perceived threat to the dominant US culture and way of life.
In this dissertation, I study the public’s fear of terrorism not as a fear of violence, but as a
fear of losing status, power, and dominance to a foreign-Muslim threat among traditionally
powerful groups in the US. Based on analyses of data from multiple sources, I find evidence that
fear of terrorism in the US is shaped more by media coverage and attention from political elites
to terrorism as a topic than actual terrorist attacks or casualties in the US. I find that the content
of news coverage of mass violence is racially biased, focusing on violence perpetrated by
Muslims, and that association with radical Islamic ideology overrides racial concerns and
“revokes” whiteness in media coverage of mass violence. I also find that members of the public
develop their perceptions of terrorism and mass violence by selectively consuming mass media
that supports and amplifies their prior political beliefs.

Power, Politics, Mass Media, and Constructing the Enemy

In many ways, my dissertation examines power: the power of media and elites to shape
conversations, to construct enemies, and to influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. I
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conceptualize a model of power based on C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite (1956) where the
relationship between societal elites and mass media is not separate but of shared power among a
class of people who move between the spheres of government, military, and big business.
Neither societal elites nor mass media are dominant in their power to influence the public, and
who is driving media coverage depends on a particular social context. While the specific goals of
media and political elites may not always align, the ruling class generally shares the goal of
maintaining and expanding their power and wealth.

To begin, I find that power constructs terrorism as a social problem worthy of significant
social concern. In chapter 2 I use data from Gallup’s Most Important Problem poll and compare
it with data from the Global Terrorism Database on terrorist attacks in the US, news media
coverage data from Lexis Nexis, and presidential addresses from the American Presidency
Project. I examine the trends in this data to give context to the long-term national trends in the
US public’s worry about terrorism as the most important problem facing the nation. I find that, at
least in bivariate analyses, the US public is most worried about terrorism when mass media
outlets devote more attention to terrorism as a topic. Surprisingly, neither the number of terrorist
events occurring in the US nor the number of American terrorism casualties are significantly
correlated with public perception of terrorism as the most important problem. There is, however,
a correlation between terrorist events and attention to terrorism as a topic by the President and
news media. This suggests a complex relationship and provides evidence to support previous
research that asserts the important role of mass media as an intermediary between current events,
government entities, and the general public.
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I find evidence that both the President and prominent news outlets exert an influence on the
public’s perception of social problems facing the US, and that they influence each other. Politics
and mass media are key in telling us what a social problem is and controlling the broad
conversation. Hermann and Chomsky (1988) articulated a propaganda model of mass media that
states that media is used by social elites to build support for their policy objectives among the
public. This was written as a rebuttal to the popular notion that mass media is often at odd with
politics and able to hold politicians accountable. In the modern era, mass media has largely not
held politicians accountable for their disastrous policies. In fact, David Altheide (2006; 2009;
2017) argue that almost all mass media outlets and politicians mutually benefit from fearinducing rhetoric, especially around issues such as terrorism because it directly increases their
viewership and revenue. Trump sells newspapers and gets people to tune in to the news.

On the other hand, considering a potential counterhypothesis, I do not find evidence that
economic insecurity is driving the fear of terrorism and associated anti-Muslim sentiments. To
the contrary, I find that the public is less concerned about terrorism during economically
challenging times. Likewise, immigration research has additionally found that anti-immigrant
politics are pursued in both good and bad economic times, and that social institutions are
primarily responsible for engendering anti-immigrant attitudes (Tichenor 2002). This is
supported by other research that has found that fears and concerns about labor market
competition are not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Heinmueller et al 2015). If
economic insecurity does amplify feelings of racial, foreign, or terrorist threat, it does not do so
in an easily measurable way, at least not with the data that is currently available to me. Instead, I
find evidence that the fear of terrorism is related to a perceived threat to the power and status of
dominant groups in the US, supporting the findings of Mutz (2018).
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To be more specific, I find that fear of terrorism is associated with a fear of Muslims. In
chapter 3 I examine the content of news stories about suspected terrorists, by collecting data on
the characteristics of terrorist attacks in the US and their suspected perpetrators, as available
from the Global Terrorism Database. Then, I collect broadcast news transcripts through LexisNexis by searching the suspects’ names, taking a quantitative content analysis approach. While
the previous chapters examined the relationship between mass media and the public, this analysis
examines the content of those news media messages, and how terrorism and terrorists are
socially constructed through framing of suspected terrorist perpetrators in the US. I find that
suspected perpetrators of terrorist attacks, as defined by the GTD, who are Middle-Eastern/North
African in origin, associated with radical Islam, and foreign born are more likely to be called a
terrorist by news media, even controlling for other characteristics of the attack.

However, when analyzed together in the same model, these factors are mediated by
association with radical Islamic ideology. This suggests that the construct of the suspected
terrorist’s race is not solely based on skin color and nationality, but on other ethnic markers
associated with Islam, and that this racial construct is central to the definition of who a terrorist
is, rather than the violence itself. Furthermore, by emphasizing non-Middle Eastern suspects who
are Muslim or associated with Radical Islam, this points out implicit biases in news media
coverage of terrorist suspects. Anyone who is Muslim or associated with Radical Islam is more
likely to be called a terrorist, however, emphasis is placed on clarifying that fact when the
suspect does not appear stereotypically “Muslim”. That is to say, there appears to be an
unspoken understanding that Middle Eastern suspects accused of committing violent acts are
Terrorists, while members of other racial groups could have had other motivations. Additionally,
this supports the view that “Muslim” is a racial category (Constadine 2017; Skenderovic and
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Spaeti 2019; Taras 2013), even if it is not based primarily on skin color (Dunn, Klocker, and
Salabay 2007) and seen as a “voluntary” one (Meer and Modood 2009), that Muslims are viewed
as non-white (Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015), and that one can lose benefits of
whiteness by associating with Islam (ibid.).
My dissertation provides evidence that “Muslims” have been racialized in the US – though
this is not based entirely on nationality or skin color. Racial Formation Theory (Omi and
Winant 1986, 1994, 2015) helps address this compared to traditional concepts of race as skincolor based. Racial formation theory emphasized the role of macro-level processes and social
institutions in creating and constructing racial categories. The findings in my dissertation
research repeatedly point to mass media as the primary social institutions that shapes the public’s
perception about issues such as race and terrorism. Mass media does this by setting agendas and
deciding what is newsworthy (McCombs and Shaw 1993), by framing events and providing the
language and imagery used to understand what is happening in society (Entman 1993), and
increasingly by reinforcing previously existing beliefs through selective media exposure (Slater
2007, 2015). Media effects, and specifically the promotion of the fear of Muslims as a terrorist
threat to Americans, have far reaching consequences in how the behavior of institutions and
individuals have been shaped over the past 20 years. This includes the US wars in the Middle
East, erosion of civil liberties domestically, and the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency
in 2016 to start.

As we know, whites and non-whites clearly have different lived experiences and media
constructions in the US. Prior research demonstrated that when a mass shooter is white, media
rarely discusses their race (Mingus and Zopf 2010). Consequently, when a mass shooter is non-
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white, media over-emphasizes the suspect’s race in their reporting (Chuang 2012). Other
research found that while white converts to Islam can still benefit from greater respect in society,
their whiteness is precarious, and they can lose some of the benefits of their whiteness (Moosayi
2015). Like Selod (2015), I find that white privilege appears to be unable to overcome a
connection to Islam. My research finds that, at least in news reporting about terrorism suspects,
association with Islam essentially “revokes” a suspect’s whiteness. Not only are Muslims
racialized as terrorists, when a white person adopts Muslim ethnic markers, they find themselves
facing a similar terrorist-threat construction as a non-white Muslim. This also demonstrates that
“whiteness” as a social construct is fragile and not just based on skin color either. Whiteness
carries behavioral expectations and standards that if not met, decrease or rescind an individual’s
white privilege. For example, a white man who commits mass murder is still perceived as white
and upholding of whiteness so long as he is not associated with radical Islam. This person is not
labelled as a “terrorist” and their actions are attributed to individual abnormalities rather than a
characteristic of their social group. If that person is Muslim, or pledging allegiance to the Islamic
State group, they are called a “terrorist”, perhaps even more so when they are violating societal
expectations and standards of whiteness. The US public popularly presumes Muslims to be
predisposed to committing terrorist acts. Consequently, we must acknowledge that in the US
today being “Muslim” is not only associated with terrorism but is thought of as being excluded
from whiteness, despite skin color.

Perhaps the most notorious example of Muslim racialization is in the case of President
Barack Obama. Race was a constant factor in Obama’s candidacy and Presidency (Fraser 2009).
While President Obama, whose father was a black Kenyan, is often cited as the first Black
President (ibid.), he can equally claim white parentage from his mother. Further, from the time of
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his initial 2008 campaign to the present day, rumors spread that Obama was both Muslim and
foreign. He was alleged to be a secret Muslim (Layman et al 2014). This misinformation is easily
disproven, as Obama attends Christian religious services and identifies with the Christian faith.
Another controversy of the 2008 campaign directly challenges the notion that President Obama
is a Muslim: his association with Reverend Jeremiah Wright of the Trinity United Christian
Church of Chicago (McKenzie 2011). The Birther movement, championed by Donald Trump,
subsequently made other claims that Obama was not born in the United States (Hughley 2012).
These claims, however, do not come from a place of good faith (ibid.). President Obama’s
multiracial heritage, which is the basis for these conspiracy theories, are presumed to be
frightening to whites and were embraced by conservatives (Hughley 2012; Layman et al 2014).
This is a key element of constructing the alleged enemy – defining who is a terrorist and
building support for political agendas such as a “Muslim ban” around this conception of
terrorism as Muslim violence. It is beneficial for social elites to have a foreign enemy on which
to focus the US public’s attention. If we do not have foreigners to blame for our problems, then
the public may become conscious of and we might have to fix the issues of structural inequality
that we have domestically or face up to the failed foreign policies we have pursued since World
War II.

The racialization of Muslims is central to understanding both Islamophobia and the
contemporary populist politics that make use of xenophobic, nativist, and white supremacist
ideas. Islamophobia plays on historical constructs of Orientalism (Skenderovic and Späti 2019).
Islamophobia in Western societies is racial in nature (Constadine 2017; Dunn, Klocker, and
Salabay 2007; Garner and Selod 2015; Taras 2013). Like others, I have found that anti-Muslim
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rhetoric plays on negative stereotypes of Islam (Dunn, Klocker, and Salabay 2007), particularly
by constructing a narrative of a Muslim terrorist threat. In some ways, this iteration of racialized
anti-foreign sentiment is complex, due to the diversity of Muslims in the real world. Muslim
immigrants come from many different continents with many different skin colors (Dunn,
Klocker, and Salabay 2007; Galonnier 2015; Moosavi 2015; Selod 2015). In others, it is
deceptively simple. Despite the findings here and in other research that this is not necessarily
based on skin color, the racialization of Muslims contributes to perceptions that Muslims do not
belong in the US. The racial project of defining Muslims as terrorists draws boundaries around a
social group as not only distinct from others, but as an enemy.

This has implications for integration and assimilation of Muslims into US society. Over time,
many groups not considered “White” in the US were eventually assimilated into dominant
culture, e.g. Irish and Italians. Some even argue this is true of Jews today, who were considered
largely non-white in Europe and the US in the early 20th Century and, who like Muslims, are
associated with a religious affiliation (Hafez 2019; Skenderovic and Späti 2019). It is unclear if
Muslims will be able to integrate and/or assimilate into US society in some manner. Currently,
Muslims are viewed more as a threat than a disadvantaged group and are seen less favorably and
less deserving of legal protections than other religious minorities in the west (Meer and Modood
2009). Numerous studies indicate that Muslims of all skin colors experience discrimination
across Western societies including the US (Galonnier 2015; Herda 2018; Mansson McGinty
2020; Selod 2019), the UK (Moosavi 2015), Canada (Wilkins 2018), Ireland (Carrand Haynes
2015), and Australia (Dunn, Klocker and Salabay 2007).
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Some racialized groups are perceived as un-assimilated and much research argues they are
unable to do so due to specifics of their racialization and oppression, e.g. African Americans
(Massey and Mullan 1984; Massey and Denton 1993). Consequently, Islamophobia and its
accompanying discrimination and violence presents a barrier for Muslims to integrate and
assimilate. Islamophobia has increased in the US and Europe since the 1990’s, especially
following the 9/11 attacks (Nebhan 2017; Skenderovic and Späti 2019) and is still used in
contemporary politics. Some scholars have linked this to increases in the movement of
population groups globally, which prompts reactions from dominant social groups in destination
countries to maintain status (Gans 2017). While this may certainly be the case, I find more
evidence in this dissertation that links Islamophobic attitudes to specific political orientations in
the US, particularly those who favor right-wing authoritarianism (Beck and Plant 2018). The
anti-Muslim/ anti-Immigrant populist movements that gained traction in both Europe and the US
in response to the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis are almost exclusively far-right in orientation
(Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019; Teitelbaum 2019; Vieten and Poynting 2016). These
movements did not simply appear in response to a new refugee crisis but were long-standing
political orientations of right-wing parties that developed throughout the early 21st Century
(Williams 2010). Contemporary anti-immigrant, nativist, and nationalistic populism, of which
Islamophobia is one expression, are rooted in large-scale social changes precipitated by
globalization, deindustrialization, and technological changes of the 21st Century.

Public Fear and Reinforcing Spirals

I argue that fear of terrorism is associated with politicalized media consumption. In chapter 4
I address the public’s fear of a terrorist attack compared with the public’s fear of a mass shooting
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in the Granite State Poll. Both of these interrelated constructs have garnered a great deal of mass
media attention and political debate in recent years. Both are relatively rare in occurrence but
have severe consequences when they do occur. I find that, despite the similarities and overlap in
definitions and measures of “terror attacks” and “mass shootings”, fear of terrorist attacks and
fear of mass shootings is predicted by an individual’s interaction with social institutions such as
political parties and media consumption, even when controlling for characteristics that already
influence fear of criminal victimization. I conclude that, when members of the public report that
they are worried about victimization in a terrorist attack versus a mass shooting, they are
responding to messages about violence communicated via mass media including who a terrorist
is and who a mass shooter is. If the public is simply worried about the violence of these events,
then there should not be a statistically significant difference in who reports fear/worry about
terrorist attacks and mass shootings. In contrast, selective exposure to partisan mass media
sources predicts likelihood of worrying about one or the other, even when controlling for
background characteristics and prior political beliefs. Clearly, the labels of “Terrorist Attack”
and “Mass Shooting” evoke distinct images and ideas separate from the violence that takes place,
and news media is a source of those differences for the general public.

The findings in this dissertation project can be interpreted in the context of criminological
research on the fear of crime victimization. My findings cast doubt on the mainstream
vulnerability hypothesis. In other words, I find limited evidence that fear of violent crime
victimization is the result of perceived inability to resist or defend against violence. For example,
respondents who possessed a gun in the home reported less fear of a mass shooting and yet were
no less worried than others about a terrorist attack. Nevertheless, sex and age are still significant
predictors of fear of violent victimization in most models tested. I do find evidence to reject the
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notion that women’s expressed fear of crime generally is a fear of sexual assault specifically
(Franklin and Franklin 2009 make a similar claim). Neither do I find support for the social
learning perspective of a gendered fear of crime (Rader and Haynes 2011), or evidence to
support the overestimation hypothesis (Callanan and Teasdale 2009; Snedker 2012). In other
words, because female respondents were more fearful of terrorist attacks than mass shootings, I
do not think that their fears can be explained by legitimated fears, gender socialization, nor
statistical overestimation. My results are much more consistent with other studies of the fear of
terrorism (see Brück and Müller 2010; Nellis 2009; Nellis and Savage 2012), although I find
additional influence of political orientation and selective media exposure. These findings suggest
a need for further research testing fear of victimization theories.

Additionally, I find a confounding relationship between age and fear of victimization. Older
respondents were more likely to report being worried about a terrorist attack than younger
respondents, although this is not always statistically significant. When examining fear of
victimization in a mass shooting, I find that younger respondents are significantly and
consistently more worried than older respondents. This suggests that individuals are evaluating
their risk of victimization not in relation to their ability to resist, but in their proximity to
perceived targets or to be targets. Woods et al (2008) similarly found that individuals who lived
closer to presumed terrorist “targets” were more fearful of victimization in a terrorist attack.
Again, additional research into perceptions of violent victimization vulnerability among age
groups is prudent in light of these findings.

I also examined the role of gun ownership on fear of violent victimization. My analysis
suggests that gun ownership is not simply a protective factor for violent victimization, but a
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reflection of deeply held social and political beliefs. Individuals who own a firearm are not
simply attempting to defend themselves against victimization as some suggest (see Strobe,
Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Turchan, Zeoli, and Kwiatkowski 2017; Warner and Thrash
2020) or deter violent victimization as others assert (see Holbert, Shah, and Kwak 2004). Instead,
I find evidence that gun culture in the United States influences people’s views about violent
crime, particularly mass violence events. For example, in the GSP analysis I find that gun owners
are not significantly different from non-gun owners in their worry about a terrorist attack;
however, gun owners are significantly less worried about a mass shooting. If protection and
deterrence were the primary mechanisms by which gun owners evaluate their risk of
victimization, this disparity would be unlikely. I find support for the hypotheses that gun owners
base their opinions on mass shootings on political beliefs (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2017)
because mass shootings are often followed by politicians talking about gun control policies
(Lawrence and Birkland 2004; Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017; Schildkraut and Elsass
2016; Vizzard 2015). Additionally, this is further supported when we consider that individuals
who own guns frequently own multiple firearms and are more likely to be involved in
organization that promote gun rights (Stroebe, Leander, and Kruglanski 2017). The predictability
of gun ownership and fear is a reflection of the unique gun culture and politics in the US.

Relatedly, I find additional support for my hypothesis that fear of terrorism is linked to social
identities as well as anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment in the GSP analysis, particularly
when examining the effects of religious attendance and political leanings. There is frequently a
link between one’s political leanings and religious affiliation (Risen and Ksiazkiewicz 2015),
however I find independent effects of religiosity and politics in my analyses. In particular, semifrequent and very-frequent religious attendees are more worried about a terrorist attack than non-
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religious respondents, however they are not more likely to worry about a mass shooting. Again,
this demonstrates that these respondents are not just concerned about the violence, after all
religious centers have been targets of mass shootings as well as terrorist attacks. Rather, this is
reflective of a worldview that is antagonistic with Muslims and Islam and leans on traditionalist
views of the US as a white-Christian dominant society (Gorski 2017). This should not be too
surprising when we consider that other research found that Muslims are the least trusted group
by highly religious Americans, and considered the definitive outsider group (Hinze, Mencken,
and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012).
Further, religiosity can limit individuals’ ability to acquire and process some types of
political information, particularly when it contradicts their closely held beliefs (Gaskins 2019).
This may partly explain why a terrorist attack, which is associated with Islam, invokes more fear
among religious respondents than a mass shooting. I find support for studies which have also
shown bias against Muslims in US public attitudes (see Blackman 2018; Hinze, Mencken, and
Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012; Thomas 2004), and among certain mainline and fundamentalist
Christian sects in the US (Hinze, Mencken, and Tolbert 2011; Jung 2012). This is particularly
pronounced among conservative Christians in the US (Yancy, Eisenstein, and Burge 2017), who
may feel a greater status threat from other religious groups, especially when they are seen as
foreign. While increased contact with out-groups is typically associated with reductions in
antagonistic feelings, the opposite may be true in the case of US conservative Christians and
evangelicals who are were more likely to have low levels of respect for Islam (Jung 2012; Pevey
and McKenzie 2009). This is consistent with my other findings that conclude that people with
conservative ideologies and institutions are more likely to express fear of terrorism and,
therefore, Muslims.
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This is especially true of their selection in media. In my analysis of Granite State Poll data, I
find support for the reinforcing spirals model (Slater 2007, 2015) in that listeners to conservative
talk radio are more likely to worry about a terrorist attack than others, even when controlling for
background characteristics and prior political beliefs. Conversely, NHPR listeners are more
likely to worry about a mass shooting than a terrorist attack, although this was also the case in
viewers of non-partisan local TV news. Further, while NHPR listeners skew toward liberal
political orientation, their news coverage is decidedly non-partisan. While some previous
research believes the reinforcing spirals effects to be symmetric, i.e. affecting conservative and
liberals similarly, I do not argue this point. Even though not all conservative talk radio host share
the same outlook (Mort 2012), I find evidence that supports the perspective that conservatives
are more prone to media reinforcing spirals (see McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011,
Wicks et al 2014). Just prior to the Fall 2017 GSP, a mass shooting in Las Vegas, NV occurred
and dominated news media sources during the survey collection period. It is reasonable to
presume that much of the worry about mass shootings reported by WMUR viewers and NHPR
listeners is reflective of this single event. These findings also support research that asserts
conservative media pushes individuals further from reality than liberal preferred media such as
NHPR. For example, conservative media sources frequently contradict scientific research and
influence individuals’ perceptions on critical issues such as climate change and public health (see
Bolin and Hamilton 2018). This demonstrates that the effects of the propaganda machine are
targeted at a particular group of people: conservative and conservative leaning voters.

Conservative party discipline and authoritarian tendencies make the propaganda effect more
pronounced. This makes sense when we consider public opinion data that shows that liberals
trust a wider range of sources than conservatives, with the notable exception of FOX News
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(Jurkowitz, Mitchell, Shearer, and Walker 2020). Conservatives conversely trust FOX News and
a limited range of conservative media much more than sources to which liberals listen (ibid.).
The effect of reinforcing spirals does appear to be stronger on conservatives based on my
findings and other related studies (McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al
2014). Therefore, the effect of the reinforcing spiral is not symmetrical and not equivalent,
despite the evidence that “both sides” engage in the politics of fear.

The political and social ramifications of the fear of terrorism in the US have been much more
damaging than the fear of mass shootings, in so much as these are framed as separate issues in
the news media. This study also demonstrates that the social construction of terrorism as a
foreign, Muslim threat is not simply a top-down phenomenon where media dictates what the
public think, rather it is something that involves active participation of media consumers. The
type of media consumed may be chosen based on the audiences’ attitudes and beliefs while also
reinforcing and amplifying their viewpoints.

Broader Implications and Policy Recommendations
This dissertation primarily deals with the issues of fear, violence, and racialization in the 21st
Century by studying media effects, and contributes to theories of Agenda Setting, Framing, and
Reinforcing Spirals. A wealth of research into both societal and individual perceptions of risk
has found that there is often a disconnect in terms of our perceptions of risk and the risks that we
actually face (Woods et al 2008). Issues such as diseases, vaccines, natural disasters, car
accidents, climate change, and other threats to our well-being may be attributed far greater or far
less probability of inflicting harm than is actually the case. The general public often lacks
information about topics, or even rejects evidence that opposes with their core beliefs (Nickerson
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1998). In some cases, experts are distrusted by segments of the public. This has been
demonstrated in research about public trust in the science of vaccines and climate change (e.g.
Bolin and Hamilton 2018; Hamilton et al 2015). Public perceptions of crime rates and prevalence
of violent offenses are also frequently out of line with what official statistics reflect, terrorism
and mass shootings being misunderstood in a similar vein. The average person is not very adept
at assessing risk, particularly when it comes to these types of high-impact, low-probability events
(Woods 2007). When our views are out of sync with regard to a whole host of phenomena, the
consequences can be disastrous when enhanced and operating at the societal level.

Notably, I find quantitative confirmation of the theoretical and qualitative work in David
Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear (2006, 2017). Throughout my dissertation, I find
that media, politics, and fear play a significant role in the construction of Muslims as terrorists.
In this conclusion chapter, I discuss how this is used for the political and economic gain of
societal elites. It is important to note that the politics of fear is not new, nor is it unique to
terrorism. Evidence in this dissertation points to a politics of fear around mass shootings and gun
violence as well. However, these are not equivalent as the politics of fear around terrorism have
much greater and more damaging consequences. These include the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
controversial legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act, and the scapegoating of minority
populations in the US and Europe.

Taken together, my research links the fear of terrorism among individuals in the public more
directly to the propaganda and institutional biases that have used and exacerbated these
xenophobic tendencies in American society. Racial tensions have been a fact of American life
since the founding of the nation, and newer immigrant groups often bear the brunt of hostility
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from the dominant majority. In the case of US Muslims, the fear of a threat to dominant
American culture posed by these non-white foreigners is leveraged and exacerbated by powerful
social actors. Not only has this detrimentally affected a vulnerable minority population in the US,
the proliferation of fear around immigrants and Muslims have had far-reaching consequences to
national security and global stability.

As of the writing of this dissertation, the efforts by the United States to combat terrorist
organizations in response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of 2001 – the bulk of
which have been focused on the Afghanistan and Iraq wars – is now in its’ 18th year, with few
results to show for it. Although President Obama announced an “end” to Operation Enduring
Freedom in 2014, the US Government’s official name for the War on Terror, the conflict
continues to this day and US forces still operate in multiple theaters in the Middle East. Some US
Troops are now fighting in a war that started before they were born – a first in American history.
Nearly two decades on, the consequences of the War on Terror are disastrous for both the United
States and the world.

Of the objectives outlined by President Bush during the launching of the War on Terror, the
only real success is the elimination of many high-ranking members of al Qaeda. The most
notable is the killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs in 2011. The original al Qaeda
organization was destroyed. However, the Taliban still operate in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
many al Qaeda affiliates in the Middle East and Africa have since grown in strength, and the
brutal Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL, arose out of the wars in Iraq and Syria.

In fact, the US failed to achieve most of its objectives and exacerbated many of the
underlying conditions that terrorist organizations seek to exploit. The conflicts in Afghanistan
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and Iraq have directly resulted in the deaths of thousands of US Troops, caused millions of
civilian casualties, and cost trillions of taxpayer dollars (Watson Institute for International and
Public Affairs 2020). Countless others bear the physical and psychological scars of these
conflicts and will for the rest of their lives (ibid.). To this day, the mission is ill-defined, with no
clear enemy, and no end in sight (Coll 2018). The extreme violence of ISIL – which was formed
as a direct result of US action in Iraq – triggered the world’s largest refugee crisis since the
Second World War (Stern and Berger 2015). This contributed to the destabilization of the
European Union, the rise of reactionary far-right groups across Western democracies, and the
2016 Brexit decision.

The US is not winning the war of ideas either. The controversial policies enacted to combat
terrorist organizations such as the drone warfare program, extraordinary rendition of terror
suspects, indefinite detention of enemy combatants, and torture of prisoners squandered much of
the international goodwill the US cultivated after the Cold War. This, combined with antiMuslim rhetoric from politicians, provides a treasure trove of propaganda for anti-US
organizations seeking to recruit disaffected young people (Stern and Berger 2015). Military force
alone cannot defeat extremist ideologies.

Domestically, the War on Terror is just as problematic. The USA PATRIOT Act allowed for
the development of a surveillance apparatus of Orwellian proportions under the pretense of
protecting US citizens from terrorism. Intelligence and Law Enforcement agencies, in
cooperation with telecom companies, now collect millions of private communications every day.
The War on Terror also furthered the militarization of domestic police forces in the US. The
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Pentagon’s controversial 1033 program directly provides surplus military uniforms, weapons,
equipment, and vehicles to state and local law enforcement agencies throughout the US.

The focus on foreign groups also means that the US has overlooked many domestic
extremists. The FBI estimates that most terrorist attacks in the US are carried out by homegrown
actors (FBI 2005). Criminologists conclude that anti-US terror groups are much more likely to
attack US targets abroad than in the US homeland (LaFree et al 2009). Terrorist attacks in the US
which result in fatalities are predominantly carried out by individuals espousing far-right
ideologies, such as white supremacism, militia affiliation, radical anti-abortion views, and incel
extremism. These domestic threats are largely ignored by the War on Terror and are now boiling
over as our politics become increasingly contentious.

Nearly two decades of costly wars, heated rhetoric, erosion of civil liberties, and
fearmongering have not made the US safer. If anything, we are more vulnerable while the fear of
terrorism is used as a political weapon against vulnerable minorities. In response to ISIL-inspired
attacks in 2015-2016, Donald Trump campaigned on banning Muslims from entering the US to
combat terrorism. During his presidency, he has tried to do exactly that, and continues to vilify
non-white immigrants. Recently, hate crimes targeting minorities, especially individuals
perceived to be Muslim or immigrants have skyrocketed (Levin and Reitel 2018), and white
supremacist groups are a resurgent menace. President Trump’s foreign policies have resulted in
the US becoming increasingly isolated from allies (Yarhi-Milo 2018), haphazardly participating
in existing Middle Eastern conflicts, all while simultaneously courting war with Iran.

The War on Terror is a multi-generational conflict, with no end in sight (Coll 2018). The US
cannot win if there is no clear-cut enemy, objectives are ambiguous, conditions of victory are ill-
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defined, and thoughtful follow through is absent. To truly make the US safer, a policy shift to
address root causes of terrorism is necessary rather than playing whack a mole in Middle East.
The US must act humanely in the pursuit of security, both at home and abroad, or risk creating
more terrorists. Careless foreign military interventions are unsustainable. The erosion of
Americans’ civil liberties is intolerable. The current administration’s words and actions against
Muslims, treatment of immigrants, and stoking of racial conflict are unacceptable and antithetical
to American values. The US government’s inaction in the face of growing domestic extremist
violence is inexcusable. The distraction from arguably greater risks to national security such as
increasing economic inequality and global climate change threatens not just the US, but the
entire world.

Far-right extremist groups pose a clear and present danger to the national security of the
United States. A Department of Homeland Security (2009) report warned about a grown
recruitment effort by far-right extremist groups since the 2007/2008 recession. Yet, the public’s
attention remained focused on radical Islamic extremists in the following decade. News media
consistently underemphasizes the threat posed by far-right domestic extremist groups, while also
contributing to the racist ideologies that they often espouse. This threat posed by far-right
domestic groups and individuals deserves at least equivalent attention to the threat posed by
foreign groups and radical Islamists. Arguably, climate change, inequality, and healthcare are
even greater concerns. Conservative news media is intentionally working to erode public trust in
science on the issues of climate change, vaccinations, and pandemics. These distortions of fact
about terrorism and extremist violence is found in this dissertation, as well as those found by
others researching the acceptance of science around climate change, vaccines, and public health
(see Bolin and Hamilton 2018 for an example) are dangerous, and cost human lives.
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The tension exists between terrorism being framed as a foreign threat, committed by
Muslims, and the academic understanding of terrorism in the US as a more complex and nuanced
phenomenon. By emphasizing terrorism as something that foreigners do, specifically Muslims,
the responses and actions to address the problem will be focused on foreigners. This is perhaps
why terrorism frequently is also discussed alongside issues of immigration, despite official
statistics reflecting that most terrorist threats in the US are primarily linked to domestic or
homegrown actors. The members of the public who accept this interpretation of terrorism and its
response want to blame foreigners for the problems that the US faces today, and for the anomic
state that they are experiencing. Not only this, these individuals interpret the societal changes as
a threat to their status, as evidenced by the heightened fear of terrorist attacks by individuals who
belong to some traditionally dominant social groups.

At the same time, social elites seek to maintain and enhance their wealth and power. For
many of these elites, evil foreigners are a convenient scapegoat. Often times, societal elites have
overemphasized and even invented alleged threats to which they conveniently have the only
viable solution. This occurs even when these solutions contradict academic research, official
statistics, or do not logically fit the available evidence. For example, elites have cited a terrorist
attack, such as the 2015 San Bernardino attack as a reason to restrict immigration from Muslim
countries despite the fact that the attack was carried out by US citizens. Similarly, elites
proposed the notion that Saddam Hussein had WMDs and ties to Al Qaeda and the only way to
remedy the situation was to depose him were two claims by the Bush administration used to
justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These were based on falsified intelligence and have never
proven to be factual to this day. Several politicians have claimed that Latin American immigrants
are dangerous criminals, which has been thoroughly debunked by criminological research
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(Barranco and Shihadeh 2015, Barranco et al 2018, Feldmeyer et al 2015, Feldmeyer et al 2018,
Ferraro 2016, Harris and Feldmeyer 2013, Light 2017, Light and Miller 2018, Ousey and Kubrin
2009, Reid et al 2005, Vaughn and Salas-Wright 2018; Wadsworth 2010; also see Ousey and
Kubrin 2018 for a review), and that the only solution is to build a costly and ineffective wall. We
must ask why supposedly rational human beings would support a position that all available
evidence suggests will be ineffective (Massey et al 2016). These strategies are useful for societal
elites because a proportion of the US public already believes that these premises are true. It
deflects attention away from domestic problems, or the reality of the alleged problems.

In a world that faces a multitude of risks (Beck 1992), it is important that we, as a society and
a species, appropriately prioritize risks and how we will address them. In practical terms, as a
global society this includes the need to prioritize what is important both objectively, as actual
threats to well-being, and subjectively in terms of what kind of lives we want to live. Arguably,
the biggest two threats are healthcare and climate change in an objective sense when it comes to
our survival and, therefore, to most any subjectively lived good life. As we have seen in the
current COVID-19 crisis, one “little” virus can cripple the world without even impacting the
physical resources that are available to us in a major way. The ever-growing threat of global
climate change adds in an impact on resources that could potentially unravel civilization as we
know it.

Nevertheless, extremist violence has very real consequences and must be taken seriously.
One clear application of these analyses from an implications and policy standpoint is that, both
as individuals and as a society, we tend to over-emphasize the threats presented by some
individuals or groups and under-emphasize those presented by others. Since the attacks of
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September 11, 2001, counterterrorism has been made a top priority of the US government. This
has involved a massive allocation of resources to combat what is perceived as a dire threat to
national security. Even looking past racially discriminatory processes that may be at work,
protecting public safety effectively may require a better alignment between how we frame the
terrorism phenomenon and the risks that we actually face. In other words, if terrorism is a unique
threat and type of mass violence that we deem worthy of targeted policies and enhanced
resources, then “getting it right” is especially important. The entities charged with protecting the
US homeland must consider a wide range of threats, and taking domestic groups seriously is as
important as the focus on international terrorism. On a positive note, there has been a recent
acknowledgement within parts of the Federal government agencies that the threat posed by white
supremacist and other far right groups pose a threat to national security on par with Islamic
radicals (for example, see the Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act of 2019)9.

Terrorism is a complex problem with no easy solutions. Counterterrorism is especially
difficult to get right and must be done thoughtfully or risk creating more terrorists. Research
shows that poorly managed counterterrorism policies that result in social exclusion,
discrimination, and hate crime victimization could foster negative emotions and end up creating
more terrorists in the long run (see Agnew 2010). It is reasonable to hypothesize that
discrimination, both experienced and perceived, may further alienate individuals who already
face the challenges of integrating into a society. By focusing on the racial characteristics and
religious motivations of terrorist offenders, we ignore the historical and systemic root causes of
extremist violence. More attention to these forces is needed outside of academia.

9

For more information on this proposed legislation visit https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s894/BILLS116s894is.xml
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In the digital era, media consumers have not rationally taken in multiple opinions to weigh
evidence when given access to the wealth of human knowledge. Nor has the average person
become more educated about the social issues of the day. The alleged openness and freedom of
the internet are an illusion when large companies such as Google, Microsoft, Apple, Amazon,
Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter control a disproportionate amount of information that the average
internet user encounters on a daily basis. The websites these companies operate censor content
that appears in people’s news feeds and search results to fit the messages they want to portray.
Conversely, they frequently allow misinformation to spread with little in the way of verification
of information or fact checking (Iosifidis and Nicoli 2020). Although the “fake news” moniker
that arose out of the 2016 election is frequently misused, it is nevertheless a real issue when
insidious actors such as Vladimir Putin are so easily able to stoke discord in Western
democracies (Moretto Ribeiro and Ortellado 2018; Tandoc, Jenkins, and Craft 2019).

The mass media landscape is fundamentally different from what it was thirty years ago.
While on the face of it, consumers have a greater wealth of media sources to choose from, they
are controlled by a small number of multinational media conglomerates such as Disney, News
Corp, and Comcast. In the US today, ninety percent of television and film media is currently
controlled by only six companies (Lutz 2012). This enormous shift in homogenization due to
changes in the structure and laws of mass media can be directly linked to telecom deregulation in
the 1990’s that was allowed by the Telecommunications Act, signed by Bill Clinton in 1996
(McCabe 2016). The subsequent decades of mergers and acquisitions by the largest mass media
companies have led to a news and entertainment media landscape that is increasingly dominated
by a few points of view. Walt Disney alone controlled an estimated 38% of all North American
Box office earnings in 2019 (Coyle 2019). This must be undone. The deregulation of mass media
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and the relaxing of FCC guidelines and rules have allowed monopolies to form and propaganda
to masquerade as news.
Today’s media landscape is one of extreme compartmentalization where news sources that
support and confirm previously held beliefs are preferred over those that challenge beliefs, a
phenomenon especially present in the conservative media environment (Jurkowitz 2020;
McCright 2011, McCright and Dunlap 2011, Wicks et al 2014). The channels of information in
the digital age have become more restrictive rather than more open. This has been mirrored in
traditional news media with the growth of partisan news outlets (Jones 2002; Mayer 2004).
Conservative news outlets such as FOX News are mouthpieces for billionaires such as Rupert
Murdoch, owner of the massive News Corp media conglomerate. Conservative talk radio shows
are barely disguised propaganda, whose hosts such as Rush Limbaugh and Sean Hannity
regularly stir controversy and partisanship (Conway, Grabe and Grieves 2004). In 2020, even
these traditional news media sources contribute to the spread of biased or outright false
information.

The politics of fear are not new, and it is unlikely to go away, although it may be directed at
new targets in the future. So, what is next and what can be done? Clearly, traditional mass media
still exerts a significant influence on the public in the digital era. However, with the growing
influence of digital media, and use of social media as a primary news source, more research is
needed. The 2016 Presidential election exposed the pitfalls and perils of the contemporary mass
media structures. The “fake news” problem, and the degree to which it exists and impacts us, are
still heavily debated. Regardless, this demonstrates two things: 1. misinformation can be spread
through populations more easily than ever before; and 2. even the most open-minded and

194

educated person can be impacted by media bubbles. Societal elites will continue to leverage
social fear for their own gain, and their efforts can now bypass traditional media filters entirely.

In this dissertation I have demonstrated, as have others, that what we are worried about as a
society is influenced by what mass media are telling us. The way we prioritize problems and
issues is partly based on the information that is coming from these sources. When examining
trends over the long term because perception of what is and is not the most important problem
changes over time, this demonstrates a myopic view of social issues. The public tends to focus
on the immediate and readily apparent concerns and not long-term causes and consequences of
social issues. As a society, it is apparent that we have a fairly short attention span for issues that
are rooted in structural conditions, such as terrorism or inequality or the economy or healthcare
or immigration. None of those things are easy to fix in a short time but we jump from one to the
other at a fairly rapid pace.

This is also concerning as I and others have demonstrated that the information and opinions
presented in mass media is often not the reality that is reflected in official statistics or rigorous
scientific research. Additionally, I like others, find that not all media outlets are created equally,
and some are more guilty of distorting the public’s views than others. The damage of this
myopic, often inaccurate, and increasingly partisan media landscape is readily apparent when we
examine the current state of domestic and global politics. The divisions and inequalities we face
as a society are not a reflection of a natural state of the world or moral order. They are created by
actors who seek to grow their own power and wealth at the expense of the common good. The
politics of fear is very intentionally used to obfuscate societal elites’ goals and redirect attention
from social problems to a grab-bag of scapegoats.

195

The good news is that we do not have to buy into it. As consumers of mass media, critical
media analysis, i.e. evaluating the validity, accuracy, and reliability of the media we consume, is
more important than ever. Making good choices about where we get our news is critical as well.
Beyond what we as individuals can do to address misinformation, structural solutions can
address these problems before individuals need to take action. We, as a nation and a species, face
a turning point in history when we can still avert total disaster. This requires collective action.
Strong democratic institutions are an essential safeguard against the moral panics around
racialized mass violence. Additionally, re-regulation of mass media, including internet media,
and a reversal of nearly thirty years of failed telecommunications policy can help restore a true
diversity of perspective and restrict the proliferation of false information.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 (MIP). Timeline of Major Terrorist/Mass Violence Events Impacting the US
1995-2016
Date
19 April
24 April
03 April
24 April
15 June
27 July
30 October
07 August
15 August
19 October
17 February
20 April
12 October
21 May
11 June
11 September
26 October
October
Oct.-Nov.

Year
1995
1995
1996
1996
1996
1996
1996
1998
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001
2001

Event
Oklahoma City Bombing
Final Unabomber Attack
Ted Kaczynski Arrested
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Signed
IRA Manchester Bombing
Centennial Olympic Park Bombing
ELF Arson of Oakridge Ranger Station
East African US Embassy Bombings
Omagh Bombing RIRA
ELF Arson of Vail Ski Resort
Israeli Consulate Attack by Kurdish Rebels
Columbine Mass Shooting
USS Cole Bombing
ELF Arson of University of Washington
Timothy McVeigh Executed
Al Qaeda Attacks on WTC and Pentagon
USA PATRIOT Act Signed into Law
US Invades Afghanistan
Anthrax Mail Attacks

22 December

2001

Attempted Shoe Bombing (American Airlines)

04 July
October
23 October
25 November
March
11 March
28 June
01 September
07 July
December
03 March
29 June
17 October
16 April
12 June
27 July

2002
2002
2002
2002
2003
2004
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
2006
2006
2007
2008
2008
2009
2009
2009

El Al Israeli Airlines Shooting
Beltway Sniper Attacks
Moscow Theater Siege
Homeland Security Act signed into Law
US Invades Iraq
Al Qaeda Madrid Train Bombings
Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld decided (GITMO)
Beslan School Siege
Al Qaeda London Bombings
13 ELF Members Arrested
Vehicular Attack at UNC
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decided (GITMO)
Military Commissions Act of 2006 signed into Law
Virginia Tech Shooting
Boumediene v. Bush decided (GITMO)
Unitarian Church Shooting
Attempted NYC Subway Bombing
Military Recruitment Center Shooting
National Holocaust Museum Memorial Shooting

01 June
10 June

Location
Oklahoma City, OK
Sacramento, CA
Lincoln, MT
Manchester, UK
Atlanta, GA
Oakridge, OR
Kenya/Tanzania
Northern Ireland, UK
Vail, CO
Germany
Littleton, CO
Yemen
Seattle, WA
Terra Haute, IN
NY/VA/PA

NY, D.C., FL, NV,
CT
Paris, FR/Boston,
MA
Los Angeles, CA
D.C., MD, VA
Russia

Spain
Russia
UK
Chapel Hill, NC

Blacksburg, VA
Knoxville, TN
New York, NY
Little Rock, AK
Washington, D.C.
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05 November
25 December
18 February
04 March
01 May
01 September
Oct./Nov.
November
06/07 January
January
08 January
17 January
15 March
02 May
22 July
18 December
31 December
01 January
20 July
05 August
11 September
February
15 April
19 April
June
01 November
12 April

2009
2009
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2012
2012
2012
2012
2013
2013
2013
2013
2013
2014

FT Hood Shooting
Attempted Underwear Bombing
IRS Airplane Attack
Pentagon Shooting
Attempted Times Square Bombing
Discovery Communications Hostage Taking
Series of Shootings Against US Military Buildings
WikiLeaks Begins Releasing US Diplomatic Cables
Mail Bombs Sent to MD Gov., US SoT, US SHS
Arab Spring Protests begin in Middle East/North Africa
Shooting of US Rep. Gabrielle Giffords and Others
Attempted Bombing of MLK March
Syrian Civil War Begins
Osama Bin Laden Killed in US Raid
Utoya/Oslo Norway Attacks (Anders Brevik)
US Troops Withdraw from Iraq
NDAA Authorizes Indefinite Detention of Terror Suspects
NYC Anti-Muslim Incendiary Attacks
Aurora Theater Shooting
Sikh Temple Shooting
Benghazi US Diplomatic Compound Attack
Christopher Dorner Attacks and Standoff
Boston Marathon Bombing
Tsarnaev Brothers Shootout and Apprehension
Edward Snowden NSA Surveillance Leaks
LAX TSA Shooting
Bundy Armed Standoff

13 April
April-June
23 May
24 May
June
06 June
08 June
15 June
07 August
September
11 September
12 September
22 October
23 October
20 December
07 January
03 May
17 June
16 July
23 July
August

2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2014
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015
2015

Jewish Community Center Attack
Ali Muhammed Brown Shootings
UCSB Incel Attacks
ISIL Jewish Museum of Brussels Attack
Interest in ISIL Begins on Google Trends
Forsyth County Courthouse Attack
Las Vegas Wal-Mart Attack
US Assessment, Advising, and Surveillance of ISIL begins
President Obama orders airstrikes against ISIL
US Allies begin airstrikes against ISIL
US Rep. Cleaver Offices Attack
PA State Trooper Barracks Attack
Canadian Parliament Attack
NYC Hatchet Attack
NYC Police Shooting
Charlie Hebdo Shooting
Curtis Culwell Center Attack
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church Shooting
Military Recruitment/Support Center Attacks
“Trainwreck” Theater Shooting
Interest in Syrian Refugee Crisis begins on Google Trends

Killeen, TX
Detroit, MI
Austin, TX
Arlington, VA
New York, NY
Silver Spring, MD
VA
MD, D.C.
Tucson, AZ
Spokane, WA
Pakistan
Norway

New York, NY
Aurora, CO
Oak Creek, WI
Libya
CA
Boston, MA
MA
Los Angeles, CA
Near Bunkerville,
NV
Overland Park, KS
WA, NJ
Isla Vista, CA
Belgium
Cumming, GA
Las Vegas, NV
Iraq
Iraq
Iraq
Kansas City, MO
Blooming Grove, PA
Ottawa, ON Canada
New York, NY
New York, NY
Paris, France
Garland, TX
Charleston, SC
Chattanooga, TN
Lafayette, LA
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01 October
04 November
13 November
23 November
27 November

2015
2015
2015
2015
2015

Umpqua Community College Incel Attack
UC Merced Knife Attacks
ISIL Paris Attacks
BLM Rally Attack
Planned Parenthood Attack

02 December
07 December
02 Jan.- 11
Feb.
07 January
11 February
22 March
12 June
07 July
07 July
14 July
17 July
16 September
17/18 Sept.
08 November
28 November
19 December
27 January

2015
2015
2016

San Bernardino Attack
Candidate Trump calls for Muslim Travel Ban
Occupation of Malheur National Wildlife Refuge

2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2016
2017

Philadelphia Police Shooting
Columbus Machete Attack
ISIL Brussels Bombings
Pulse Nightclub Attack
TN Police Shooting
Dallas Police Shooting
Nice Truck Attack
Baton Rouge Police Shooting
Philadelphia Police Shooting
NY/NJ Bombings
Donald Trump elected President
OSU Vehicle Attack
Berlin Christmas Market Attack
President Trump Signs Executive Order 13769

Roseburg, OR
Merced, CA
France
Minneapolis, MN
Colorado Springs,
CO
San Bernardino, CA
Princeton, OR
Philadelphia, PA
Columbus, OH
Belgium
Orlando, FL
Bristol, TN
Dallas, TX
France
Baton Rouge, LA
Philadelphia, PA
NY/NJ
Columbus, OH
Germany
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Appendix 2 (MCA). List of Suspects Sampled from Global Terrorism Database
SUSPECT NAME

RACE/ETHN. SEX NATIONALITY

YEAR

ABDUL RAZAK ALI ARTAN
ABDULHAKIM
MUHAMMAD
AHMAD AJAJ
AHMAD KHAN RAHAMI
ALI MUHAMMAD BROWN
AMANDA MILLER
BENJAMIN NATHANIEL
SMITH
BRUCE IVINS
BUFORD O'NEAL FURROW
JR.
CHARLES BISHOP
DAHIR AHMED ADAN
DENNIS MARX
DYLANN ROOF
DZHOKHAR TSARNAEV
EDWARD ARCHER
ELTON SIMPSON
ERIC FREIN
ERIC RUDOLPH
FAISAL MOHAMMAD
FLOYD CORKINS
FRAZIER GLENN CROSS
[MILLER]
GAVIN LONG
HESHAM MOHAMED
HADAYET
ISMAAIYL BRINSLEY
JAMES CHARLES KOPP
JAMES LEE
JAMES W. VON BRUNN
JERAD MILLER
JIM DAVID ADKISSON
JOHN PATRICK BEDELL
JOHN RAYNE RIVELLO
JOHN RUSSELL HOUSER
JOHN SALVI III
JOSEPH STACK
JUSTIN NOJAN SULLIVAN
LARRY MCQUILLIAMS
LUKE HELDER

B
B

M
M

Somalia
US

2016
2009

MENA
MENA
B
W
W

M
M
M
F
M

Palestine
Afghanistan (Naturalized)
US
US
US

1993
2016
2014
2014
1999

W
W

M
M

US
US

2001
1999

W
B
W
W
W
B
B
W
W
MENA
B
W

M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

US
Somalia (Naturalized)
US
US
Russia (Naturalized)
US
US
US
US
US
US
US

2002
2016
2014
2015
2013
2016
2015
2014
1996
2015
2012
2014

B
MENA

M
M

US
Egypt

2016
2002

B
W
Asian
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W
W

M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US
US

2014
1998
2010
2009
2014
2008
2010
2016
2015
1994
2010
2014
2014
2002
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MAHMUD ABOUHALIMA
MATTHEW WILLIAMS
MICAH XAVIER JOHNSON
MIR AIMAL KANSI
MOHAMED BARRY
MOHAMMAD SALAMEH
MOHAMMAD YOUSSUF
ABDULAZEEZ
MOHAMMED REZA
TAHERI-AZAR
NADIR SOOFI
NAVEED AFZAL HAQ
NIDAL AYYAD
NIDAL MALIK HASAN
OMAR MATEEN
PAUL CIANCIA
RACHELLE SHANNON
RAMZI YOUSEF
ROBERT LEWIS DEAR
RUSSELL WESTON
SCOTT ROEDER
SYED RIZWAN FAROOK
TAMERLAN TSARNAEV
TASHFEEN MALIK
TED KACZYNSKI
TIMOTHY MCVEIGH
TYLER WILLIAMS
UMAR FAROUK
ABDULMUTALLAB
WADE MICHAEL PAGE
WASIL FAROOQUI
ZALE THOMPSON

MENA
W
B
MENA
B
MENA
MENA

M
M
M
M
M
M
M

Egypt
US
US
Pakistan
Guinea
Palestine
Kuwait (Naturalized)

1993
1999
2016
1993
2016
1993
2015

MENA

M

Iran (Naturalized)

2006

MENA
MENA
MENA
MENA
MENA
W
W
MENA
W
W
W
MENA
W
MENA
W
W
W
B

M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M

US
US
Kuwait
US
US
US
US
Kuwait
US
US
US
US
Russia (Naturalized)
Pakistan (Naturalized)
US
US
US
Nigeria

2015
2006
1993
2009
2016
2013
1992
1993
2015
1998
2009
2015
2013
2015
1993
1995
1999
2009

W
MENA
B

M
M
M

US
US
US

2012
2016
2014
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Appendix 3. Media Content analyses with Alternate Measures of Religion and Race
TABLE A.1. PREDICTORS OF USE OF TERROR FRAME IN BROADCAST NEWS TRANSCRIPTS:
MIXED-EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH A RANDOM INTERCEPT – ODDS RATIOS
REPORTED (FOUR CATEGORY RACE/MUSLIM VARIABLE)
Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
Coefficient
Std. Err.
ABOUT
2.62
1.35
0.96
0.52
YEAR
1.07*
0.03
0.07*
0.03
EXPERT GUEST
6.58***
2.52
1.89***
0.38
NUM. KILLED
1.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
WEAPON USED
FIREARM OTHER WEAPON 4.31**
1.33
1.46**
0.47
RELIGION AND
RACE
NOT-MUSLIM MUSLIM/WHITE 6.86
7.28
1.93
1.06
MUSLIM/BLACK 16.95***
13.03
2.83***
MUSLIM/MENA 9.39***
5.74
2.24***
0.47
PLACE OF BIRTH
US BORN FOREIGN BORN 1.14
0.69
0.13
0.60
CONS.
1.02
6.39*
-135.84
62.97
GROUP-LEVEL
RANDOM EFFECT
Estimate
Std. Err.
RANDOM
0.88
0.27
INTERCEPT
LR TEST VS FIXED
p=0.0059
EFFECTS
N = 312
Groups = 57
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001
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,
TABLE A.2. PREDICTORS OF USE OF TERROR FRAME IN BROADCAST NEWS TRANSCRIPTS:
MIXED-EFFECTS LOGISTIC REGRESSION WITH A RANDOM INTERCEPT – ODDS RATIOS
REPORTED (THREE CATEGORY MENA/RI VARIABLE)
Odds Ratio
Std. Err.
Coefficient
Std. Err.
ABOUT
2.53
1.30
0.93
0.51
YEAR
1.06
0.03
0.06
0.03
EXPERT GUEST
6.61***
2.54
1.89***
0.38
NUM. KILLED
1.03
0.02
1.09
0.02
WEAPON USED
FIREARM OTHER WEAPON 2.97*
1.33
1.09*
0.45
IDEOLOGY AND
RACE
NOT-RI/NOT-MENA RI/NOT-MENA 20.72***
12.95
3.03***
0.62
RI AND MENA 10.83***
6.13
2.38***
0.57
PLACE OF BIRTH
US BORN FOREIGN BORN 1.14
0.62
0.13
0.54
CONS.
1.77
1.05
-114.56
59.09
GROUP-LEVEL
RANDOM EFFECT
Estimate
Std. Err.
RANDOM
0.71
0.27
INTERCEPT
LR TEST VS FIXED
p=0.032
EFFECTS
N = 312
Groups = 57
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001

The mediation effect of race/ethnicity by ideology may be the result of previous measures
not properly accounting for the overlap found in Table A.1. Therefore, I created a new three
category variable from the crosstabulation in Table A.1 to more accurately assess the effects on
suspects’ race/ethnicity and ideology on use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts.
The three-category variable is coded as: 1 = Not-Radical Islam/Not-MENA (N = 162); 2 =
Radical Islam/Not-MENA (N = 72); 3 = Radical Islam/MENA (N = 78). This variable then
replaces the old race/ethnicity and ideology measures. Both MENA and not-MENA categories
which are associated with radical Islam are compared to cases which are not associated with
either radical Islam or MENA suspects. In addition, the weapon used measure was simplified to
reflect cases where the incident involved primarily firearms (coded 1, N = 192), and other
weapons (coded 0, N = 120). Again, a mixed-effects logistic regression with a random intercept
is used to estimate the effect of suspect’s characteristics on the use of the terror frame while
controlling for characteristics of the incident and characteristics of the transcripts/cases. Table 4
details the results of this analysis, reporting both odds ratios and coefficients.
The mixed-effects logistic regression with a random intercept reported in Table A.2
assesses the effect of the suspects’ association with radical Islamic ideologies, MENA
race/ethnicity, and place of birth on use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts. The
regression also includes whether the transcript is about the incident, the year in which the
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incident took place, the number of people killed in the incident and the weapon used in the
incident as control variables, and a group-level random effect on the incident id number from the
GTD (coef. = 0.71, p=0.032).
Whether the transcript was about the incident or not, the year in which the incident took
place and the number of people killed in the incident are all not statistically significant predictors
of use of the terrorism frame in broadcast news transcripts. The appearance of an expert guest
increases the odds of transcripts using the terrorism frame by 561% (multiplied by 6.61, p<.001)
compared with transcripts that did not feature an expert guest. Additionally, the type of weapon
used was a significant predictor of use of the terrorism frame. Incidents which involved weapons
other than firearms (multiplied by 2.97, p<.05) were more likely to be called terrorism than
incidents which primarily involved firearms. As for suspect characteristics, the newly created
three category race/ethnicity/ideology variable does significantly predict use of the terrorism
frame. Compared to cases where the suspect was not associated with radical Islam or of MENA
race/ethnicity, cases involving individuals associated with radical Islam, both not-MENA and of
MENA race/ethnicity, were more likely to be discussed in the terrorism frame. Specifically,
when cases involve suspects who are associated with radical Islam but not-MENA, the odds of
the terror frame being used in transcripts increased by about 1972% (multiplied by 20.72,
p<.001) when compared to cases involving not-radical Islam not-MENA suspects. When cases
involve suspects who are both associated with radical Islam and of MENA race/ethnicity, this
increases the odds that news transcripts will use the terrorism frame by about 983% (multiplied
by 10.83, p<.001) compared with suspects who are not associated with radical Islam. Place of
birth, however, was not a significant predictor. This finding provides strong evidence for an
interaction effect between ideological affiliation and race/ethnicity when broadcast news
organizations discuss mass violence. Essentially, even when accounting for association with
radical Islamic ideologies, suspects who are or appear to be Middle Eastern are still more likely
to be discussed as “terrorists” in news media. Interestingly, the odds of non-Middle Eastern
suspects associated with Radical Islam being framed as “terrorists” is even higher. Figure 7
below visually charts the finding in Table 4.
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Figure A.1 Predictive Margins for Use of Terrorism Frame by Suspect Race/Ethnicity and
Ideology, with 95% Confidence Intervals – Three Category Measure

This analysis does not, however fit as well as Model 4 in table A.2, as the group-level
random effects are again statistically significant, meaning that factors outside the variables
included influence variation between one incident and another. Taken together, it appears that
the models presented in Table 2 are a better representation of bias in broadcast news coverage of
terrorism suspects.
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Appendix 4. Granite State Poll Questions
Questions Submitted by for Dissertation Research
05 October 2017
Question with two versions (assigned randomly to half sample):
Version 1: “How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a mass
shooting?”
Version 2: “How worried are you that you or someone you know will become a victim of a
terrorist attack?”
Answers (flip order randomly):
“Very worried”; “Somewhat worried”; “Not too worried”; “Not worried at all”
Questions Typically Included in GSP
D1
“Now, a few final questions ...”
“Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?”

*

1
2
3
4
5
6

MARRIED (INCLUDE COMMON LAW MARRIAGE & SPOUSE AWAY IN MILITARY)
WIDOWED
DIVORCED
SEPARATED
NEVER MARRIED (INCLUDING ANNULMENTS)
LIVING TOGETHER NOT MARRIED (VOLUNTEERED)

99

NA / REFUSED

D2
“Are you or any other person in your household a member of a labor union?”

*

1
2

YES
NO

98
99

DK (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED

VET
“Are you or any person in your household a member or veteran of the armed forces?”

*

1
2

YES
NO

98
99

DK (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED
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GUNOWN
"Do you or does anyone in your house own a gun?"

*

1
2

YES
NO

98
99

DK (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED

D3
“What is the highest grade in school, or level of education that you’ve completed and got credit for ...” [READ
RESPONSES]

*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

“Eighth grade or less,
Some high school,
High school graduate, (INCLUDES G.E.D.)
Technical school,
Some college,
College graduate,
Or postgraduate work?”

98
99

DK (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED

NEWS2
"Do you subscribe to or regularly read ..."
(READ LIST AND CHECK ALL SAY YES TO)
1
2
3
4

The Union Leader or the New Hampshire Sunday News?”
The Boston Globe?”
A local daily newspaper, such as the Concord Monitor or the Nashua Telegraph?”
NONE OF THE ABOVE

NEWS3
"How often, if ever, do you watch WMUR, Channel 9 News? Would you say everyday ... several times a week ...
occasionally or never?"
1
2
3
4

EVERYDAY
SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK
OCCASIONALLY
NEVER

98
99

DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
NA/REFUSED

NEWS4
"How often, if ever, do you listen to New Hampshire Public Radio? Would you say ... everyday ... several times a
week ... occasionally or never?"
1
2

EVERYDAY
SEVERAL TIMES A WEEK
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3
4

OCCASIONALLY
NEVER

98
99

DON'T KNOW/NOT SURE
NA/REFUSED

D4
“GENERALLY SPEAKING, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or
what?”
(IF REPUBLICAN): “Would you call yourself a STRONG Republican or a NOT VERY STRONG Republican?”
(IF DEMOCRAT): “Would you call yourself a STRONG Democrat or a NOT VERY STRONG Democrat?”
(IF INDEPENDENT, NO PREFERENCE, OR OTHER): “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or
to the Democratic party?”

*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

STRONG DEMOCRAT
NOT VERY STRONG DEMOCRAT
INDEPENDENT, BUT CLOSER TO DEMOCRATS
INDEPENDENT--CLOSER TO NEITHER
INDEPENDENT, BUT CLOSER TO REPUBLICANS
NOT VERY STRONG REPUBLICAN
STRONG REPUBLICAN
OTHER PARTY

99

DK / NA / REFUSED

TPARTY
"Overall would you say you support the political movement known as the Tea Party, you oppose the Tea Party, or
that you neither support nor oppose it?"
IF NEITHER / DK: "Would you say you lean towards supporting or opposing the Tea Party movement?"

*

1
2
3
4
5

SUPPORT TEA PARTY
LEAN - SUPPORT
NEITHER SUPPORT OR OPPOSE
LEAN - OPPOSE
OPPOSE TEA PARTY

98
99

DK / NOT SURE
NA / REFUSED

VOTE16
“Think back to the election for President in 2016. Did you vote for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Gary Johnson,
Jill Stein, someone else, or did you skip that election?

*

1
2
3
4
5

DONALD TRUMP - REPUBLICAN
HILLARY CLINTON - DEMOCRAT
GARY JOHNSON – LIBERTARIAN
JILL STEIN – GREEN
OTHER

97

DID NOT VOTE

98
99

DK / NOT SURE
NA / REFUSED
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D5
“We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. What about yourself--that is, in politics, do you
generally think of yourself as a liberal, a moderate, or a conservative?”
(IF LIBERAL): “Would you say you are EXTREMELY liberal, FAIRLY liberal, or just SOMEWHAT liberal?”
(IF CONSERVATIVE): “Would you say you are EXTREMELY conservative, FAIRLY conservative, or just
SOMEWHAT conservative?”
(IF MODERATE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD): “Would you say that you LEAN a little more toward the LIBERAL
side or the CONSERVATIVE side?”

*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

EXTREMELY LIBERAL
FAIRLY LIBERAL
SOMEWHAT LIBERAL
MODERATE--LEANS LIBERAL
MODERATE--LEANS NEITHER
MODERATE--LEANS CONSERVATIVE
SOMEWHAT CONSERVATIVE
FAIRLY CONSERVATIVE
EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE

97
98
99

REFUSED
DK (PROBE: “In general . . .”)
NA / REFUSED

D6
"On another topic ... What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no
religion?"

*

1
2
3
4
5

PROTESTANT
CATHOLIC
JEWISH
NONE, NO RELIGION
OTHER (SPECIFY)

97
98
99

REFUSED
DON'T KNOW / NOT SURE
NA / REFUSED

D7
"How often do you attend religious services apart from occasional weddings, baptisms, or funerals ... more than
once a week ... once week ... once or twice a month ... a few times a year ... or never?"

*

1
2
3
4
5

MORE THAN ONCE A WEEK
ONCE A WEEK
ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH
A FEW TIMES A YEAR
NEVER

98
99

DK (DO NOT PROBE)
NA
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ABORT
“Which of the following statements BEST represents your position on abortion ... abortions should be legal in ALL
circumstances ... abortion should be legal in limited circumstances, such as in cases of rape or incest or when the
mother’s life is in danger ... or, abortion should not be legal in ANY circumstance?” (ROTATE ANSWER
OPTIONS)
1
2
3
98
99

LEGAL IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
LEGAL IN LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCES
NOT LEGAL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE
DK/NOT SURE (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED

*
D8
“And what is your current age?”

___ ___
:
::
: (RECORD EXACT NUMBER OF YEARS OLD -- E.G., 45)
:
::
:

*

96
97
98
99

NINETY-SIX YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER
REFUSED
DK
NA

D9
“How many years have you lived in the State of New Hampshire?”
IF “ALL MY LIFE” ASK – “About how many years is that?”
RECORD EXACT NUMBER OF YEARS OF RESIDENCE
1

*

96
97
98
99

ONE YEAR OR LESS
96 YEARS OF MORE
REFUSED
DK
NA

MVFROM
"Have you always lived in New Hampshire or did you move here from another state?"
IF MOVED HERE ASK: "What state did you move here from?"
ENTER STATE NUMBER
95 ALWAYS LIVED IN NH → SKIPTO D10
96 CANADA
97 OTHER COUNTRY

*

98 DON'T KNOW
99 REFUSED

MVTONH1
"What year did you move to New Hampshire?"
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ENTER LAST TWO DIGITS OF YEAR RESPONDENT SAYS.
EXAMPLE: 1965 ENTER "65"
EXAMPLE 2004 ENTER "04"

*

998
999

DON'T KNOW
NA/REFUSED

D10
“How many of the persons who CURRENTLY live in your household are under 18 years of age, including babies
and small children?”

*

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN OR MORE

98
99

DK
NA / REFUSED

D11
“Including yourself, how many adults CURRENTLY live in your household?”

*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN OR MORE

98
99

DK
NA / REFUSED

EMPLOY
"Which of the following best describes your current employment status ... Are you currently ...
READ RESPONSES. IF R GIVES 2 RESPONSES, ENTER LOWER NUMBER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Employed full-time,
Employed part-time,
Self-employed,
Retired and not working,
Unemployed and looking for work,
Homemaker,
Disabled, or a
Student?"
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*

98
99

DK / NOT SURE (DO NOT PROBE)
NA / REFUSED

D14
“Not counting business lines, extension phones, or cellular phones -- on how many different telephone NUMBERS
can your household be reached?”

*

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NO LANDLINE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN OR MORE

98
99

DK
NA / REFUSED

D15
“And on how many different cellphone NUMBERS can your household be reached?”

*

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

NO CELL PHONE
ONE
TWO
THREE
FOUR
FIVE
SIX
SEVEN OR MORE

98
99

DK
NA / REFUSED

D16
“How much TOTAL income did you and your family receive in 2015, not just from wages or salaries but from ALL
sources -- that is, before taxes and other deductions were made? Was it ... (READ CATEGORIES)
ANNUAL
MONTHLY EQUIVALENT
1
Less than $15,000,
LESS THAN $1,250
2
$15,000 - $29,999,
$1,250 - $2,499
3
$30,000 - $44,999,
$2,500 - $3,749
4
$45,000 - $59,999,
$3,750 - $4,999
5
$60,000 - $74,999,
$5,000 - $6,249
6
$75,000 - $99,999, or
$6,250 - $8,333
7
$100,000 and over?”
$8,334 AND OVER

*

97
98
99

REFUSED
DK
NA
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Appendix 5 (GSP) – Ancillary Analyses
Ancillary analyses were also conducted examining further interaction by sex and age group.
Effects examined in Table 2 are present for female respondents when asked about fear of a mass
shooting. But not males, orrespondents asked about a terrorist attack.
Table A.3. Analyses by Sex
VARIABLE
GROUP
UNDER 40
GUN OWNER
RELIG.
ATTEND.
VOTED IN 2016
TRUMP
CLINTON
OTHER
WMUR NEWS
NHPR
CONS. TALK
RADIO
CONSTANT

TERROR ATTACK
Male
Female
0.67(0.41)
2.76(1.58)+
1.37(0.73)
1.44(0.71)
1.44(0.38)+
1.17(0.31)

MASS SHOOTING
Male
Female
2.20(1.22)+
3.25(1.77)*
0.88(0.49)
0.31(0.16)*
0.94(0.19)
0.79(0.17)

0.67(0.46)
0.54(0.39)
1.12(0.25)
0.86(0.25)
1.49(0.42)+

1.39(1.04)
1.67(1.17)
1.27(0.31)
1.42(0.34)+
1.30(0.37)

0.56(0.38)
0.67(0.49)
1.08(0.23)
0.93(0.23)
1.59(0.63)

0.07(0.07)**
0.44(0.58)
0.04(0.06)*
N = 131
N = 114
N = 115
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 ONE-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS

4.02(2.95)*
1.79(1.45)
1.59(0.33)*
1.49(0.32)*
0.59(0.19)+
0.13(0.18)+
N = 141
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Interestingly, media effects observed in Table 2 are still persent in this analysis – but only in the
older cohort. This could be because younger respondents simply do not use traditional media
sources tested in this analysis, instead relying on social media or similar sources for their news.
Table A.4 Analyses by Age Group
VARIABLE
GROUP
SEX
GUN OWNER
RELIG.
ATTEND.
VOTED IN 2016
TRUMP
CLINTON
OTHER
WMUR NEWS
NHPR
CONS. TALK
RADIO
CONSTANT

TERROR ATTACK
Under 40
Over 40
55.46(55.60)***
4.64(1.99)***
2.68(2.08)
1.19(0.51)
1.10(0.49)
1.33(0.26)

0.19(0.22)
0.35(0.36)
0.99(0.32)
0.70(0.30)
1.45(0.63)

0.74(0.42)
0.76(0.46)
1.17(0.21)
1.02(0.20)
1.61(0.46)*

MASS SHOOTING
Under 40
Over 40
2.07(1.33)
1.49(0.65)
0.75(0.44)
0.42(0.18)*
1.26(0.35)
0.69(0.12)*

2.87(2.44)
1.42(1.35)
1.07(0.35)
1.10(0.30)
1.26(0.58)

0.12(0.14)*
0.04(0.05)**
0.13(0.21)
N = 62
N = 183
N = 67
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 ONE-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS

2.29(1.31)
1.35(0.81)
1.43(0.27)*
1.52(0.27)*
0.83(0.23)
0.14(0.17)*
N = 189
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Table 8. Analyses By Political Party
TABLE A.5LOGISTIC REGRESSION COMPARING FEAR OF TERROR ATTACK TO FEAR OF MASS
SHOOTING ON DEMOGRAPHICS, LIFESTYLE, POLITICAL CANDIDATE SUPPORT, AND MASS MEDIA
CONSUMPTION BY POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION (SURVEY WEIGHTED, ODDS RATIOS
REPORTED)
Democrat – OR(SE)
Independent/NA – OR(SE)
Republican – OR(SE)
VARIABLE
Terrorist
Mass
Terrorist
Mass
Terrorist
Mass
Attack
Shooting
Attack
Shooting
Attack
Shooting
SEX
MALE
FEMALE 12.50(8.53)** 4.14(2.10)**
29.66(31.73)* 2.53(1.93)
5.54(6.62)
0.56(0.40)
*
*
AGE RANGE
18-34
35-49 0.37(0.36)
0.22(0.18)+
0.33(0.33)
0.10(0.12)*
0.20(0.26)
3.57(4.50)
50-64 1.38(1.05)
0.17(0.12)*
0.26(0.32)
0.16(0.15)+
0.83(0.72)
0.97(0.95)
65+ 0.32(0.28)
0.17(0.12)**
0.18(0.39)
0.04(0.05)*
0.32(0.40)
0.37(0.44)
NA/REF. 0.65(0.77)
0.33(0.50)
0.03(0.03)**
0.41(0.58)
GUN(S) IN HH
NO/NA/REF.
YES 1.15(0.72)
0.66(0.34)
0.24(0.22)
0.05(0.05)**
5.35(4.74)+
0.60(0.50)
RELIG.
ATTEND.
NEVER/DK/N
A
FEW 1.99(1.36)
1.20(0.82)
1.52(1.34)
0.03(0.03)*** 8.13(6.58)*
0.12(0.17)
TIMES/YR.
1-2 0.26(0.35)
0.22(0.20)
2.11(3.39)
2.69(3.43)
2.15(2.26)
1.19(1.52)
TIMES/MO.
WEEKLY+ 2.35(2.30)
0.72(0.49)
7.17(11.05)
0.09(0.10)*
2.91(2.67)
3.75(3.56)
MEDIA
EFFECTS
WMUR (TV) 0.96(0.27)
1.13(0.27)
2.27(0.93)*
3.56(1.92)*
0.58(0.20)
1.38(0.12)
NHPR 0.68(0.19)
1.72(0.38)*
0.83(0.37)
1.46(0.69)
0.96(0.33)
1.38(0.49)
(RADIO)
CTR (RADIO) 8.14(0.04)+
1.48(0.54)
1.14(0.05)
0.05(0.05)**
2.12(0.85)+
1.35(0.50)
CONSTANT
0.03(0.04)*
0.20(0.25)
0.03(0.05)*
15.83(28.84)
0.10(0.16)
0.04(0.06)*
N = 102
N = 118
N = 69
N = 70
N = 74
N = 63
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001, +P<.10 TWO-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS
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Table A.6 The Effect of Fear of Terrorism and Fear of Mass Shootings on Voting for
Trump in the 2016 Election
FIGURE X. VOTING FOR DONALD TRUMP IN 2016 ELECTION
Fear of Terror Attack
Fear of Mass Shooting
VARIABLE
OR
SE
OR
SE
POLITICAL PARTY
DEMOCRAT
INDEPENDENT 18.66**
18.58
4.60*
3.38
REPUBLICAN 74.48***
80.57
50.38***
36.68
NA 6.51
8.21
5.64+
5.55
SEX
FEMALE
MALE 3.68*
2.12
0.41
0.23
AGE RANGE
18-34
35-49 1.65
1.36
3.97+
2.82
50-64 5.97+
5.85
2.92
2.13
65+ 1.47
1.28
3.26
2.67
NA/REF. 0.77
1.03
0.54
0.55
GUN OWNERSHIP
NO/NA/REF.
GUN OWNER 1.04
0.55
8.20***
4.85
FREQ. RELIG.
1.58*
0.35
1.99**
0.45
ATTD.
MEDIA USE
WMUR 0.85
0.20
0.92
0.18
NHPR 0.56*
0.14
0.69
0.16
CTR 3.11***
1.01
3.91***
1.15
HOW WORRIED?
NOT AT ALL
WORRIED
NOT TOO WORRIED 3.78+
3.02
0.53
0.33
SOMEWHAT 4.95*
3.61
0.32+
0.20
WORRIED
VERY WORRIED 3.03
2.94
0.18
0.21
CONSTANT
0.00***
0.00
0.00***
0.21
N = 245
N = 256
NOTE: *P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001, +P<.10 TWO-TAILED HYPOTHESIS TESTS

